We say: Negotiations with the Palestinians can produce a permanent border for Israel that meets its security needs.

First, nobody - neither President Obama nor the Palestinians, or the international community - is trying to force Israel to accept the 1967 lines as a permanent and official border between the West Bank and Israel. Borders will be the result of negotiations, subject to mutual agreement. There will be no peace agreement unless Israel agrees that it can live with it, including with respect to the defensibility of its borders.

Second, when considering the defensibility of future borders, one must distinguish between legitimate concerns and the ubiquitous manipulation of these concerns. Those who manipulate legitimate concerns do so by misrepresenting facts or by ignoring overarching Israeli national security interests, while attempting to advance an ideological "Greater Israel" agenda.

Besides being a red herring - an intentional attempt to divert attention from Israel's acute need to end its occupation of the West Bank - the "indefensibility" argument is wrong on its merits. Yes, an Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank does involve some security risks, but these risks do not render the borders of a future two-state agreement "indefensible." Moreover, the national security benefits for Israel of a future peace agreement with the Palestinians far outweigh the risks.

They say: But doesn't Israel need to retain significant parts of the West Bank as "strategic depth"?

We say: Territorial depth - particularly when measured in single miles rather than in tens or hundreds of miles - is almost insignificant as a buffer in an age of intermediate-range and long-range missiles. Israel's adversaries already have missiles that can reach every corner in the country. Keeping the West Bank does not provide Israel additional meaningful strategic depth with respect to such a threat.

Furthermore, Israel does not need the West Bank as a buffer to fend off an invasion by foreign armies from the east, through the West Bank. The probability of such an invasion has become extremely low since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq and in light of Israel's longstanding peace agreement with Jordan.

Clearly, Israel will continue to prepare itself for worst-case scenarios, including a rise in extremist influence in the West Bank, in Jordan and beyond. But even if such changes were to occur and foreign armies were to try to invade through the West Bank, the threat posed to Israel would still be low. The Jordan Valley is an excellent natural barrier, almost insurmountable for invading armies with tanks and mechanized infantry, regardless of whether or not the Israeli army is actually present in the West Bank. Israeli military superiority would make any such attempt suicidal for the invading forces. Israel's early warning capabilities, which comprise sophisticated reconnaissance technologies, including satellites, are such that under no circumstances could Israel be surprised by a land invasion. In the context of peace talks, Israel will consider it a priority to negotiate security arrangements that satisfy Israel's need for early warning stations in key points in the West Bank - something to which Palestinian leaders have in the past indicated they would agree.

Finally, Israel's air force, the strongest and best-equipped in the region would easily stop any ground forces advancing toward Israel.

They say: But what about the threat of terrorism? The only thing keeping the West Bank from turning into a terrorism haven is the IDF's presence there. If the IDF withdraws, Israel's largest population centers and its most vital strategic assets could be easily attacked by rockets and shells.

We say: An Israeli military presence on the ground in the West Bank is not a guarantee against the infiltration of terrorists and the smuggling of weapons into the West Bank. It is also not a guarantee against the use of projectiles targeting Israeli population centers and installations, These are valid concerns, as is the concern that terrorists will use smuggled or locally-made projectiles against Israel.

Even when Israel was in full control of the Gaza Strip, rockets and mortar rounds were routinely launched at Israel from the northern part of the Gaza Strip. Fire from the Gaza Strip stopped when the Palestinian authorities in Gaza decided to stop it. Likewise in the West Bank, a motivated Palestinian government will be the most effective means of stopping terrorism. Added to this, in the context of peace negotiations there is no doubt that Israel will insist on security arrangements that address specific Israeli concerns, including protecting Ben Gurion airport and preventing infiltration of both people and weapons through the Palestinian-Jordanian border into the future Palestinian state.

Terrorism emanating from the West Bank and Gaza, and sometimes supported by outside forces, is already a top Israeli concern. To address this concern, Israel today is forced to rely mainly on defensive measures, like the Iron Dome anti-rocket system. Israel will no doubt maintain such measures even under a peace agreement. However, under a peace agreement, Israel would likely also benefit from intensified security cooperation with Palestinian security authorities.

The Palestinian Authority has already shown its capability to fight terrorism in the West Bank and to cooperate with Israel's security authorities, even while the West Bank is still under occupation, and security cooperation negotiated by Israel as part of a peace agreement would most likely include anti-smuggling measures, early warning systems and intelligence sharing. Likewise, subject to negotiations and the agreement of both sides, there is a possibility of the deployment of an international force inside the future Palestine, as has been the case, successfully, in the context of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty (the Multinational Force & Observers in the Sinai). Such a force could, for example, monitor the Jordan-Palestine border to prevent infiltration of terrorists and the smuggling of weapons, and be present at points in the West Bank from which Israel perceives itself to be especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Moreover, under a peace agreement the existing Israeli-Jordanian security cooperation would likely be strengthened and serve as an additional component in counter-terrorism efforts.

A peace agreement would have an important counter-terrorism value: it would strengthen Israel's ability to deter terrorist attacks. Israel's ability to inflict pain militarily, whether against Hizballah or Hamas, is unquestioned. However today, absent a peace agreement, Israel's right to do so is often challenged. Under a peace agreement in which Israel's borders with the Palestinians are universally recognized and it is universally accepted that the occupation has ended, Israel's right to use force to defends its borders from outside attack will no longer be subject to any serious challenge and Israel's military deterrence will be exponentially stronger.