Recently, in yet another effort to clean up old files, I stumbled on an essay I wrote five years ago and had entirely forgotten. Some things have changed since then; more have stayed pretty much the same.
I do not know whether I any longer agree with myself, but much of the analysis strikes me as on the mark. Make of the conclusions what you will; the heart of it is the analysis, not the prescription.
Oh yes: It's long. Here goes:
---------
October 8, 2003
"We fed our heart on fantasies
Our heart's grown brutal on the fare."
-- Ted Hughes
1. I was an early recruit to what is now called "the Zionist project" - more specifically, the State of Israel. From the age of 11, three years before there was a state, I was convinced by its moral claims and of its historic necessity. From then to now, much of my life's work has been to protect the State as best I could from Baltimore and Chicago and East Lansing and Boston, my homes during these years. While that "protection" has often taken the form of cautioning Israel on the folly of its policies, the caution was always expressed from "within the camp." However sharp my criticism of Israel's policies, I accepted the fundamental assumptions of the Zionist project as axiomatic. I have not been blind to the tensions involved in being both a Jewish state and a democratic state, of being the national home of the Jewish people and home as well to a million Arab citizens ( almost 20 percent of Israel's population), of welcoming all Jews but privileging one form of Jewish religious expression at the expense of others, and, more recently, of the anomaly of opening wide the doors to almost anyone with a claim, however tenuous, to being Jewish while closing firmly the doors to relatives of Israel's Arab citizens.
All these seemed to me either tensions one had to accept as inherent in complex societies or problems that could and surely would in time be resolved. In any event, they were trumped by the Jewish people's need for and right to a national home, as also by Israel's achievements as a young liberal democracy. Israel's cultural and intellectual elites were fundamentally no different from my friends, from me. They understood both the exigencies of history and the claims of decency; their compromises were reluctant and always temporary. In the meantime, the people of the young nation restored the Hebrew language, they restored Jerusalem, they made a valiant and worthy effort (now lamentably almost surely a failed effort) to create, with the kibbutz, a Utopian society. They built hospitals and universities of undeniable quality, they built museums and created symphony orchestras, they were active and even aggressive modernizers. All this and more appealed to me, validated my commitment and concern, made me proud.
And their children served in the army and did what they had to do in 1967 and again in 1973, heroically, and between wars, less heroically, more and then much more controversially, in the West Bank and the Gaza District.
Over the years, I fought quite publicly with Menachem Begin, I chastised Ariel Sharon, I dismissed Bibi Netanyahu with contempt; I also found reason, now and again, to write critically of Shimon Peres and Yitzchak Rabin. I raised and contributed money for the United Jewish Appeal and the New Israel Fund and sought to broaden the definition of what we mean by "pro-Israel," distinguishing between support for the nation and its people and endorsement of the policies of its government. I encouraged American Jews to engage with Israel. And I did what I could to help give heart to Israel's peace camp and to mobilize American Jews and now and then American policy-makers in support of peace in Israel.
So I speak from very deep inside the camp, and I say that it has come time to re-examine the old axioms. We wanted a Jewish state because we wanted safety for the Jews. Let Jews live free of persecution and let them die of natural causes or in traffic accidents, not because they are Jews. But the Jews of Israel are not safe, and even the new wall/fence will not make them safe. Israel is in full control of Jenin, and in the last days there has been a lock-down in Jenin, but that did not prevent a woman from Jenin from entering a crowded restaurant in Haifa and blowing herself up there, as a few weeks earlier another suicide murderer blew himself up on Emek Refa'im Street in Jerusalem, where I typically spend much time during my frequent visits to Israel. And so forth. We have now learned that the Zionist project does not end the dangers Jews face; it merely trades the old dangers in for new dangers - more random, to be sure, even less comprehensively lethal, but hardly acceptable. True, but for Israel Ethiopian Jews would still be in Ethiopia, and the Jews of North Africa would be who knows where and in what condition, and the Jews of Argentina would have had no place to go, nor the Jews of the Former Soviet Union, and for the time being Jews everywhere know Israel as their redoubt should they be in need of refuge. True as well that Zionism expected more, and better; it did not foresee endless and bitter and brutal conflict.
We wanted a Jewish state because we wanted one place in the world where Jews would be able fully and freely to express their culture. And so they do, in as riotous a mix as can be imagined. At least some of the early Zionists hoped that a Jewish state would also be a spiritual and intellectual center of the Jewish people, home to a refreshed Jewish culture; Israel has amply fulfilled their early hope. By and large, they had contempt for the possibilities of the Diaspora. They believed that the Diaspora was doomed, that Jews outside the Land would either be killed or assimilated, either raped or seduced. And there has been much murder and much assimilation.
But Jews now create and celebrate a refreshed Jewish culture here in America, with boundless freedom and with astonishing productivity. I cannot and would not claim that the Jewish cultural expression of America's Jews is richer than the Jewish cultural expression of Israeli Jews - but neither is it inferior to what is produced in Israel. The themes of the two literatures are inevitably different, the problems and tensions those literatures describe are different, but on both sides of the oceans there is freedom of cultural expression and the freedom is richly utilized. And literature aside, who can doubt that America has been a more hospitable home to liturgical innovation, a far freer home to the varieties of Jewish religious expression, a congenial home to the music, the textual research and exegesis, and the other key elements of a living culture? What we in America most manifestly (and painfully) lack is Hebrew, our language. And there is no easy or early fix to that. But we push ahead with remarkable energy in English.
Theodore Herzl and his colleagues came to their Zionist conclusion having despaired of achieving freedom, real freedom (which includes, of course, physical safety), for Europe's Jews. History, in the cruelest way, proved them right. But now history has tricked us all; what was not possible in Europe in 1900 is manifestly not merely possible but actual in the United States and Canada in 2003.
If North America's Jews are these days unsafe in any way, their unsafety is chiefly of their own making. The threats that afflict them arise principally from a confused set of priorities as well as from the seductions of commercial culture. (The same can, of course, be said of Israel. In a New York Times report just this week on Israeli expatriates in New York, with all their trance parties and whatnot, we read of one 37 year-old who, when asked whether he might one day return to Israel, replies, "I would go back there one day when I'm older, if there's peace and quiet. The weather's great. The food is great. It's beautiful." He pauses, and then: "Or maybe Barcelona.") But the challenges to American Jews and their culture are interesting and even provocative challenges, challenges worth grappling with. Almost all that grappling is internal to the community; very, very little of it has to do with threats from without.
Will America always be safe? None of us can know. These days, with the American Empire so dangerously overreaching, one can see how the system on which we have depended is capable of collapse. Even without such apocalyptic possibilities, history is notoriously full of tricks, or, tricks aside, of major tectonic shifts. But the analogy to Weimar Germany is no analogy, since Germany's democratic institutions had such fragile roots, and the entrenched doctrine of pluralism is indigenous to America, not an afterthought. It is well not to be complacent, to keep wariness alive (along with hope), but here in America we do not need to keep our bags packed. America is different.
So: The central axioms that gave rise to the Zionist project a hundred years ago and more no longer hold, at the least have lost their axiomatic status. Israel is not the safe harbor it was meant to be, and the Diaspora is not the dead end it was thought to be. (Even in Germany, Jewish life is resurgent.)
This is not in any way to blame the Israelis. While Israel has made endless mistakes in seeking to come to some sort of arrangement with its Palestinian neighbors, it is not at all clear that those neighbors would have responded positively, let alone amicably, to more thoughtful policies. Israel's policies these last years have surely increased Palestinian and Arab enmity towards the Jewish state, but there is no evidence that more benign policies would have satisfied the Palestinians. One laments Israel's errors, even condemns them - but they do not excuse or justify the errors of the Palestinians (and of the Arab states).
Where does all that leave us today, between yesterday's suicide murder and tomorrow's Israeli retaliation, between tomorrow's Israeli retaliation and the day after tomorrow's suicide murder?
2. During the 1930s, a small number of Zionist leaders urged upon the nascent Jewish community in Palestine a bi-national state. They were dismissed at the time as both wrong-headed and impossibly naive. The whole purpose of the project, they were told, was for the Jews to enjoy the benefits of national sovereignty; moreover, the notion that Palestine's Arabs would make willing partners with the Jews in a bi-national state was preposterous.
