Earlier this month, APN's Board of Directors adopted principles to guide our approach on the issue of the Palestinians and efforts for international and UN recognition. These principles underlie my recent op-ed on the topic published on ForeignPolicy.com, and will be the basis of forthcoming APN statements and commentary on the topic.
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A great deal of attention is focused today on September 2011, when it is expected that the UN will take up some kind of initiative related to the Palestinians. Both the form and the content of such an initiative remain unknown and in all likelihood are in fact still undecided - realities that have not stopped pundits and organizations from rushing to judgment and staking out hard-line positions opposing the effort.
APN believes that this is an unwise and irresponsible response. We believe a more responsible approach - an approach that has some chance of averting a crisis in September - must derive from the following basic principles.
A great deal of attention is focused today on September 2011, when it is expected that the UN will take up some kind of initiative related to the Palestinians. Both the form and the content of such an initiative remain unknown and in all likelihood are in fact still undecided - realities that have not stopped pundits and organizations from rushing to judgment and staking out hard-line positions opposing the effort.
APN believes that this is an unwise and irresponsible response. We believe a more responsible approach - an approach that has some chance of averting a crisis in September - must derive from the following basic principles.
Principle 1: UN action cannot resolve the conflict. Negotiations can.
UN action regarding Palestine - be it a resolution calling on member states to recognize a state of Palestine, admission of Palestine into the UN General Assembly, or adoption of explicit UN-backed peace parameters - is not and cannot be an alternative to a negotiated settlement. UN action on Palestine will not end the occupation. Likewise, the issues of borders, refugees, security and Jerusalem will not be resolved by UN action. These issues will only be resolved through negotiations that involve both Israel and the Palestinians - something that the Palestinian leadership itself has recognized even in the context of this effort.
Principle 2: The Palestinians have the right to take their case to the UN.
Whether people like it or not, and whether they feel it is a good idea or not, it is the Palestinians' right to seek recognition of a state of Palestine, even under Israeli occupation. This applies both to seeking recognition from specific countries or some sort of broader recognition at the UN. Likewise, it is legitimate for the Palestinians to approach the UN with some other initiative, be it a request for admission to the UN General Assembly or an effort to have the UN adopt explicit Israeli-Palestinian peace parameters (for example, an "updated" version of Resolution 181 or 242).
Principle 3: The Palestinians' resort to the UN does not reflect a rejection of the negotiations process; it reflects the failure of that process.
The decision of the Palestinians to take their case to the UN reflects, first and foremost, the loss of credibility of the current peace process and their understandable conviction that as things stand today, negotiations will never end the occupation or deliver statehood. Palestinian leaders, like leaders anywhere, need to address the concerns of their people and provide them a tangible path forward. Their decision to take their case to the UN also reflects the recognition that the situation is nearing a tipping point - the point at which developments on the ground in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, in particular expansion of settlements and settlement-related infrastructure, will make the two-state solution unworkable.
Principle 4: The Palestinians' UN strategy is positive in a number of important senses (that have been largely overlooked).
The decision to appeal to the UN demonstrates, critically, the Palestinian leadership's determination to achieve progress through non-violent means. Likewise, while the content of a Palestinian initiative at the UN is still unknown, it appears likely that it will be consistent with a continued Palestinian commitment to the two-state solution, seeking recognition of a state based on the 1967 lines, not in all of historic Palestine. Similarly, it appears likely that this effort will demonstrate the Palestinians' commitment to a permanent status agreement that is consistent with longstanding U.S. positions, including parameters laid out by President Obama and his predecessors, as well as with the Arab Peace Initiative and the more recent Israeli Peace Initiative.
Principle 5: The Palestinians' decision to go to the UN entails very real risks for all sides.
The Palestinian strategy of taking their case to the international community and the UN is intended, without question, to put pressure on Israel - and it is doing so. Israeli concerns that in the wake of UN action, Israel could potentially be subjected to sanctions and multilateral enforcement mechanisms, are not unreasonable. At the same time, this strategy holds risks, too, for the Palestinians. Action at the UN could become a pretext for Israel to accelerate actions on the ground, particularly with respect to settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which could hasten the demise of the two-state solution. There is also the risk, in the wake of such action by the UN, of stepped-up pressure for sanctions and other punishment against the Palestinians (by the U.S., Israel, and others).
Moreover, this effort risks unintentionally strengthening rejectionists on both sides - Palestinians and Israelis alike, who oppose peace negotiations and a two-state solution and who would welcome confrontation and violence as a means of closing the door to both.
