Alpher discusses what will be on the agenda for the March 5th meeting between Obama and Netanyahu, what the United States could do to stop the slaughter in Syria, what Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad was talking about when he warned publicly that the current "security silence" could collapse at any moment and how seriously we should take him, and what will happen in the aftermath of Israel's high court overturning the Tal law which had regulated a slow trickle of voluntary military service on the part of ultra-orthodox yeshiva students.
Q. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu are scheduled to meet on March 5. Thus far, this has not been a particularly jovial relationship. What's on the agenda this time?
A. The principal agenda item is almost certainly the question of Iran's nuclear program and how to deal with it. A flurry of American emissaries to Jerusalem in recent weeks and months has pressed Israel not to attack Iran without a US "green light", and this is where the Obama-Netanyahu meeting will focus. Netanyahu will want to hear ironclad US assurances that if Israel remains passive, Washington will continue to escalate sanctions and will make certain Iran does not cross the nuclear threshold. The problematic definition of what constitutes that threshold will also be on the agenda. Both leaders (and President Shimon Peres) will put their case to the annual AIPAC convention in the hope of generating political support both electorally (Obama) and regarding Iran.
Two additional and not-unrelated agenda items are likely to be Syria and the Palestinian issue. Netanyahu will point out to Obama that removal of the Assad regime could contribute to weakening Iran even without a preemptive attack by pushing it out of the Levant. He may want to hear whether and how Washington intends to make that happen and whether Assad can be replaced by a less extreme regime. At the same time, he will caution Obama that the chaos surrounding Israel requires extreme caution and readiness on Israel's part.
Obama will undoubtedly encourage Netanyahu to be more forthcoming with the Palestinians by advancing both peace proposals and confidence-building measures. But this item will probably be last on the two leaders' agenda, reflecting the low likelihood of any serious movement toward a two-state solution at a time when the Obama administration is preoccupied with domestic issues, and particularly the November elections.
Apropos those elections, Netanyahu will almost certainly take advantage of his stay in the US to meet with Republican leaders and fundraisers and size up their chances of unseating Obama in November. His assessment on this issue could go a long way toward determining whether he himself initiates elections in Israel this year. If Obama is going to win, Netanyahu would presumably prefer to renew and reinforce his own electoral mandate first, in order better to withstand possible American pressures generated by a second Obama presidential term.
A. The principal agenda item is almost certainly the question of Iran's nuclear program and how to deal with it. A flurry of American emissaries to Jerusalem in recent weeks and months has pressed Israel not to attack Iran without a US "green light", and this is where the Obama-Netanyahu meeting will focus. Netanyahu will want to hear ironclad US assurances that if Israel remains passive, Washington will continue to escalate sanctions and will make certain Iran does not cross the nuclear threshold. The problematic definition of what constitutes that threshold will also be on the agenda. Both leaders (and President Shimon Peres) will put their case to the annual AIPAC convention in the hope of generating political support both electorally (Obama) and regarding Iran.
Two additional and not-unrelated agenda items are likely to be Syria and the Palestinian issue. Netanyahu will point out to Obama that removal of the Assad regime could contribute to weakening Iran even without a preemptive attack by pushing it out of the Levant. He may want to hear whether and how Washington intends to make that happen and whether Assad can be replaced by a less extreme regime. At the same time, he will caution Obama that the chaos surrounding Israel requires extreme caution and readiness on Israel's part.
Obama will undoubtedly encourage Netanyahu to be more forthcoming with the Palestinians by advancing both peace proposals and confidence-building measures. But this item will probably be last on the two leaders' agenda, reflecting the low likelihood of any serious movement toward a two-state solution at a time when the Obama administration is preoccupied with domestic issues, and particularly the November elections.
Apropos those elections, Netanyahu will almost certainly take advantage of his stay in the US to meet with Republican leaders and fundraisers and size up their chances of unseating Obama in November. His assessment on this issue could go a long way toward determining whether he himself initiates elections in Israel this year. If Obama is going to win, Netanyahu would presumably prefer to renew and reinforce his own electoral mandate first, in order better to withstand possible American pressures generated by a second Obama presidential term.
Q. Last week, you discussed Russia's role in supporting the Assad regime in Syria. Last Friday, much of the international community and Arab world gathered in Tunis to discuss ways to support the revolutionary opposition. What, in fact, can the United States do to stop the slaughter in Syria?
A. More than a year after the Arab revolutionary wave commenced, and in view of some hard lessons learned since then, together with the special circumstances of Syria, Washington's options are limited. It's easier to point to the obvious priorities for what should not happen in Syria in terms of American (and Israeli) interests, than to suggest what should and could happen.