Perhaps because of their own sense that a two-state solution is no longer viable, several Palestinian moderates have lately resurrected the idea of a one-state solution - that is, of a bi-national state. Or, as a handful of Israeli critics put it, now that a two-state solution has fallen from the table to the littered floor, is a more modest Zionism a constructive alternative?
Imagine the fantastic, that the Jews of Israel were prepared to let go the reins of power:
Can one today seriously consider what was only naively thinkable 70 and more years ago? Would there be in a bi-national state a serious prospect of Jewish cultural autonomy? The whole idea is absurdly farfetched - unless, of course, one is prepared to declare the idea of a Jewish state an anachronism, a clumsy leftover from the age of nationalism, a self-defeating example of particularism in a world increasingly committed to universalism.
Plainly, a bi-national state would mark the end, the abject end, of the Zionist project. A state in which Palestinians were the decisive majority could not, in any sober analysis, be expected to be cordial to its Jewish minority, providing for Jewish cultural autonomy. (As if the Jews would be satisfied with "cultural autonomy" or, for that matter, well-advised to rely on the promises of a seething Palestinian Arab majority.) Even without imagining a Palestinian state turning to Islamic fundamentalism, to shari'a law, even without imagining that under the actual circumstances the Palestinians would not be able to resist a politics of triumphalism, even without imagining a flood of refugees exercising the right of return and insisting on returning to their ancestral homes, the prospect that Jews would be able to continue to live fully and freely and proudly as Jews is surely remote. Arab societies are not exactly famous for their endorsement of pluralism, and this particular mix would raise even more problems than most. The examples of successful integration of two radically different ethnic and/or religious communities elsewhere in the world are not encouraging. India? Rwanda? Bosnia? Ireland? Cyprus? Turkey? Spain?
No, a one-state solution is a prescription not only for the end of the Zionist project, but for the end of Jewish autonomy. At best, it would render the residual Jewish population of the new state - most Jews would in fact leave as quickly as other nations would accept them - a theme park. (For that matter, even a state in which Palestinians were a sufficiently large minority to become a blocking element in the nation's political life would make that life exceedingly difficult. Note, then, that Israel's current Palestinian population may well become exactly such a minority in the readily foreseeable future.)
Even the Israeli left, universalists though they be, in its overwhelming majority opposes a bi-national state. These days, the argument most frequently employed by liberal Israelis in arguing for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza settlements and for other "painful compromises" - Ariel Sharon's term for what Israel must do - is in fact the demographic argument: If Israel retains the territories it now occupies, the growth in the Palestinians sector will quite soon mean that between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River a majority of the people will be Palestinian. At that point, Israel, if it is to remain a Jewish state, will be bound either to deny the Palestinians full citizenship - an apartheid state, in other words - or encourage, pacifically or if necessary by force, the emigration of most Palestinians. (This last, euphemistically termed "transfer" in Israel's current political lexicon, was just a few years ago regarded as an disgraceful proposal, unsuited for polite conversation. It is now part of conventional discourse, demonstrating the calamitous deterioration of the peace process, providing yet another instance - our world is crowded with so many - of how yesterday's outrage becomes today's convention.)
No Zionist, whatever the axioms from which he or she argues, can comfortably imagine an apartheid Israel or an ethnically cleansed Israel. (I say no Zionist can, but instantly am aware of the fundamentalist Zionists who explicitly propose exactly such possibilities or whose arguments implicitly approve them. It does, after all, depend on the foundational axioms.) Indeed, no Zionist can celebrate the erosion of moral restraint we witness in Israel. I say this in full knowledge of the terrible choices Israel is forced to make, and with considerable respect for those Israelis - more than a few - who still recognize the moral predicament to which preserving Israel's security gives rise. I say this with abiding affection for those in Israel who have long argued against the stupidity of Israel's policies, destined as they have been to exacerbate rather than mitigate the conflict, the terror.
The left uses the demographic argument to alarm Israelis into territorial compromise, not into national compromise. It does not see (to the limited extent the possibility is even mentioned) a one-state solution as a solution, since it believes such a solution would write "finished" to the Zionist dream and to Israel as its fulfillment.
3. All that said, what now? There is no peace process, nor any reason to suppose there soon will be. No American president during an embattled election year is likely to undertake the kind of sustained intervention in the conflict that might - and only might - move peace forward. And any future president will have to face the same strangling constraints that have until now inhibited American action - the sophistication and energy of the pro-Israel community in America, including now not only the storied Jewish lobby but also millions of evangelical Christians whose passionate support for Israel is a new and complicating element of the mix.
As to the Israelis, they are not soon likely to support the kind of massive shift in policy that some press upon it - say, a unilateral withdrawal from the settlements. The demographic argument is weighty, but the security crisis is immediate. In the heat of such a crisis, the more so when there are Israelis in important positions who see all this less as a crisis than as an opportunity, it is exceedingly difficult to plead the centrality of a different crisis, one that is still abstract, still a few years away. Some Israelis, perhaps even most, understand that the West Bank and Gaza settlements are in fact a security liability, not a security asset. But withdrawal? Would that not be interpreted by the Palestinians as a victory for their violence? Would it really satisfy the Palestinian appetite, or would it whet that appetite? Moreover, and most important: The settler movement is by now used to success, and as many as half the settlers, a hundred thousand or so (excluding those in Jerusalem's immediate suburban neighborhoods), are where they are for ideological reasons that are not readily susceptible to cool analytic arguments.
And the Palestinians? It would be folly to count on their being either able or willing to reign in their extremists, to put an end to the terror. True, there was effective cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security forces during the best of the Oslo process years. But the tumbling deterioration of the last three years, since the second Intifada began, renders remote the prospect of a united stand against terrorism.
These observations are not merely situational. They are not of the kind that will dissolve if only we hold our breath a bit longer. Everything has been tried, everything has failed. And the situation gets worse, year by year. Less secure, less humane, less acceptable. Tactical shifts are no longer sufficient to repair the damage and to prevent the disaster.
The disaster: Until quite recently, we could and did speak of Israel as a Jewish democratic state. We understood that there was an inherent tension in juxtaposing the two ideals, but we imagined that a combination of constructive ambiguity, a readiness to settle for less than perfection, and a relaxation if not a final end to the conflict, would enable both the Jewishness of the state and its democratic commitments to co-exist, even, according to some, to enrich each other.
An Israel stretching from the Mediterranean to the Jordan in which five million Jews live with an equal and rapidly increasing number of Palestinians, disenfranchised in order to preserve the Jewish State, cannot be thought a democracy. An Israel that seeks to avoid the apartheid problem by "transfer," whether forcibly or via a mix of tactics, will forfeit any serious claim to democracy and render its Jewishness a matter of intense debate - nor will it solve the security problem, since the Palestinians will not go quietly nor will the surrounding Arab states for long be able to resist being pulled into the conflict. An Israel committed to ethnic cleansing will become a pariah state, will lose such international support as it enjoys today, and will at best fracture the Jewish Diaspora. (At best: One can also imagine profound and widespread alienation from Israel of the bulk of the Diaspora - which, after all, has its own "red lines.")
Yet all these threats have not until now been sufficient to accelerate the movement towards a two-state solution, which remains the only solution that enables the Zionist project - a Jewish, democratic state - to survive and to thrive.
The most zealous of the settlers, who come to discussions of these matters with years of experience in debate, armed with thrusts and counter-thrusts that sustain a weird internal logic that is unassailable until its most basic assumptions are challenged, will tell you - have told me - that if it comes to a choice between democracy and a Jewish state, they will sacrifice democracy. They will not accept, do not comprehend, that once their Jewish state gives up on democracy, it will have embarked on a path to suicide. The world community will turn hostile; America will turn away; Diaspora Jews will grieve; many Israelis will leave the country. And Arab enmity will escalate, be expressed with ever-more lethal weapons. Jewish or democratic? There is no such choice, not in the real world.