Principle 6: The U.S. should act boldly to transform the current challenge into an opportunity to advance peace.
The appropriate response by those concerned with the Palestinians' strategy of taking their case to the UN is not simply castigating the Palestinians and demanding they desist, but, rather, working urgently to give the Palestinians a real reason not to do so. In this regard, the Palestinians need real reason to change course, not a transparent pretext that, rather than seriously advancing peace, merely defuses an immediate crisis. Absent such a reason, support for a Palestinian initiative at the UN can be expected to gain momentum, and the Palestinians will have a difficult time backing off their UN strategy, even if they want to.
What is required today is bold U.S. action. This means, for example, a serious initiative to re-accredit peace efforts and launch a meaningful process that can deliver tangible and quick results, or a U.S.-backed initiative to transform the proposed UN action on Palestine into something broader and far more significant - for example, a resolution at the Security Council embracing key peace parameters.
Principle 7: The US and Israel, for their own interests, should be working to avoid a confrontation at the UN in September.
In opposing UN action on Palestine, in whatever form it may take, Israel will find itself in an awkward position, given that it was the UN that gave birth to Israel after Israel's founders went to that body with their own demand for recognition. Similarly, the U.S. will find itself in a painfully awkward position, forced to choose between opposing a resolution that could well be consistent with U.S. policy, or being portrayed in some circles as having abandoned Israel. This is a situation that the U.S. should work assiduously to avoid. Moreover, opposing UN action on Palestine will only exacerbate the growing U.S. and Israeli isolation on this issue, and further undermine the chances of achieving peace and security for Israel.
Principle 8: If a Palestine-related initiative is ultimately brought to the UN in September, that initiative must be considered on its merits.
If the U.S. fails to provide the Palestinians a positive alternative to their UN strategy, it is seems inevitable that the Palestinians will go ahead with an initiative of their own at the UN in September.
In such a case, their initiative must be judged on its merits, and both the context and the content of the resolution matter. Once we know the nature of the action and the language of the resolution itself, we must ask: were the Palestinians offered any reasonable, serious way forward in the wake of Netanyahu's hard-line speech in Washington in May 2011, or were they offered merely more of the same "trust us and wait" while settlements continued to expand? We must also ask: is this initiative consistent with longstanding U.S. policy regarding permanent status issues, or does it stake out new ground that conflicts with U.S. policy and is inconsistent with a negotiated agreement that will resolve the actual details of permanent status? Support for or opposition to such a resolution should be based on the answers to these questions, not on a predetermined, dogmatic rejection of any action by the UN on this issue.
UN action regarding Palestine - be it a resolution calling on member states to recognize a state of Palestine, admission of Palestine into the UN General Assembly, or adoption of explicit UN-backed peace parameters - is not and cannot be an alternative to a negotiated settlement. UN action on Palestine will not end the occupation. Likewise, the issues of borders, refugees, security and Jerusalem will not be resolved by UN action. These issues will only be resolved through negotiations that involve both Israel and the Palestinians - something that the Palestinian leadership itself has recognized even in the context of this effort.
Principle 2: The Palestinians have the right to take their case to the UN.
Whether people like it or not, and whether they feel it is a good idea or not, it is the Palestinians' right to seek recognition of a state of Palestine, even under Israeli occupation. This applies both to seeking recognition from specific countries or some sort of broader recognition at the UN. Likewise, it is legitimate for the Palestinians to approach the UN with some other initiative, be it a request for admission to the UN General Assembly or an effort to have the UN adopt explicit Israeli-Palestinian peace parameters (for example, an "updated" version of Resolution 181 or 242).
Principle 3: The Palestinians' resort to the UN does not reflect a rejection of the negotiations process; it reflects the failure of that process.
The decision of the Palestinians to take their case to the UN reflects, first and foremost, the loss of credibility of the current peace process and their understandable conviction that as things stand today, negotiations will never end the occupation or deliver statehood. Palestinian leaders, like leaders anywhere, need to address the concerns of their people and provide them a tangible path forward. Their decision to take their case to the UN also reflects the recognition that the situation is nearing a tipping point - the point at which developments on the ground in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, in particular expansion of settlements and settlement-related infrastructure, will make the two-state solution unworkable.
Principle 4: The Palestinians' UN strategy is positive in a number of important senses (that have been largely overlooked).