Washington--indeed, most of the international community--does not want Salafists, and if possible not even political Islam, to take power in Syria. It does not want the army to rule, other than perhaps as a temporary measure. It does not wish to see al-Qaeda and other jihadi terrorists on Syrian soil. And it realizes that too much overt US support for the revolutionary opposition could prove damning to its fortunes.
Washington would like very much to be able to identify a viable opposition movement that could be profitably supported, either overtly or clandestinely. But just last week, General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lamented, "I would challenge anyone to identify for me the opposition movement in Syria at this point."
Washington has expressed the desire to deliver humanitarian aid to the Syrian population. It would like to cooperate with Turkey in opening up "safe havens" on the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border where humanitarian aid could be delivered. (The Arab League, led by Saudi Arabia, wants to supply arms via the safe havens--a move Washington objects to.) In any case, Turkey has thus far balked at the idea of, in effect, occupying sovereign Syrian soil (and almost certainly starting an inter-state war) in order to establish the safe havens, whatever their purpose.
Amidst this frustration, all the parties could agree on in Tunis was to tighten sanctions on the Syrian government. They called on the United Nations to ready a peacekeeping force. But peacekeeping is only possible if there is a ceasefire and both sides to a conflict agree to its deployment. Because this is not the case with Syria, introduction of such a force is virtually impossible without generating large-scale violence.
It's easier, and probably more productive, to speculate as to what the US and other interested parties can do at the clandestine level. In Syria, as in the other Arab revolutions, it's fairly safe to say that nothing will change unless and until the army, or key units thereof, moves against the regime. There are reportedly divisions of the Syrian armed forces whose leadership appears less than happy with what is happening. Washington could conceivably help them take the initiative by contacting key officers, both Alawite and Sunni, and offering them support for a takeover, based on an agreed agenda of transfer of power to Sunni-majority civilian opposition groups, protection of minorities, and immunity from prosecution for attacks carried out thus far on civilians.
Obviously, the risks of moving in this direction are huge. As in Egypt, the US could be helping to usher in a military junta and/or Muslim Brotherhood rule. Unlike in Egypt and Libya, the regime in Syria is backed by major players: Russia, Iran and Iraq. Moreover, in Syria there are large ethnic and religious minorities--Alawites, Druze, Kurds, Christians--that continue to support the Assad regime and that might still fight to maintain it.
Israelis got a refresher course on Syria's ethnic mosaic last weekend, when about 500 Israeli Druze and Christian Arabs, as well as non-citizen Druze from the Golan Heights, rallied in Haifa in support of Assad. One of them, a member of Knesset, caustically "reminded" Israelis that the anti-Assad coalition extends from Avigdor Lieberman to al-Qaeda, with the US and "democratic" Saudi Arabia somewhere in the middle.
If I had to place my bet today, I would wager that, at least in the short term, Bashar Assad will hold onto power.
Q. Last Saturday, Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad warned publicly that the current "security silence" could collapse at any moment. What was he referring to, and how serious should we take this warning?
A. The immediate catalyst for Fayyad's concern is unrest on the Temple Mount in recent days that included Palestinian stone-throwing and Israel Police firing of gas canisters. It was precisely escalating unrest of this nature in and around the Temple Mount that turned into the second intifada back in September 2000. This time, the cause was reaction by extreme Palestinian groups to verbal incitement against the mosques on the Mount by extremist Israelis. A number of additional incidents of bloodshed in the vicinity of greater Jerusalem have added to the tension.
Back in September 2000, a stalemated peace process fueled the violence. Now, too, the process is demonstrably going nowhere. The Israel Foreign Ministry's recent annual intelligence report also apparently warned of the danger that a failed process could catalyze new Palestinian violence. Add to this the prospect of "reconciliation" between Fateh and Hamas (possibly meaning more Hamas influence in the West Bank) and incitement by Islamists, including those freed in the Shalit deal: Israel just rearrested four Islamic Jihad terrorists released in that deal and charged them with plotting new acts of violence. All this, against the backdrop of the Arab revolutionary wave with its mass demonstrations and accompanying violence.
To be sure, there are also strong counter-trends mitigating against renewed large-scale violence. Palestinians in the West Bank have not forgotten the painful "deterrent" price they paid in the last intifada. There are potential alternative courses of action, such as the prospect of PA elections and peace talks: at the Amman meetings last month, PM Binyamin Netanyahu reportedly softened his position somewhat regarding the territorial issues, offering ideas (e.g., Israel will not annex the Jordan Valley, Jerusalem will be discussed after West Bank issues are resolved) that could conceivably, with heavy external pressure, still form the basis for further exploratory talks.
But Fayyad's warning should not be ignored: Israeli-Palestinian violence nearly always breaks out when we're not expecting it, and the catalyst is often a seemingly minor incident.