4. What is left? In an unpublished paper, the veteran Israeli analyst Yossi Alpher present a detailed review of the two-state solution. He reminds us that it is of relatively recent vintage, that is not inherent in the scheme of things, and that it is now - now! - in mortal peril. So we must, those of us who care for Israel, force ourselves to imagine what was yesterday unimaginable.
Is it possible to imagine some variant of the mandate system, an assumption of responsibility by the European Union for a nascent Palestinians state, a step that would also necessarily involve the formal (and presumably imposed) assertion of Israel's final boundaries? Might such a development become an appropriate rallying point for Israel's friends, for Zionists and post-Zionists alike - as also for those Palestinians who seek peace and who accept (as a majority of both Israelis and Palestinians in diverse polls have indicated they do) a two-state solution? Can the international community somehow accomplish what the parties to the conflict are plainly incapable of accomplishing?
One of the things that characterized Zionism during its middle period - from the beginning of the British Mandate in 1921 to the declaration of Israel's independence in 1948 - was a readiness on the part of the Zionist movement to accept what it could get. It accepted the Peel Commission report in 1937, and it accepted the United Nations Partition Resolution in 1947. Neither satisfied Zionist maximalists, and it is possible that among those who did accept these compromises there were those who imagined a more expansive day would somehow come - but the compromises were accepted. More than half a century later, it is doubtful that Israelis would revert to an easy acceptance of boundaries drawn by others. Nor does it seem at all likely that the other central actors - the Palestinians, the United States, the Europeans themselves - would endorse such a regime. But amidst all the likelihoods and unlikelihoods, the grim prospects that can no longer be avoided with any degree of honesty, what else is there?
Were Israel prepared to negotiate around the Saudi plan, had it officially noticed Arafat's backing away from the Right of Return in his OpEd essay in The New York Times two years or so ago, had Oslo been more carefully drawn and its terms more assiduously implemented by both sides, things might today be different. But they are not. Nor is there anything like a coherent peace camp in Israel that can come to the Israeli people and offer a reasonable plan for a negotiated resolution of the conflict. And even if there were, it is virtually certain that terrorists from the other side would seek to undermine it, to give peace no chance.
Still, an imposed resolution would quite likely bring with it a huge sigh of relief from the people - the masses, if you will - on both sides. The leaders might squeal and otherwise complain, but if the hostilities were truly finished, done, Palestinians and Jews alike would welcome, with prayers of thanksgiving, the new day.
Israel could be expected to complain the more vigorously, its independence so rudely assaulted. But one can hardly say that Israel is free today to determine its own destiny; it is free only to determine its own reaction to the choices made by others. And if Israel genuinely fears the decision others might make with regard to its borders, and most especially to the fate of Jerusalem and the holy places, there are ways of approaching the problem that provide at least some limit to the imposition: The relevant entity - presumably, the United Nations, or perhaps the Quartet, might announce that the parties have a year to settle their differences at the negotiating table before international troops arrive to enforce the settlement they have reached or, absent such a settlement between the parties, the settlement they themselves intend to impose. Proxies for both sides might be selected to see how far they can move towards an agreement, and then, if successful, submit their agreement to plebiscite by both sides. The terms of the agreement, with the exception of the borders, might be subject to renegotiation every few years, with the understanding that the behavior of the parties between times would be taken into account in addressing their proposed changes. Or: The entity might insist on that form of arbitration which announces in advance that it will consider only two proposals, one from each party to the conflict, and then choose one or the other, as is - forcing the parties towards moderation up front.
Alas, the joker in any such deck is the government of the United States, hostage as it has for so long been to the most shrill voices within its own polity - voices not only of (some) Jews, but also and increasingly of evangelical Christians. But surely these matters are too weighty to be determined by Pat Robertson (the Christian Coalition) and Mort Klein (Zionist Organization of America). The people of both sides, the people whose lives are at stake, must be given the opportunity to vote for an end to the conflict, based on reasonable compromise, and with the appropriate guarantees that their choice - if, indeed, they vote as I expect they would - will then be vigorously enforced.
A bold and sustained effort by the United States - in support of a settlement very much like that agreed to by the parties at Taba in 1990, very much like what has come to be known as President Clinton's plan - is the obvious need. The key ingredients of a resolution to the conflict are known to all. But if the United States is unable to muster the energy and yes, the courage required to move the process, if, in order to get from here to there, it is necessary for the United States to relinquish its special role as principal interlocutor, so be it. Given the current disrepute of the United States as a disinterested broker, as also domestic political considerations, it may be best and most realistic that America not be considered the lead actor. But the United States will always retain, by virtue of its power, an implicit veto over the process, sufficient, one presumes, to assure the Israelis that their genuinely fundamental interests will not be neglected.
If such a process were to move on a highly accelerated track, if there were sufficient inducements to the warring parties to turn a new page, then one can imagine America accepting such a tempered role. Indeed, for its own reasons, the State Department and the White House might themselves welcome the opportunity to be rid of the problem.
All this can hardly be thought a likely prospect. Is the scenario I have here sketched any more realistic a prospect than a resumption of real negotiations between the parties themselves? Almost all those with whom I've shared an earlier draft of this essay think it entirely beyond the realm of possibility. But they are no more optimistic than I regarding alternative possibilities. Their replies are a sigh of despair. One friend accepts the underlying gloomy analysis, refers to the "antisemitic European countries," goes on to discount the prospect of American military intervention (on account of domestic American political considerations), and concludes that the only solution must therefore be internal. But his letter trails off into a fog in defining the conditions under which the parties might shrink back from the apocalypse. And it asserts as fact what has hardly been established - namely, that the EU nations (as distinguished from the Moslems of France) are antisemitic. A second agrees that things will likely have to get much worse than they are before they start getting better, notes the outcry that might be expected from the American Jewish mainstream community, and wonders, incidentally, why I use the term "mandate" rather than simply calling "for an international buffer to allow a Palestinians state to come into being in a way that is safe for both sides." But my use of "mandate" is not incidental to my argument. I meant and mean quite specifically more than troops defending borders, constituting a buffer. I mean a period of tutelage (yes, I know) as also a period during which central internal police functions will be performed by the mandate authority. Such a situation would perhaps give the Israelis added confidence that the new Palestinian state would not merely be a home to the next generation of terrorists, and would give the Palestinians time to cleanse their own house, with the help of the external power.
Yet another correspondent wonders whether I ought not be more specific about the degree of external pressure I would endorse - specifically, would I support an "or else" move by America in which Israel is offered the proposal and threatened with a cutoff of all American aid in the event of its rejection.
I duck his question. I do not intend here a full-blown articulation of how an imposed solution might be arrived at nor what its dimensions should be. I introduce the idea (and I am scarcely the first so to do) in order to encourage its more detailed exploration. I feel pressed to do this because of the murmurs that I hear in the course of my travels that point in directions quite different from any I would find acceptable. I mean: "Perhaps the entire enterprise was a mistake." I mean: "A lot of other states are accepting multiculturalism in place of ethno-nationalism, why not Israel?" I mean: "Who can predict the future? For now, there is simply nothing to do. If things get worse, new possibilities may arise. If, somehow, they get better, then we'll open a bottle of champagne."
The Zionist project, shorn of its foundational assumptions, rests today on one proposition and one proposition only: The State of Israel, which is the name of that project, has the right to exist within secure borders. All but the extremists (on both sides), and that means most, understand that Israel can achieve such a happy state only with a new State of Palestine as its equally secure neighbor. If the parties cannot figure out how to get there on their own - and, manifestly, they cannot - then let others who for whatever their reasons (self-interest, vision, kinship, guilt) cause it to happen. And if others are not willing or able to do that, let them stop their meddling at the fringes, let them stop their bloated preaching, let them leave the parties to their own dismal destiny.
Leonard,
After an essay like this you can take a vacation for a few weeks. Maybe you should go back to reprinting some of your essays from BEFORE you opened this blog. I'd like to start by saying that I agree with just about all of it, especially the parts regarding Palestinian reaction and the one-state solution.
Thirty plus years ago I attended a seminar in Jerusalem on Israeli politics. The speaker after outlining the Labor and Likud positions on foreign affairs said he thought that Labor won on demographic grounds and the Likud on security grounds. So the public was divided into those with short-term immediate anxieties and long-term anxieties.
