Q. As the situation continues to deteriorate in Syria, with potential far-reaching ramifications for Israel, Russia appears to be a critical actor internationally in propping up the Assad regime. Why? How does this affect Russia's relations with Israel and the rest of the Arab world?

A. I recently sat in on an informal discussion between senior Russian foreign policymakers and Arab diplomats, academics and journalists, including one leader of the opposition to Bashar Assad's regime. When the conversation turned to the Arab revolutionary wave, the atmosphere quickly became tense. Russian officials and academics tried to make their case for having vetoed a recent United Nations Security Council resolution calling for Assad's departure, and for continuing to sell arms to his regime. The Arabs--unanimously and from many countries--condemned Moscow for its Syria policy.

This Russian-Arab interaction reflects the way the Middle East affects electoral politics in Russia. It could even influence Moscow's Syria policy in the days ahead.

Both sides cite polling data to back up their case. Russians argue that more than 50 percent of Syrians still support Assad; hence Moscow is actually in tune with Syrian public opinion. The Arabs, without disputing the Russian data--which reflect the large percentage of non-Sunni and non-Muslim minorities in Syria who fear a Sunni takeover, together with those Sunnis who still have a vested interest in the regime--claim, also convincingly, that 95 percent of Arabs throughout the Middle East (i.e., virtually all the Sunnis, though the growing polarization between Arab Sunnis and Shiites/Alawites is rarely mentioned directly in discussions of this nature) seek Assad's downfall.

Assad is a major customer for Soviet arms, which continue to be delivered steadily despite the revolution. He recently rewarded Moscow with docking and refueling privileges for its fleet in Tartus, the only Mediterranean port the Russian navy has access to. Russia seeks, after 20 years, to reestablish a superpower presence in the Middle East. It will be hindered by political Islam, which is taking over Egypt and, in Russian eyes, threatens to "infect" Russia's own Muslim population. Assad's Syria is the ticket.

Additional arguments favoring the Russian position regarding Syria hold, not without some logic, that Russia's goal of reducing conflict in Syria is good for regional stability: Syrian minorities (Alawites, Kurds, Christians, etc.) have the most to fear from the Sunni Islamist wave and look to Russia for support. Then too, the Arab revolutions are described in some quarters as focusing more on good government than democracy--a position the Putin-Medvedev government finds congenial. Even the Syrian opposition understands that too much overt western support for its cause could be detrimental.

Israel, by the way, is somewhat ambiguous about the Russian stance. It is concerned lest the Assad regime be replaced by political Islam, as in Egypt and Tunisia. On the other hand, there are grounds to assess that a Sunni-dominated regime in Syria would expel the Iranians and cut ties with Hezbollah, thereby serving a major Israeli strategic interest. In any case, Israel's wise policy of remaining demonstrably uninvolved in the Syrian revolution precludes it from publicly judging the Russian position one way or another.

In this regard, Syrian revolutionaries are watching Israel closely. A few weeks ago, IDF Chief of Staff Beni Gantz visited Israel's Golan Heights border with Syria and was quoted as announcing that Israel was preparing to absorb Alawites fleeing a collapsing Assad regime. The statement seemed strange: Syria's ruling Alawites, some 12 percent of the population, are centered geographically far from the border with Israel. If they have to flee, it would be to Turkey or northern Lebanon.

In fact, it turns out that Gantz was misquoted and never mentioned Alawites, only refugees in general. But he never bothered to deny the statement. In any case, the reaction of the Syrian opposition is instructive: by "inviting" Alawites to flee, Gantz, they reason, is signaling in Israel's name, in a very sophisticated way that does not embarrass them, that Israel favors the opposition.

One of the key factors behind the tough Russian position on Syria is the Russian presidential elections scheduled to take place in two weeks. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who wants again to be elected president without the need for an embarrassing second-round runoff, is burnishing his tough image on the foreign policy front. This means confronting the United States, something old-guard Russians like, and Syria is the timeliest issue, particularly against the backdrop of Russia's sense of betrayal by the United States at the United Nations: Moscow originally agreed to an air campaign to protect Libyan civilians, not depose Muammar Gaddafi--who was also a client of Russian arms. All of this makes it difficult for Putin to back down and relax his support for Assad in the near term.

Yet the Russians, to their credit, are paying close attention to Arab criticism of their position. Sometime soon, we may encounter a joint Russian-Arab statement that seeks to introduce more balance into Russia's attitude toward Assad.


Q. How do you now assess the state of the revolution in Syria?

A. The key is what goes on inside Syria, not among the revolutionary exile groups and leaders who are jostling for international recognition. Inside the country, hundreds of revolutionary cells made up of young activists have established a network that coordinates opposition activities. They claim that about 50 percent of the country is semi-liberated, meaning Syrian army armored vehicles may enter and patrol on occasion, but they cannot remain.

With the revolution well implanted on the ground, victory over the Assad regime depends on two additional factors. One is the opening of safe havens by the Turks along their border with Syria, to allow opposition forces to regroup and arm. The other--as in the Tunisian, Egyptian and Yemeni revolutions--is the eventual readiness of at least a portion of the armed forces to betray the Assad regime to save Syria from disintegration. The coming months will tell whether either or both of these events take place.

Meanwhile, Iraqi Kurdish leaders claim that all of Syria's fragmented Kurdish community--as many as 14 diverse groups and parties--appears to have lined up against Assad. That might be an exaggeration, but the anti-Assad trend is clear. Syrian revolutionaries are talking of a future Syria where Kurdish areas are autonomous. Iraq's already autonomous Kurds profess to look forward to the possibility that Syrian Kurdistan, with its 2.5 million Kurds and which borders on northern Iraq (and southern Turkey), will provide them with a kind of strategic depth they do not enjoy today.


Q. The Assad regime is broadly considered to be fascistic in nature. Back in Israel, ten days ago a slander trial about local "fascism" commenced. The McCarthyist right-wing organization "Im Tirzu" is suing an Israeli Facebook group that wrote that the organization is fascistic in nature. Fascism in Israel?

The Facebook group, rather than issuing a retraction or apology to dismiss the case, has taken up the challenge and intends to prove to the courts that Im Tirzu qualifies to be called "fascist".

The term "fascist" has in recent decades in Israel become a popular way to condemn anyone, left or right, who does something one doesn't like through some form of compulsion. Thus, the far right-wing Likudnik who recently challenged PM Netanyahu for the party's leadership and garnered 25 percent of the vote, Moshe Feiglin, once alleged that during the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, the state under Ariel Sharon "adopted fascistic characteristics" by forcibly removing settlers.  By the same token, leftists recently complained about a "fascistic initiative of the Knesset to interrogate citizens".  When my kids were in high school, any teacher who was too strict or nasty was quickly crowned a "fascist".

Im Tirzu has led the right-wing campaign in recent years to pillory peace advocates and civil rights NGOs as traitors. It once widely published a photomontage of New Israel Fund head Naomi Chazan, a former Meretz member of Knesset, with horns. The Hebrew for "fund" also means "horn", but the anti-Semitic allusion was blatant.

Now the left has to try to prove that Im Tirzu fits more classic definitions of political fascism. Can it be compared with European pre-WWII fascist movements before they took power? Does it conceive of the nation as an organic body and believe the country is in a state of emergency that justifies a struggle against supposed traitors?

It would be significant if the defendants succeed in persuading the court that the term "fascism" does indeed fit Im Tirzu and, by extension, additional McCarthyist witch-hunt groups as well that have emerged in the last few years.