In January 2006, Palestinian legislative elections, held under pressure from the U.S., were won by Hamas – a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. In response, the U.S. and the international community adopted policies designed to force Hamas to radically change its positions and behavior or to give Palestinian voters the incentive to oust Hamas from power. These policies, including a virtual blockade of the Gaza Strip, led to a dramatic deterioration in the health and welfare of Gaza’s civilian population.

During this same period, the world also witnessed an increase in the firing of rockets and mortar rounds from Gaza into Israel, where they have sown destruction, fear, and death. The firing of rockets and mortars from Gaza into Israel is unacceptable, as is the use of tunnels to smuggle weapons into Gaza. Israel has the right to protect its citizens from such attacks and threats.

The Gaza war that broke out at the end of 2008 underscored the volatility and complexity of the situation in Gaza. Israel has learned through painful experience that military force alone cannot eliminate threats: while the IDF can achieve short-term tactical gains in Gaza, it cannot destroy popular support for Hamas, stop all rockets from falling, or force the release of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Indeed, military escalation risks playing into the hands of extremists.

Moreover, it is clear today that the effort to pressure Hamas through boycotts and blockade has failed to oust that group from power or force it to moderate its behavior and rhetoric. Instead, it has contributed to creating a desperate humanitarian situation in Gaza – even before the recent Gaza war – that led to harsh criticism of Israel throughout the world. Given both the failure of this strategy to achieve its goals and its highly problematic consequences, continuing such a strategy in hopes of a different result does not make sense.

For its part, Hamas’ unconscionable strategy of sending rockets into Israel has failed to win the group international legitimacy or to force an end to the siege of Gaza. While Hamas will no doubt seek to portray any end to the siege as a victory, ultimately it will be the people of Gaza, whose lives have been devastated by the siege and by the Gaza war, who will deliver a verdict on whether this “victory” has been worth the steep price Hamas’ policies forced them to pay.

Finally, while most of the world would prefer to see more pragmatic Palestinian political forces take root in Gaza, it must be the Palestinians – not Israel or the international community – who choose their leaders. To the extent that the U.S., Israel, and the international community are truly committed to aiding and strengthening Palestinian moderates, it is time to at last empower these moderates with the political and economic resources and diplomatic dividends that, by demonstrating such moderates’ relevance and effectiveness, can help them earn the support of their constituents.

APN believes that the U.S. should adopt a serious, far-sighted policy toward Hamas. This must include working to halt violence in the short term and prevent its re-emergence in the future, and improving the humanitarian situation. Most important, the U.S. must work to establish a meaningful political process. Even the most durable, sustainable interim arrangements cannot substitute for negotiations to deal with the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the absence of a credible effort to reach a long-term solution that meets the needs and aspirations of both sides, extremists will inevitably draw popular support and will invariably resort, once again, to violence.

A new, serious policy toward Hamas need not, necessarily, mean engaging Hamas directly. Indeed, the U.S. should redouble support for moderate Palestinian leaders with whom it and Israel have been working for many years. At the same time, the U.S. should recognize that a Palestinian government with the legitimacy and capacity to enforce its will in terms of security and governance – one that is seen as representing all Palestinians – is vital to the achievement and implementation of any future peace agreement.

Bearing this in mind, the U.S. should encourage and support efforts to promote Palestinian reconciliation, including the possibility of forming a national unity government. And the U.S. should make clear that relations with any Palestinian government – including a unity government – will be determined based on the positions and actions of that government and the national security interests of the U.S., not on the basis of whether Hamas is included in it.