I believe that the situation must get worse before it can get better. In South Africa the whites could deal because they had a reasonable adversary that gave them an easy exit out of the situation. Such an adversary does not exist for Israel. In South Africa the moderates had the support of the people--about 60% support. The terrorist extremists had the support of only two percent based on their share of the vote in 1994.
In Northern Ireland the extremist native nationalists--the republicans of the IRA and INLA--had the support of about a third of the Catholic population. Once they declared a ceasefire their share of the vote rose steadily to over sixy percent of the Irish vote today. Indulgence by the British and Irish governments administering the peace process allowed the IRA to postpone its obligation to disarm until the post 9/11 climate rendered this impossible.
In both South Africa and Northern Ireland the hardline settler party appropriated the political position of its more moderate rivals and then used its reputation for security to establish a hegemony. In South Africa this was very short-lived because of the advent of majority rule. But in NI it might last for decades, as did the previous hegemony of the Ulster Unionists. Both the Ulster Unionists and the Catholic SDLP committed political suicide for the sake of peace, although they did not realize it at the time (except for SDLP leader John Hume). Will Labor be as willing to commit suicide a second time if they recover from the damage from the Oslo process and the Second Lebanon War?
Martin Indyk, Clinton's ambassador to Israel and a former director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, did propose a mandate for the occupied territories. No one seriously took him up on his suggestion and it died a natural death. Even before Iraq no one in America wanted to take up the mandate and after Iraq it will be impossible. That leaves either the European Union or a European power such as France, Britain, or Italy. (Germany has constitutional limitations on such a role and no other single European country has the resources to do so.) There is also the possibility of a non-democratic great power such as Russia or China taking up the task.
A warning to Israel and its foreign supporters lies in the history of antebellum America. Due to the 3/5ths clause of the Constitution that counted blacks as 3/5ths of a person for congressional representation while counting them as 0/5ths for personal rights, the South as a section dominated the Congress and the presidency until the 1850s. Then when they could no longer dominate they opted to secede. As the Israeli right comes to dominate Israeli politics might it act as impulsively and self-destructively if it feels that its domination is threatened? In America the only presidents that weren't from the South or pro-Southern were John Adams, John Quincy Adams, and William Harrison. They served a total of 8 years and one month. Since 1977 the only liberal Israeli prime ministers were Peres from 1984 to 1986 and Barak from 1999 to 2000. Between them they served less than one Knesset term as prime minister. Rabin became a liberal only after his death. Since Barak we have had Sharon for five years, Olmert for two or three and then a new Likud premier. As you say Leonard, the right opts for Orthodoxy and occupation over democracy. Just as the South once opted for slavery.
The Israeli equivalent of the 3/5ths clause is the present PR system that gives the status quo a veto over any change. There is the old saying: don't fix it if it isn't broke. But it all depends on who is determining what is broke and what is not. Most Israelis still think their political system and foreign policy is not broken.
Mr Fein, this is truly an eloquent and articulate expression of the despair the Israeli Left today feels. Even the Prime Minister himself, and, no less, one who came out of the Revisionism movement, stated "Israel is finished if we don't set up a Palestinian state". As if the Palestinians want to "help" Israel by going along with Olmert's plans.
After stating your case here about all the difficulties there are in having a peace agreeement reached, you are finally left with the "deus ex machina", an "imposed" peace. I find it interesting you call it a "mandate". This reminds us of the British Mandate for Palestine which seemed to have all the ingredients you stated for someone who can "impose" a solution. How did that work out in the end? Did the British manage to "impose" a solution? Today, there is a similar experiment in "peace keeping" and "nation building" going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. How is that working out? I note that after the Americans went in and things got tough, most of their allies have dropped out, with a true political solution nowhere in sight. Do you think a lot of countries want to send troops to the Palestinian territories in order to be perceived in the Arab/Muslim world as "using military force to defend Israelis"? One of the unstated assumptions Alpher gives is that the "Palestinian/Israeli" conflict (which is a misnomer in itself) can somehow be isolated. Of course, this is not the case. There is no "Palestinian/Israeli" conflict, there is an "Arab/Israeli" conflict. The Arab world views the Palestinians are their front men for the struggle (or, "cannon fodder", if you prefer). As I said in my other comment, Alon Liel, former Israeli Foreign Ministry Official and close friend of Yossi Beilin, said recently on the "Hakol Diburim" radio show on Reshet Bet that the Egyptians totally oppose ANY Palestinian/Israeli peace agreement because they view that as a mortal threat to themselves, since they believe that Israel would use peace in order to come to dominate the Arab world economically and militarily (this is how they interpret Shimon Peres' "New Middle East" and his proposal that Israel become a member of the Arab League). Thus, Egypt encouraged the arming of HAMAS in the Gaza Strip and their firing of rockets into Israel, even while they suppress HAMAS' relatives in the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt itself. Egypt maintains a proxy war against Israel by way of HAMAS in the Gaza Strip, just as Syria does with HIZBULLAH in Lebanon.
Thus, we see the conflict can not be localized and the Palestinians are not free agents, on their own, to make any agreement with Israel. In addition, any Europeans who might get the idea of sending forces would also have to take into account the attitudes of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which have always kept the "peace process" at arm's length. Then there are the Syrians and Iranians who also totally oppose any peace agreement under any terms and who would agitate against any foreign presence in the Palestinian areas.
The bottom line is that Israel is going to have to deal with the problem on its own. The difficulty is that the Israeli Establishment keeps insisting that the problem is an argument over territory, which it isn't. It is ideological and spiritual, confronting the place of Islam in the world and its relations with dhimmi non-believers. As I said in the comment in the previous post, I do NOT believe the situation is hopeless, as do so many on the Left do, but nothing will improve until we look at the situation REALISTICALLY and not with the Leftist blinders that have impeded clear thinking for some many decades, and stop hoping for deus ex machina solutions.
Dear Mr Fein,
Your somber assessment of 2002 remains valid today too. And your life-long dedication to act to protect Israel from all possible calamity remains a powerful attraction to those who think along your lines. And there a not so few in Israel who see the situation like you.
However, the approach that looks upon Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the international point of view and searches for reasonable political arrangements in the Middle-East requires reconsideration. It should start asking to explain Israel's inability to act in accordance to the spirit of international (western) norms of conduct and to work within the accepted diplomatic patterns, at this late stage of the conflict.
Israel's very discursive culture is distorted to the bottom by the form the public debate is held here and by the manner the state is governed. And there is also a deep dishonesty right at the middle of our political tempest: Many of Israel's most extreme far-rightists, and many settlers among them, live under the protection of their second, American, passport. In case of the worst – and not only then – they can peacefully leave and live-on in Arizona, Idaho, or in any other state of the USA. True: many of them live in dangerous places, and some frequently risk their lives, sometimes displaying heroism. But collectively they present an effrontery towards the State, without having to carry the ultimate price for their stance: in the worst case they have where to withdraw. Not so are the many Israelis trapped in their "development-townships" frequently bombed but underfinanced and uncared-of by our government. And these trapped fellows are to carry the ultimate results of the settler's visionary experiments, with no chance to influence their fate. Frankly, this is too much, and no talk about "Jewish values" can change the picture.
To return to the former points:
the rating-oriented mass-media mercilessly presents news in a conflict-inciting manner, competing within its ranks who could exert "heavier" influence on our intellect-free government. And of course, they feel no responsibility whatsoever about their behaviour.
On the other hand, the military – which is heavily permeated by anti-Arab and pro-settler attitudes, - every single day impose upon the government "solutions" that only widen the scope of bloodshed. There is no other policy-providing body for the Israeli government, with the exception of the Finance officials. These top Finance-Ministry officials act in deep belief they are saving Israel from corruption and moral decay, constantly imposing more and more slashes in public funding. This results in deep public resentment, not towards them, but towards the government, which is hardly able or willing to impose its will upon them, and is not routinely interested in helping the society et-large. The most needy, the bombed and the underprivileged are left to their own wretched devices.