The decision to appeal to the UN demonstrates, critically, the Palestinian leadership's determination to achieve progress through non-violent means. Likewise, while the content of a Palestinian initiative at the UN is still unknown, it appears likely that it will be consistent with a continued Palestinian commitment to the two-state solution, seeking recognition of a state based on the 1967 lines, not in all of historic Palestine. Similarly, it appears likely that this effort will demonstrate the Palestinians' commitment to a permanent status agreement that is consistent with longstanding U.S. positions, including parameters laid out by President Obama and his predecessors, as well as with the Arab Peace Initiative and the more recent Israeli Peace Initiative.
Principle 5: The Palestinians' decision to go to the UN entails very real risks for all sides.
The Palestinian strategy of taking their case to the international community and the UN is intended, without question, to put pressure on Israel - and it is doing so. Israeli concerns that in the wake of UN action, Israel could potentially be subjected to sanctions and multilateral enforcement mechanisms, are not unreasonable. At the same time, this strategy holds risks, too, for the Palestinians. Action at the UN could become a pretext for Israel to accelerate actions on the ground, particularly with respect to settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which could hasten the demise of the two-state solution. There is also the risk, in the wake of such action by the UN, of stepped-up pressure for sanctions and other punishment against the Palestinians (by the U.S., Israel, and others).
Moreover, this effort risks unintentionally strengthening rejectionists on both sides - Palestinians and Israelis alike, who oppose peace negotiations and a two-state solution and who would welcome confrontation and violence as a means of closing the door to both.
Principle 6: The U.S. should act boldly to transform the current challenge into an opportunity to advance peace.
The appropriate response by those concerned with the Palestinians' strategy of taking their case to the UN is not simply castigating the Palestinians and demanding they desist, but, rather, working urgently to give the Palestinians a real reason not to do so. In this regard, the Palestinians need real reason to change course, not a transparent pretext that, rather than seriously advancing peace, merely defuses an immediate crisis. Absent such a reason, support for a Palestinian initiative at the UN can be expected to gain momentum, and the Palestinians will have a difficult time backing off their UN strategy, even if they want to.
What is required today is bold U.S. action. This means, for example, a serious initiative to re-accredit peace efforts and launch a meaningful process that can deliver tangible and quick results, or a U.S.-backed initiative to transform the proposed UN action on Palestine into something broader and far more significant - for example, a resolution at the Security Council embracing key peace parameters.
Principle 7: The US and Israel, for their own interests, should be working to avoid a confrontation at the UN in September.
In opposing UN action on Palestine, in whatever form it may take, Israel will find itself in an awkward position, given that it was the UN that gave birth to Israel after Israel's founders went to that body with their own demand for recognition. Similarly, the U.S. will find itself in a painfully awkward position, forced to choose between opposing a resolution that could well be consistent with U.S. policy, or being portrayed in some circles as having abandoned Israel. This is a situation that the U.S. should work assiduously to avoid. Moreover, opposing UN action on Palestine will only exacerbate the growing U.S. and Israeli isolation on this issue, and further undermine the chances of achieving peace and security for Israel.
Principle 8: If a Palestine-related initiative is ultimately brought to the UN in September, that initiative must be considered on its merits.
If the U.S. fails to provide the Palestinians a positive alternative to their UN strategy, it is seems inevitable that the Palestinians will go ahead with an initiative of their own at the UN in September.
In such a case, their initiative must be judged on its merits, and both the context and the content of the resolution matter. Once we know the nature of the action and the language of the resolution itself, we must ask: were the Palestinians offered any reasonable, serious way forward in the wake of Netanyahu's hard-line speech in Washington in May 2011, or were they offered merely more of the same "trust us and wait" while settlements continued to expand? We must also ask: is this initiative consistent with longstanding U.S. policy regarding permanent status issues, or does it stake out new ground that conflicts with U.S. policy and is inconsistent with a negotiated agreement that will resolve the actual details of permanent status? Support for or opposition to such a resolution should be based on the answers to these questions, not on a predetermined, dogmatic rejection of any action by the UN on this issue.
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What a puzzling bunch of hemming and hawing.
We've been saying that we should have a two state solution for years ( APN and lots of people. )
What do we care if the Palestinians act to create what we've been saying we want them to have and need them to have? We should be upset if they do it without our permission?
I thought we two staters gave our permission a long time ago, and I'm pretty sure that most of us understand that various Israeli governments have had a lot to do with its non-realization. So, more power to them on declaring a state. No? Do we really need 8 principles to define and delimit how they do what we've been saying we want them to do? Really?
Why not just say, "declare a Palestinian State, please. It's what we want you to have. Now let's negotiate some borders and terms." How bad would that be? Seems like it's a step forward to me.
What PR or negotiating problem are these 8 points trying to solve? Is every win for them still a loss for us, and mightn't better tactics (and PR!) be to welcome a Palestinian state declaration as a fulfillment of what we've been calling for for years?