Q. Last week, the Israel High Court of Justice struck down the Tal law which, over the past decade, had regulated a slow trickle of voluntary military service on the part of ultra-orthodox yeshiva students. What happens now?
A. The thrust of the High Court's move is to renew popular pressures for all conscription-age young men to do some form of national service. This is now being translated into pressures within Netanyahu's coalition between secular and orthodox parties advocating universal service and ultra-orthodox or haredi parties demanding some new legal structure that will continue to absolve their youth, already some 12 percent of their age cohort in the population and growing, from service.
So one spinoff of the decision is a possible "religion and state" election issue that could hasten the demise of the coalition. Another is to fuel the fires of citizen "social justice" initiatives with yet another incendiary issue.
But a third issue is more nuanced. The past decade under the Tal law witnessed a number of modest initiatives to bring haredi youth into both IDF combat units and air force and navy auxiliary units. The army gained experience in dealing with some of the extreme demands of haredi serving youth, backed by their rabbis and their political clout, e.g., no contact with female soldiers, glatt kosher food, objections to non-vital tasks on the Sabbath, etc. One conclusion is that forcing all haredi youth to serve in the IDF--even as secular and orthodox youth, including young women, continue to serve--could be unwieldy.
This has led to a certain "refinement" of the universal service demand from many quarters close to the IDF: all youth will report for service; the IDF will select those it needs; the remainder will serve in the police, fire department, first aid crews and civilian service units in their communities, such as hospitals and schools. If this sounds like a good compromise, the ultra-orthodox establishment does not agree. It vows to fight any measure that will force its youth to serve their country in any way other than through prayer and Torah study. Sadly, it has the political clout to back up this demand.
A. More than a year after the Arab revolutionary wave commenced, and in view of some hard lessons learned since then, together with the special circumstances of Syria, Washington's options are limited. It's easier to point to the obvious priorities for what should not happen in Syria in terms of American (and Israeli) interests, than to suggest what should and could happen.
Washington--indeed, most of the international community--does not want Salafists, and if possible not even political Islam, to take power in Syria. It does not want the army to rule, other than perhaps as a temporary measure. It does not wish to see al-Qaeda and other jihadi terrorists on Syrian soil. And it realizes that too much overt US support for the revolutionary opposition could prove damning to its fortunes.
Washington would like very much to be able to identify a viable opposition movement that could be profitably supported, either overtly or clandestinely. But just last week, General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lamented, "I would challenge anyone to identify for me the opposition movement in Syria at this point."
Washington has expressed the desire to deliver humanitarian aid to the Syrian population. It would like to cooperate with Turkey in opening up "safe havens" on the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border where humanitarian aid could be delivered. (The Arab League, led by Saudi Arabia, wants to supply arms via the safe havens--a move Washington objects to.) In any case, Turkey has thus far balked at the idea of, in effect, occupying sovereign Syrian soil (and almost certainly starting an inter-state war) in order to establish the safe havens, whatever their purpose.
Amidst this frustration, all the parties could agree on in Tunis was to tighten sanctions on the Syrian government. They called on the United Nations to ready a peacekeeping force. But peacekeeping is only possible if there is a ceasefire and both sides to a conflict agree to its deployment. Because this is not the case with Syria, introduction of such a force is virtually impossible without generating large-scale violence.
It's easier, and probably more productive, to speculate as to what the US and other interested parties can do at the clandestine level. In Syria, as in the other Arab revolutions, it's fairly safe to say that nothing will change unless and until the army, or key units thereof, moves against the regime. There are reportedly divisions of the Syrian armed forces whose leadership appears less than happy with what is happening. Washington could conceivably help them take the initiative by contacting key officers, both Alawite and Sunni, and offering them support for a takeover, based on an agreed agenda of transfer of power to Sunni-majority civilian opposition groups, protection of minorities, and immunity from prosecution for attacks carried out thus far on civilians.
Obviously, the risks of moving in this direction are huge. As in Egypt, the US could be helping to usher in a military junta and/or Muslim Brotherhood rule. Unlike in Egypt and Libya, the regime in Syria is backed by major players: Russia, Iran and Iraq. Moreover, in Syria there are large ethnic and religious minorities--Alawites, Druze, Kurds, Christians--that continue to support the Assad regime and that might still fight to maintain it.
Israelis got a refresher course on Syria's ethnic mosaic last weekend, when about 500 Israeli Druze and Christian Arabs, as well as non-citizen Druze from the Golan Heights, rallied in Haifa in support of Assad. One of them, a member of Knesset, caustically "reminded" Israelis that the anti-Assad coalition extends from Avigdor Lieberman to al-Qaeda, with the US and "democratic" Saudi Arabia somewhere in the middle.
If I had to place my bet today, I would wager that, at least in the short term, Bashar Assad will hold onto power.