However, the press, populated by richly paid anchor-people, celebrates the coming elevation of the Israeli shekel to international convertibility in foreign banks and change-centers. The celebration is sincere and widely discussed.
The society that is "run" in such a manner is a society on the road to mental eclipse. In fact, the signs of mental eclipse are already here, and many. No talk about international cure for this country and for its neighbours could do anything if our mental illness, producing more and more casualties and more and more unfit leaders, is seriously addressed. This is a cultural problem. And in this view your stance "to protect Israel" acquires new, even more staggering meaning.
Bar Kochba,
I agree with much of what you say. But there are certain realities to take into account. There is a Western double standard in perceptions that now favors the Arabs, particularly in Europe. While Israel can still rely on widespread American public support this could change over time. This would likely occur if the American public began to perceive Israel as the cause for friction between America and the Muslim/Arab world. Israel is dependent on Europe for trade and the U.S. for arms supplies and foreign aid. While Israel can shift much of its trade from Western Europe to North America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe and could do without American financial aid, it needs American high-tech weaponry to maintain its qualitative edge over the Arabs in the event of a general war such as 1948, 1967, or 1973.
This compels Israel to maintain certain Western norms (ironically stemming from Catholic just war doctrine that have been adopted into Israel "toher neshek" (purity of arms) doctrine)in dealing with the Arabs. It must also be ready to demonstrate to the West periodically that it is Arab intransigence rather than Israeli expansionism that is responsible for the continuation of the conflict. This means taking risks for peace as from 1993-2000.
The Arab-Israeli conflict is beginning to display the worst features of both the NI and S. African conflicts. The Palestinians behave even worse then the Irish republican terrorists. Meanwhile the Israeli security forces are beginning to return to the politicization that characterized the IDF's first quarter century. But this time the IDF is becoming a preserve of Likud senior officers with an increasing role for settler officers in the territories. Labor is as dependent on former generals as the United Party was in South Africa (or the Whigs in the U.S.). In S. Africa there was an ideological split between the regular army and air force who favored the ruling National Party and the South Africa Police, responsible for counter-insurgency warfare within S. Africa, supported the rival Conservative Party. While the senior officers will continue to support the Likud and Kadima, rank and file officers on the West Bank will increasingly support the more radical nationalist parties like Israel Beitenu, the ideological offspring of both Tehiya and Moledet.
Leonard,
Your dedication to Israel and to justice is certainly not common. After writing such a comprehensive analysis, most people, having made their contribution, would have left it to others to pick up the peace-burden and would have turned to other concerns. But, not you – thanks.
With the experience of the years since you wrote your analysis, one can see certain weaknesses. I think that you were too optimistic about the health of American Jewry. Tom and, surprise, Bar Kochba have already indicated several of these weaknesses. In addition, if I read your analysis correctly, you have not indicated how the Jewish state vs. democracy dichotomy can be resolved, nor have you taken account of the influence of Israel’s immediate neighbors. I believe that none of these weaknesses are essential and that each can be remedied.
With the notable exceptions of the organization that you founded, Mazon, and, perhaps, of Tikkun and of the Southern Poverty Law Center, Jewish Americans have not, qua Jews, been involved in the major issues confronting contemporary society: the limits of nationalism and the development of international law, racial and cultural bigotry, widespread poverty, income segregation involving the dwindling middle class and the growing income disparity between the rich and the poor, limiting the pain of economic globalization, and global warming and other environmental crises. If Judaism is to continue to grow, Cultural Zionism is as necessary today as it has ever been.
No nation that is acceptable to both the Israelis and the Palestinians will be willing to bear the expense in wealth and in the lives of its citizens that would be required to garrison an Israeli/Palestinian peace. Therefore, the terms of future Israeli/Palestinian relations must be determined by the parties themselves and cannot be imposed. This does not mean that the members of the international community are powerless. The provision or denial of economic aid and of favorable terms of trade offer all the carrots and sticks necessary to promote sincere negotiations between the parties. And, in addition, community members can play the roles of observers, truth-tellers and mediators outlined in the Geneva Accord.
As I understand Tom’s post, there is an assumption about South Africa and Northern Ireland which does not apply to the Israelis and Palestinians. This assumption is that the loyalties to white and colored and to Catholic and Protestant cultures will eventually become subordinate to growing identifications as South Africans and as Northern Irish. This kind of scenario is completely unacceptable to the Israelis and to the Palestinians. Thus, the precedent of the American experience does not pertain. A different approach to obtaining equal justice and political parity must be found, and the Lebanese, Yugoslavian and Czechoslovakian examples are evidence that this cannot be accomplished within a single state.
Not ever having been taken for any kind of angel, I will rush in to suggest a solution. Political equality cannot be achieved within one state, but it can be achieved by Israel and a Palestinian state, jointly. With three exceptions, it must be clearly established within the law and vigorously enforced by the appropriate courts that all Palestinians resident in Israel and all Israelis resident in a Palestinian state must enjoy all the rights of citizens, particularly, equality before the law. The exceptions are that: no Israeli may vote in Palestinian elections and no Palestinian may vote in Israeli elections; there will be no right of return of Jews to the territory of a Palestinian state and no right of return of Palestinians to the territory of Israel, and no Palestinian or Israeli may serve in the military or police of the other’s nation. Subject to these conditions, Israel can still attract Palestinians and a Palestinian state can still attract Israelis by, for example, offering favorable tax treatment or terms of employment, but the Israelis and Palestinians may not participate in each other’s political processes.
I believe that if an independent Palestinian state is established and if the two states cooperate so that they are clearly on the road to greater prosperity, then “two-states for two peoples” will be endorsed by most Israelis and Palestinians, who will act to prevent extremist’s military adventures.
Will such an arrangement be acceptable to Israel’s nearest neighbors? Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan will welcome it, since it is essential to their stability and security. If the occupied Golan is returned to Syria, then Syria will have no reason to oppose a two-state peace. This leaves Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have maintained their position by sharing their oil income with the other Sunni Arab states and by advocating militant Wahhabism to prove that they are the legitimate custodians of Mecca and Medina. With the decline in demand for oil as the U.S. seeks energy independence and the West comes to grips with global warming, unless they make substantial investments elsewhere or develop their own industry the Saudis will have decreasing income to share. The Saudi interest in a successful two-state peace can be increased by offering attractive investment opportunities in Israel and in the new Palestinian state and by providing Israeli technical aid to the Saudi industrialization effort. Also, since a two state peace is essential to Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon and will be acceptable to Syria, the challenge to the legitimacy of a genuinely pro two-state Saudi regime will be greatly reduced. Thus, reaching an accommodation with Syria and establishing economic ties with the Saudis will be prerequisites or co-requisites to achieving a two-state peace.
Thanks everyone.
Two very limited responses: Joel, you are simply mistaken about the involvement of American Jews in the work of justice. I am very much in touch with agencies and organizations all over the country -- e.g., the Progressive Jewish Alliance in LA and SF, Jewish Funds for Justice, based in NYC but working all over the country, the Religious Action Center of the Reform movement, the Jewish Council on Urban Affairs in Chicago, Boston's Jewish Community Relations Council, efforts in DC, the Twin Cities, and the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, a national agency and likewise American Jewish World Service -- that have poverty, health care, workers' rights and hunger at the top of their agendas. The error is to take the increasingly conservative disposition of the UJC and the AJCongress and several others as representative of the whole.
Let me stay with that for a moment. When my daughter Nomi died, in 1996, we established in her memory a fellowship at Shatil, the New Israel Fund's capacity building arm, for an American college graduate. A year in Israe, working for one of the many NGOs that Shatil helps out. Each year, I get to see the applications. They are stunning -- the very best and brightest, from the finest universities, almost all fluent in Hebrew, a good number with Arabic as well, and almost to a person they get, and get deeply, the connection between Judaism and the pursuit of justice. So the beat goes on. Less than I'd like, but more, much more, than is generally perceived. There's a growing, not diminishing, constituency for such endeavors.