The whole "they can do it as long as they do it our way" tone seems as if we can't actually accept yes for an answer if "yes" is spoken in a slightly different accent or language.
This one is easy. The Belfour Declaration in 1922 approved by the League of Nations and the US congress and senate gave the Jews all the land of Israel. As you know the UN cannot cancel previous treaties. Therefore UN resolution 242 is against the rules of the UN since it goes against the Balfour Decleration. Any PA attempts to circumvent this is an affront to international law. This is against the charter of the UN. It is not politically correct to say that the UN resolution 242 is valid. At least if you guys are going to lie admit it I would respect you more. I guess in your case you have to break a lot of eggs to make your state. These eggs would be going against international law. You people are lawbreakers and don't follow the rule of law. For this reason you people are uneducated and stupid. You ignorance is second to your offensiveness. You people don't have the courage to argue this truth so you choose to ignore it. I dare you to argue this fact. This is the unvarnished truth. It is light and you are darkness. You people are a bunch of erev rav spiteful jewish people with no morals. You add nothing to this world but lies and you know its true.
Hi Shlomo: Your defense of the Balfore Declaration [1922] and other acts of bodies long gone is touching but useless. Everything before modern times may be faith but not current law. A
few of past 'laws' brought us slavery, then Jim Crow. In Germany, the 'Nuremburg law'[revoking
Jewish legal and civil rights] and the 'Wannsee
Konference' [meeting that began The Holocaust and
Showa] are examples of obsolete law now gone...
If Israel and Palestine were both nations with equal rights and influence, the present conflict
might be addressed. Unfortunately, they are not
equally-recognized nations: Israel is a real country [without some boundries] while Palestine is not recognized--or respected. A suitable solution can be agreed--by experts from both sides with help from other UN Members, UN Organizations, and an open-meeting of the conferees around a large, topographic map. The alternate is continued harassment and theft by
Israel--up to the point where Palestine really
fights back...Israel doesn't have enuf troops,
cops, goons, and Goldsteins to kill all Pals and
destroy the very land it craves...Yankee Doodle
and Vietnam 'won' their respective wars thru
guerrilla tactics and motivation...How long does it take for an Israel-based fire engine or MDA
ambulance to divre out to Ariel or to even farther outposts?..Aaron Allen...
I guess the facts are useless to you that's why your a liberal. Are you one of those hopey, changey, flakey people. You avoided the facts as I said you would. Read over the UN by laws. You cannot argue the facts so you must ignore them. By the way the UN also gave Israel all the land. I guess this is useless in your mind as well. If that's the case I definitely don't want to hear about the troubles of the poor philistines. That was in the ancient past. That was 40 years ago. Let's get to the present hahahah. The present is that the UN will have to break it's charter to allow resolution 242. I would not mind seeing this, but it wouldn't be politically correct. I know how much you like the truth and political correctness hahahah. Let's deal with the present and the facts on the ground as you said. There are 600,000 Jews living in Israel where you don't want them to be. That is just tough wait to they reach a milliion people. This will be in 8 years. I know how much you want to kick all people out of their houses especially Jews. Well I don't and this shows the lack of respect for your elders who died in the holocaust. Wait that's the past can't talk about it. You arguments are stupid.
Hi Shlomo: I went back to re-read UNR 242, 338, and 181. Palestine has NOT violated the main principles of 242 by deciding to move the issues to UNHQ in New York. Discussing/arguing the conflict ONLY with Israel, in their venues, on their terms, and with Israel the superior party
sucks!..Wud two Jewish scientists, Rabinical Authorities, gold/gemstone merchants conduct their 'business' [the kind concluded by a sincere
handshake] with ONE of the participants maintaining that ONLY he is RIGHT?..Both Israel and Palestine have growing, younger populations--
many of whom want this 'war' to end...Suppose that Palestine takes its large [pingpong table-
sized] topo map of ALL Israel & Palestine to NYC
and start the exercise [open session with full TV
coverage] by placing a pin between Qazir and Rehan and another just southwest of Qibya: Stretch a string from one to the other--this becomes the boundry between Israel and Pal-North,
and a utility easement with powerlines, fiberoptic comm cable and other non-poluting use.