Q. Last Saturday, Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad warned publicly that the current "security silence" could collapse at any moment. What was he referring to, and how serious should we take this warning?
A. The immediate catalyst for Fayyad's concern is unrest on the Temple Mount in recent days that included Palestinian stone-throwing and Israel Police firing of gas canisters. It was precisely escalating unrest of this nature in and around the Temple Mount that turned into the second intifada back in September 2000. This time, the cause was reaction by extreme Palestinian groups to verbal incitement against the mosques on the Mount by extremist Israelis. A number of additional incidents of bloodshed in the vicinity of greater Jerusalem have added to the tension.
Back in September 2000, a stalemated peace process fueled the violence. Now, too, the process is demonstrably going nowhere. The Israel Foreign Ministry's recent annual intelligence report also apparently warned of the danger that a failed process could catalyze new Palestinian violence. Add to this the prospect of "reconciliation" between Fateh and Hamas (possibly meaning more Hamas influence in the West Bank) and incitement by Islamists, including those freed in the Shalit deal: Israel just rearrested four Islamic Jihad terrorists released in that deal and charged them with plotting new acts of violence. All this, against the backdrop of the Arab revolutionary wave with its mass demonstrations and accompanying violence.
To be sure, there are also strong counter-trends mitigating against renewed large-scale violence. Palestinians in the West Bank have not forgotten the painful "deterrent" price they paid in the last intifada. There are potential alternative courses of action, such as the prospect of PA elections and peace talks: at the Amman meetings last month, PM Binyamin Netanyahu reportedly softened his position somewhat regarding the territorial issues, offering ideas (e.g., Israel will not annex the Jordan Valley, Jerusalem will be discussed after West Bank issues are resolved) that could conceivably, with heavy external pressure, still form the basis for further exploratory talks.
But Fayyad's warning should not be ignored: Israeli-Palestinian violence nearly always breaks out when we're not expecting it, and the catalyst is often a seemingly minor incident.
Q. Last week, the Israel High Court of Justice struck down the Tal law which, over the past decade, had regulated a slow trickle of voluntary military service on the part of ultra-orthodox yeshiva students. What happens now?
A. The thrust of the High Court's move is to renew popular pressures for all conscription-age young men to do some form of national service. This is now being translated into pressures within Netanyahu's coalition between secular and orthodox parties advocating universal service and ultra-orthodox or haredi parties demanding some new legal structure that will continue to absolve their youth, already some 12 percent of their age cohort in the population and growing, from service.
So one spinoff of the decision is a possible "religion and state" election issue that could hasten the demise of the coalition. Another is to fuel the fires of citizen "social justice" initiatives with yet another incendiary issue.
But a third issue is more nuanced. The past decade under the Tal law witnessed a number of modest initiatives to bring haredi youth into both IDF combat units and air force and navy auxiliary units. The army gained experience in dealing with some of the extreme demands of haredi serving youth, backed by their rabbis and their political clout, e.g., no contact with female soldiers, glatt kosher food, objections to non-vital tasks on the Sabbath, etc. One conclusion is that forcing all haredi youth to serve in the IDF--even as secular and orthodox youth, including young women, continue to serve--could be unwieldy.
This has led to a certain "refinement" of the universal service demand from many quarters close to the IDF: all youth will report for service; the IDF will select those it needs; the remainder will serve in the police, fire department, first aid crews and civilian service units in their communities, such as hospitals and schools. If this sounds like a good compromise, the ultra-orthodox establishment does not agree. It vows to fight any measure that will force its youth to serve their country in any way other than through prayer and Torah study. Sadly, it has the political clout to back up this demand.
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The hardest question that needs to be answered is; 'Is Isreal really interested in peace'? All the current evidence, in fact, the evidence for some time says Isreal is not the slightest bit interested in peace. Isreal's just looking for excuses whilst grabbing land all the time.
Well, Robert, you certainly have a nice way of demonizing Israel. I'm sure you're very comfortable w/ this organization, which claims to be a friend of Israel, while essentially laying the entire Israel/Palestinian situation at the former's door. The Palestinians are blameless victims, are they not? But as for you, how do you reconcile giving away the Gaza Strip w/ your statement that ALL Israel does is "grab land"? More broadly, taking a complex situation and simplifying it to a simple matter of blaming the Jews... Does that sound familiar at all? Does that have any historic resonance, going back say 2000 years or so? The issue isn't whether the Jewish state is blameless, since no state is blameless. The issue is whether people like you are capable of doing anything OTHER than blaming Israel. In case you think that only Israel "doesn't want peace," you could do worse than look at the Hamas Charter, which among other things contains this gem: "The Day of Judgement will not come about until Muslims fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Muslims, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him."