Next: I believe it was Bar Kochba (I really wish he would change his moniker) who talked about the Arab fear of Israeli economic imperialism. That is, indeed, a very real fear. When Abba Eban addressed the UN General Assembly after the Six Day War (I think that is when this happened, though it may have been earlier) he spoke of how little Israel could get along with the vastness of its neighbors. No problem, he said: Israel will be a highly urbanized core serving a large agricultural hinterland. There it was, all the way back then. He -- as smart as he was -- didn't begin to comprehend how that model would play in the Arab states. The fear of Imperial Israel is very, very real.
More later.
Leonard,
You may be right; I may be wrong, and I am certainly imprecise in my postings.
A nation must prioritize the issues which confront it. In a truly democratic nation, setting priorities must be preceded by discussion among a large number of its citizens (members), who are hopefully aware of the nation’s relevant history. And, then, based on whatever consensus has been achieved, a nation must formulate and act on policies for dealing with these issues. If these policies are new to the nation, then they and their success or failure will be carried into the future as additions to the national culture.
As far as I know, this has not been the experience of Jewish Americans, qua Jews.
Leonard,
Sorry for the somewhat late response. I enjoyed your piece in many ways. It is also truly a tour de force. So much of what you wrote reflects my experiences, feelings, frustrations and thoughts that it is uncanny. I was 13 in 1948, so there was that, too.
So, thank you for writing so personably, eloquently and clearly this piece that I will keep and pass to close friends. Even when you are (in the narrative) in the U.S. and I in Israel, it reads as if we were close friends that connect, sharing their common experiences from afar.
About the future: A few months ago, just before Annapolis, there was a letter composed by Zbigniew Brzezinski and seven others of his caliber( I believe) that contained a detailed outcome of what an I/P agreement should look like. In that same letter, the heavyweights that wrote it so much as said what your piece concludes: Essentially, “If those clowns (the letter did not say “clowns”, of course, it was much too diplomatic in style and content) cannot agree among themselves, there is enough at stake in reaching an agreement that we should impose this agreement on them.”
I have to close with a short confession, that as time passes and the conflict becomes broader (now intensely regional) with broader dimensions (fundamentalism), and Israel and the Palestinians divide further, I am losing some of my optimism.
Joel,
My reference was that the Palestinians have always resembled the Irish republicans and the Israelis are becoming more and more like the Afrikaners, or like what the unionists would have been without the restraining influence of London and if they had been responsible for their own security.
Two topics ago I did mention that a solution in South Africa was possible because all ethnic groups were willing to see themselves as primarily South African. Such a future may become possible in Northern Ireland over time, maybe in a generation. In both South Africa and NI the two sides share a common religion (the theological differences between Catholics and mainstream Protestants are minimal today). In Israel/Palestine that is not the case. This strongly exacerbates the underlying territorial/national conflict. And the fact that the religion of one of the parties is Islam further exacerbates the differences.
Curious: More readers this week than usual, fewer comments.
it was Yeats not Hughes who wrote the famous lines, "We had fed the heart on fantasies..." Just an FYI.
Dan --
You're right, of course. Now I have to track back and see why I erred.
in any event, thanks.
LF
Leonard,
Over the years since making your 2003 analysis you have shared your views in this Conversation, in the Forward and I’m sure in many other fora. Still, I would appreciate a complete description of how your views have changed since then. On the other hand, all our analyses may be irrelevant.
As I recall, in our analyses we have considered the role of the Jew-as-victim self image (promoted by Jewish liturgical elements), the role of those who enjoy continuing power and/or incomes as a result of continuing conflict, and the role that third party nations must play if there is to be Israeli/Palestinian peace. Writing about the need for a two state peace we have emphasized the guilt that we feel about how the Palestinians, Israeli citizens and others, have been treated and the moral and economic destruction of Israeli society that has resulted from the strain of carrying on the occupation and the effort to acquire the West Bank for Israel. Yet, we seem to have missed what is perhaps the most important point, the religious position that underpins the Settlement and the Greater Israel Movements.
I, at least, have not written about the view of so many religious Israelis that it is the Jewish holy mission to resettle the land – all the land, and the shared sympathy with this view that is held by so many others. I have not written, because I have no idea of what to do about it and because I feel a certain level of despair about it.
Israel or at least the Israel we know today would not exist without the olim from the religious Eastern European communities. Their immigration would probably not have occurred without the advocacy of Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak HaCohen Kook. Kook proclaimed the superiority of the Jews and of the Jewish religious culture compared to all others, and asserted that the Jewish religious spirit and national spirit are inseparable (see Kook’s The Land of Israel). It follows, he argued, that the reclamation of all of biblical Israel by the Jews is a religious duty – the first step in the coming of the messiah (ibid. and in his The Rebirth of Israel). Thus, Kook legitimized immigration to Israel for all who had been piously waiting for the messianic ingathering.
Kook’s son and student, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, absorbed his father’s ideas and, in 1967, founded the Gush Emunim. Thousands of modern young religious Jews campaigned actively against any territorial compromise, and established numerous settlements throughout Judea and Samaria. Many of these settlements, though originally founded illegally, were subsequently granted official recognition by the Israeli government. In the early ‘70s, Gush Emunim mutated into today’s Yesha Council, which continues the Gush’s philosophy and program.
Gush Emunim was attractive to others in addition to members of long-settled families. My friend Roz was a member of SZO in ’61, when Harvey was already an accomplished engineer who had served in Alaska with the U.S. armed forces. They both came from indifferently observant families, shared a lot, and married, shortly after meeting. In ’67, Harvey went to Israel for the duration of the war, and he and Roz and their young daughter went on aliyah in ’68 or ’69. In Israel, Roz taught physics, and Harvey worked on advanced RADAR systems.
Roz and Harvey became olim in order to be part of the continuing adventure of building the Jewish homeland. However, they were disappointed to find that hardly anyone was settling the Negev, and there were few who were passionate about developing Israeli leadership in the arts or sciences or in the development of the institutions of justice. They had joined a middle class society, more bourgeois than the one they had left. They were consoled by the fact that so many of the people around them attended services, and, since they had only one day off, Shabbath, they soon found that almost all of their social contacts were with observant Jews. Still longing to be halutzim, it was perfectly natural for them to join Gush Emunim.
What about Israelis who never were, never joined or left the Haredi? Yehuda Shaul is the founder of ‘Breaking the Silence', an organization of former IDF members publicizing the day-to-day ugliness of the occupation. He recently spoke at a meeting sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a video of his presentation can be viewed by going to the Americans for Peace Now web site. He was asked whether the settler movement was holding the Israeli Government hostage? Using the settlement in Hebron as an example, Shaul answered that the situation was mixed and complicated. “The Hebron settlers, which are considered the most violent and extreme settlers, are really wacko and are considered really out by the majority of Israelis, but the idea of having a settlement inside Hebron, near the tomb of the patriarchs, is a very mainstream idea.”
Is it correct to conclude from Shaul’s statement that not only do the Haredi think that their portion-in-the-world-to-come depends on their dedication to redeeming all of the land and that Israeli society, generally, believes that redeeming the land is the proper path to the future? The Tel Aviv University’s Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC) (http://www.tau.ac.il/peace/) has been surveying Israelis and Territory residents every month since June, 1994. The TSC has developed a Negotiations Index. If all respondents heavily favor negotiations and greatly believe that negotiations will bring peace in the coming years, then the Negotiations Index will be 100. The results of the February 4 – 6, 2008 survey were, Negotiation Index: 42.9 (Jewish sample - 39.3).
If the foregoing picture of Israeli opinion is correct, then it is no wonder that many in the IDF officer corps and in the courts and in the government ministries are complicit in continuing the establishment of illegal settlements, their expansion and the persecution of the Palestinians. In the presentation mentioned above, Yehudah Shaul said that the U.S. has an essential role to play in bringing peace. He also said that: “You can’t turn a society around overnight or in ten years.” Do we have ten years? Does anyone have ideas about how we can shorten this period, which will surely be filled with growing economic and moral poverty and death for both Israelis and Palestinians?