Another string is stretched [in straightline courses] from Qibya, just north of Rte 443 to a
point just south of Atarot Airport [which goes to
Palestine]. The 'bulge' near Imwas goes to Israel. The formerly-Pal cities of Qalqilya and
Tulkarm move east and become the suburban 'boule-
vard' linear communities explained in the Rand
Corp. Israel can demolish or adapt the cities left--and change their names. All Pal communities
will end at the new Boundries and all minor roads
will be cut off. Only a few jointly-agreed 'Ports
Of Entry' will remain. ALL persons and vehicles
will be checked by THEIR SIDE first--then the other. No weapons or explosives shud get thru.
Israel may keep Rte 5, Ariel and its 2-3 satellite villages--if Israel does NOT impede or
attempt to control the 'boulevard' from the new
Pal City of Rawabi to its station on The ARC...
The ARC [tollroad, 2-track railroad, 2-lane rural
'frontage road' suitable for low speed traffic,
and water/other utilities] will pass Ram Allah/
Jericho, Metro Jewrusalem, Bethlehem, then splits
at Hebron with a branch alongside old Rte 60 to a
point a few km north of the Pal Boundry. The main
line of The Arc follows a straight line just north of 31d/30'N from Hebron to North Gaza. At
about midpoint, there is a Pal State Police Post,
Emergency Services Garage, rest stop, fast food
shop and visitors' center with restrooms, showers, telephones, computer wireless and plug-in services...Rte 1East from Jewrusalem serves
Israeli 'Gated Communities and provides limited
access service to Jordan, over the King Abdullah
Bridge. The intersection with old Rte 90 [N-S] is
broken by an under/overpass...All Israelis and
motorists transiting Israel will use this road
only: Pals and all motorists transiting Palestine will use the King Hussein Bridge, via
Jericho...Using the large topo map, Israel and
Palestine will agree the Boundries of Pal-South
[Judea] and Gaza...Hope you approve of this so
far. Shalom, Aaron Allen...
Hi Lara: After reading ur 'APN Principles on the
Pals, Intl Recognition & the UN' I offer my opin-
ion of them: P-1: UN action cannot resolve; Negot
iations can. Yes--so why can't UN offer 'good of
fices' and encouragement--Pals and Israel 'teams'
will agree terms...P-2: The Pals have the right to take their case to UN: Yes, it is only there
that Israel & Palestine will be considered two
countries--not one and a bunch of untermenchen...
P-3: The Pals' resort to UN is not rejection of
negotiation process--just the failure of it: Yes,
previous attempts were fruitless...P-4: The Pals'
UN strategy is positive in a number of important
senses that have been largely overlooked: Yes,
you are right to bring this up. Another thing possible will be almost unlimited, sincere press
coverage: As the 'underdogs' the Pals will get a
bigger [and hopefully positive] 'audience' from
the UN Members, the US, and people worldwide..The
long advantage held by Israel will be whittled-
down when Pal officials and specialists can really tell their story without Israel's interference and whining...P-5: The Pals trip to
the UN entails very real risks for all sides: No,
I disagree--the Pals will appeal to the UN Member
ship and the world in a manner that emphasizes
'fair play' and 'justice'. Just as the Israelis
cannot 'go back to where they came from', the Pals face a similar case: After 30-40 years in
'DP' camps, hostile 'hosts', most Pals just want
to live in peace and provide for their families.
Once in New York, the Pals can keep an 'official'
presence there and earn many points and much good
will--especially when they say they want to emulate the better parts of the 'American way'!..
P-6: The US shud act boldly to transform the current challenge into an opportunity to advance
peace: Yes, I suppose, but the activity shud seem
to be Pal-initiated and not controlled by or manipulated by the US. We are stuck in the middle
when one considers the heavy influence that US Jews wield--we shud stick to OUR wars, the lousy
economy, helping global disaster victims, etc. We DON'T need guys like Bibi trying to tell our
government what to do...P-7: The US and Israel
shud avoid a confrontation at the UN in Sept: Yes--we shud look like we are only encouraging
Palestine to sell its case to the world--and say
that we have confidence that they will succeed in getting their cause agreed by a majority of the 149 other UN Members and the UN International Organizations and Agencies...P-8:
If the Pal-related initiative is brought to the
UN in Sept, it must be considered on its merits:
Yes--the 'trust us and wait' [while we steal ur
land] must end...If Palestine presents a truly
righteous and sensible case, the US shud back 'em
up...With a truly defined land area, Israel can
quit spending millions on their never-ending task of trouble-making and rable-rousing...
Shalom, Aaron Allen...
PS: Add to Ben's 'real estate' sign: Small top-
sign with his actual phone number, "Call 962-XXX-
XXXX"--maybe his office phone at the Knesset? Shud get a lotta calls?..Add Israel/R [Realtor]
crossed-flags pin to his visible lapel?..Aaron Allen...