To Joel Levitt-
As a "right-wing Orthodox/religious pro-settlement" Israeli Jew (originally from a traditionalist-but non-Orthodox background in California) I would say your analysis about the ideological motives of the pro-Judea/Samaria settlement movement as initially articulated by Rav Kook is pretty fair. However, it is interesting how you and others draw distinctions between this group which is viewed as "extremist" or "crazy" and an earlier group of settlers who went to the Jezreel Valley or the Negev or the Sharon region and did the same thing, drain the swamps, build settlements and fight off Arab marauders who didn't want to see Jews in those places any more than they want to see thim in Judea/Samaria today. This second group is still viewed as being "salt of the earth" or "progressive" or whatever. They, instead of quoting the Bible and Rav Kook quoted Marx and A. D. Gordon. Both did the same things, but the "progressives" who dismiss the first group as "extremists" while lauding the second group are certainly being inconsistent, certainly from the viewpiont of the Arabs.
What I don't understand is the fact that you put the onus of change on the Israelis. You quote Yehudah Shaul as saying "you can't turn around a society overnight or in ten years", implying that if only we can get rid of this "settler mentality" then we can have peace. Why not change the mentality of the Arabs? Why not convince them, as Shimon Peres did in the books written in his name about the New Middle East to exchange Islam for the modern, consumerism, globalist materialist culture. Wouldn't that help make peace. Most Israelis, on both the Right AND Left do not believe the Arab will ever agree to making peace with Israel on ANY terms and within ANY borders. This led to the Sharon/Olmert Kadima policy of unilateral withdrawals which, of course, blew up in their faces.
Thus, the idea that "if only there would be a US Administration that will knuckle down and impose a withdrawal on the Israelis" is a non-starter because that would not bring peace, it would bring war. You are going to have to convince the Arabs to want peace, and that just does't seem to be in the cards, at least for the foreseeable future.
To Joel Levitt-
As a "right-wing Orthodox/religious pro-settlement" Israeli Jew (originally from a traditionalist-but non-Orthodox background in California) I would say your analysis about the ideological motives of the pro-Judea/Samaria settlement movement as initially articulated by Rav Kook is pretty fair. However, it is interesting how you and others draw distinctions between this group which is viewed as "extremist" or "crazy" and an earlier group of settlers who went to the Jezreel Valley or the Negev or the Sharon region and did the same thing, drain the swamps, build settlements and fight off Arab marauders who didn't want to see Jews in those places any more than they want to see thim in Judea/Samaria today. This second group is still viewed as being "salt of the earth" or "progressive" or whatever. They, instead of quoting the Bible and Rav Kook quoted Marx and A. D. Gordon. Both did the same things, but the "progressives" who dismiss the first group as "extremists" while lauding the second group are certainly being inconsistent, certainly from the viewpiont of the Arabs.
What I don't understand is the fact that you put the onus of change on the Israelis. You quote Yehudah Shaul as saying "you can't turn around a society overnight or in ten years", implying that if only we can get rid of this "settler mentality" then we can have peace. Why not change the mentality of the Arabs? Why not convince them, as Shimon Peres did in the books written in his name about the New Middle East to exchange Islam for the modern, consumerism, globalist materialist culture. Wouldn't that help make peace. Most Israelis, on both the Right AND Left do not believe the Arab will ever agree to making peace with Israel on ANY terms and within ANY borders. This led to the Sharon/Olmert Kadima policy of unilateral withdrawals which, of course, blew up in their faces.
Thus, the idea that "if only there would be a US Administration that will knuckle down and impose a withdrawal on the Israelis" is a non-starter because that would not bring peace, it would bring war. You are going to have to convince the Arabs to want peace, and that just does't seem to be in the cards, at least for the foreseeable future
bar_kochba,
1) I did not write that the Haredi settlers are crazy. I do believe that the Jewish Israelis who are religiously committed to resisting a two-state peace, like the Palestinians, e.g., Hamas loyalists, who resist for their religious reasons, are unwittingly bent on their own destruction. As I understand the matter, they disagree with this view, because they all believe that God is on their side. I don’t understand how they, particularly my fellow Jews, can believe that God wants them to kill each other over a peace of land.
2) I believe that the majority of the Israeli Jews and of the Palestinians want peace, while they also want other things that are not consistent with peace. However, I think that the religious resistors are the ones who are fervently convinced that these other things are by far the more important.
3) Changing the Arab mentality (your words) is the job of the enlightened Arab leaders. Our job is changing the Jewish view.
4) There are enlightened Palestinians, many of them, even among the Palestinian leadership examples are Abbas and Fayad and the Palestinians who signed the Geneva Accord: Yasser Abed-Rabbo, former Minister of Information and Culture; Nabil Qassis, former Minister of Tourism; Qadoura Fares, Palestinian Legislative Council member; Mohamed Horani, Palestinian Legislative Council member associated with Fatah/Tanzim; Samih al-Abed, Palestinian Legislative Council member; Bashar Jum'a, Palestinian Legislative Council member; Dr. Nazmi Shuabi, Palestinian Legislative Council member; Gheith al-Omri, Palestinian Legislative Council member (from the Negotiations Support Unit); Jamal Zakut, Palestinian Legislative Council Member; Hisham Abdel Raziq, then Prisoners Affairs Minister; Ghadi Jarei, then member of the Prisoners Committee and Fatah Nazmi Jub'a; and General Zoheir Manasra, former Governor of Jenin and the Head of Preventative Security in the West Bank.
5) I agree with you, as I wrote in post #5, “…the terms of future Israeli/Palestinian relations must be determined by the parties themselves and cannot be imposed.” But, the U.S. and the rest of the international community can tip the balance toward negotiations. And, they can help in the negotiations and in their implementation.
Sorry for the multiple posting, the computer seemed to hang up.
To Joel Levitt:
Do any of the Palestinians on this list you mentioned tell their own people that they had better give up the way of violence, or are their statements directed at Israelis and the western media only? You list Abbas and Fayyad , and yet their own state-controlled media is always dehumanizing the Jews ("decendents of pigs and monkeys") and calling for violence. How can you say they are for "peace" when their own state-controlled media says the opposite? Are they telling their own people that there isn't going to be a "right of return"? Abbas keeps saying explicity that there is and that he won't make any concessions that Arafat wouldn't make.
I can assure you that if an Arab leader really came forward and spoke about peace and ending the violence ONCE AND FOR ALL the Israeli people would respond in the way the "progressive" camp would like, even though I would oppose it. But the Arabs are making it easy for us "rejectionists" because they seem to be incapable of doing that.
bar_kochba,
Yes, Abbas has told his public that violence is the way to lose. No, Abbas continues to insist on the return of Palestinian refugees to Israeli territory, just as Olmert has insisted that East Jerusalem is not a settlement, but a part of Israel. Olmert cannot command. He must act carefully or he will be ignored. The same is true of Abbas. As a matter of fact, the Geneva Accord pretty much leaves it to Israel to decide what if anything Israel will do about these refugees:
“Article 7 - Refugees
1. Significance of the Refugee Problem
(a) The Parties recognize that, in the context of two independent states, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace, an agreed resolution of the refugee problem is necessary for achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace between them.
(b) Such a resolution will also be central to stability building and development in the region.
2. UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative
(a) The Parties recognize that UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative (Article 2.ii.) concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees represent the basis for resolving the refugee issue, and agree that these rights are fulfilled according to Article 7 of this Agreement.
3. Compensation
(a) Refugees shall be entitled to compensation for their refugeehood and for loss of property. This shall not prejudice or be prejudiced by the refugee's permanent place of residence.
(b) The Parties recognize the right of states that have hosted Palestinian refugees to remuneration.
4. Choice of Permanent Place of Residence (PPR)
The solution to the PPR aspect of the refugee problem shall entail an act of informed choice on the part of the refugee to be exercised in accordance with the options and modalities set forth in this agreement. PPR options from which the refugees may choose shall be as follows;
(a) The state of Palestine, in accordance with clause a below.
(b) Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap, following assumption of Palestinian sovereignty, in accordance with clause a below.
(c) Third Countries, in accordance with clause b below.
(d) The state of Israel, in accordance with clause c below.
(e) Present Host countries, in accordance with clause d below.
i. PPR options i and ii shall be the right of all Palestinian refugees and shall be in accordance with the laws of the State of Palestine.
ii. Option iii shall be at the sovereign discretion of third countries and shall be in accordance with numbers that each third country will submit to the International Commission. These numbers shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that each third country shall accept.
iii. Option iv shall be at the sovereign discretion of Israel and will be in accordance with a number that Israel will submit to the International Commission. This number shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that Israel shall accept. As a basis, Israel will consider the average of the total numbers submitted by the different third countries to the International Commission.
iv. Option v shall be in accordance with the sovereign discretion of present host countries. Where exercised this shall be in the context of prompt and extensive development and rehabilitation programs for the refugee communities.
Priority in all the above shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon. “
The Geneva Accord was signed in early 2004, four years ago. I think it is important for us to become reacquainted with its contents, very long though it is.
The Geneva Accord
The following is the text of the Geneva Accord: Posted: 10/19/03
Draft Permanent Status Agreement
Preamble
The State of Israel (hereinafter "Israel") and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter "PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people (hereinafter the "Parties"):
Reaffirming their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security based on a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace and achieving historic reconciliation;
Recognizing that peace requires the transition from the logic of war and confrontation to the logic of peace and cooperation, and that acts and words characteristic of the state of war are neither appropriate nor acceptable in the era of peace;
Affirming their deep belief that the logic of peace requires compromise, and that the only viable solution is a two-state solution based on UNSC Resolution 242 and 338;
Affirming that this agreement marks the recognition of the right of the Jewish people to statehood and the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to statehood, without prejudice to the equal rights of the Parties' respective citizens;
Recognizing that after years of living in mutual fear and insecurity, both peoples need to enter an era of peace, security and stability, entailing all necessary actions by the parties to guarantee the realization of this era;
Recognizing each other's right to peaceful and secure existence within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
Determined to establish relations based on cooperation and the commitment to live side by side as good neighbors aiming both separately and jointly to contribute to the well-being of their peoples;
Reaffirming their obligation to conduct themselves in conformity with the norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations;
Confirming that this Agreement is concluded within the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated in Madrid in October 1991, the Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993, the subsequent agreements including the Interim Agreement of September 1995, the Wye River Memorandum of October 1998 and the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum of September 4, 1999, and the permanent status negotiations including the Camp David Summit of July 2000, the Clinton Ideas of December 2000, and the Taba Negotiations of January 2001;
Reiterating their commitment to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 1397 and confirming their understanding that this Agreement is based on, will lead to, and - by its fulfillment - will constitute the full implementation of these resolutions and to the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in all its aspects;
Declaring that this Agreement constitutes the realization of the permanent status peace component envisaged in President Bush's speech of June 24, 2002 and in the Quartet Roadmap process;
Declaring that this Agreement marks the historic reconciliation between the Palestinians and Israelis, and paves the way to reconciliation between the Arab World and Israel and the establishment of normal, peaceful relations between the Arab states and Israel in accordance with the relevant clauses of the Beirut Arab League Resolution of March 28, 2002; and
Resolved to pursue the goal of attaining a comprehensive regional peace, thus contributing to stability, security, development and prosperity throughout the region;
Have agreed on the following:
Article 1 - Purpose of the Permanent Status Agreement
1. The Permanent Status Agreement (hereinafter "this Agreement") ends the era of conflict and ushers in a new era based on peace, cooperation, and good neighborly relations between the Parties.
2. The implementation of this Agreement will settle all the claims of the Parties arising from events occurring prior to its signature. No further claims related to events prior to this Agreement may be raised by either Party.
Article 2 - Relations between the Parties
1. The state of Israel shall recognize the state of Palestine (hereinafter "Palestine") upon its establishment. The state of Palestine shall immediately recognize the state of Israel.
2. The state of Palestine shall be the successor to the PLO with all its rights and obligations.
3. Israel and Palestine shall immediately establish full diplomatic and consular relations with each other and will exchange resident Ambassadors, within one month of their mutual recognition.
4. The Parties recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The Parties are committed not to interfere in each other's internal affairs.
5. This Agreement supercedes all prior agreements between the Parties.
6. Without prejudice to the commitments undertaken by them in this Agreement, relations between Israel and Palestine shall be based upon the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
7. With a view to the advancement of the relations between the two States and peoples, Palestine and Israel shall cooperate in areas of common interest. These shall include, but are not limited to, dialogue between their legislatures and state institutions, cooperation between their appropriate local authorities, promotion of non-governmental civil society cooperation, and joint programs and exchange in the areas of culture, media, youth, science, education, environment, health, agriculture, tourism, and crime prevention. The Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee will oversee this cooperation in accordance with Article 8.
8. The Parties shall cooperate in areas of joint economic interest, to best realize the human potential of their respective peoples. In this regard, they will work bilaterally, regionally, and with the international community to maximize the benefit of peace to the broadest cross-section of their respective populations. Relevant standing bodies shall be established by the Parties to this effect.
9. The Parties shall establish robust modalities for security cooperation, and engage in a comprehensive and uninterrupted effort to end terrorism and violence directed against each others persons, property, institutions or territory. This effort shall continue at all times, and shall be insulated from any possible crises and other aspects of the Parties' relations.
10. Israel and Palestine shall work together and separately with other parties in the region to enhance and promote regional cooperation and coordination in spheres of common interest.
11. The Parties shall establish a ministerial-level Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee to guide, monitor, and facilitate the process of implementation of this Agreement, both bilaterally and in accordance with the mechanisms in Article 3 hereunder.
Article 3: Implementation and Verification Group
1. Establishment and Composition
(a) An Implementation and Verification Group (IVG) shall hereby be established to facilitate, assist in, guarantee, monitor, and resolve disputes relating to the implementation of this Agreement.
(b) The IVG shall include the U.S., the Russian Federation, the EU, the UN, and other parties, both regional and international, to be agreed on by the Parties.
(c) The IVG shall work in coordination with the Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee established in Article 2/11 above and subsequent to that with the Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee (IPCC) established in Article 8 hereunder.
(d) The structure, procedures, and modalities of the IVG are set forth below and detailed in Annex X.
2. Structure
(a) A senior political-level contact group (Contact Group), composed of all the IVG members, shall be the highest authority in the IVG.
(b) The Contact Group shall appoint, in consultation with the Parties, a Special Representative who will be the principal executive of the IVG on the ground. The Special Representative shall manage the work of the IVG and maintain constant contact with the Parties, the Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee, and the Contact Group.
(c) The IVG permanent headquarters and secretariat shall be based in an agreed upon location in Jerusalem.
(d) The IVG shall establish its bodies referred to in this Agreement and additional bodies as it deems necessary. These bodies shall be an integral part of and under the authority of the IVG.
(e) The Multinational Force (MF) established under Article 5 shall be an integral part of the IVG. The Special Representative shall, subject to the approval of the Parties, appoint the Commander of the MF who shall be responsible for the daily command of the MF. Details relating to the Special Representative and MF Force Commander are set forth in Annex X.
(f) The IVG shall establish a dispute settlement mechanism, in accordance with Article 16.
3. Coordination with the Parties
A Trilateral Committee composed of the Special Representative and the Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee shall be established and shall meet on at least a monthly basis to review the implementation of this Agreement. The Trilateral Committee will convene within 48 hours upon the request of any of the three parties represented.
4. Functions
In addition to the functions specified elsewhere in this Agreement, the IVG shall:
(a) Take appropriate measures based on the reports it receives from the MF,
(b) Assist the Parties in implementing the Agreement and preempt and promptly mediate disputes on the ground.
5. Termination
In accordance with the progress in the implementation of this Agreement, and with the fulfillment of the specific mandated functions, the IVG shall terminate its activities in the said spheres. The IVG shall continue to exist unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
Article 4 - Territory
1. The International Borders between the States of Palestine and Israel
(a) In accordance with UNSC Resolution 242 and 338, the border between the states of Palestine and Israel shall be based on the June 4th 1967 lines with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis as set forth in attached Map 1.
(b) The Parties recognize the border, as set out in attached Map 1, as the permanent, secure and recognized international boundary between them.
2. Sovereignty and Inviolability
(a) The Parties recognize and respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, as well as the inviolability of each others territory, including territorial waters, and airspace. They shall respect this inviolability in accordance with this Agreement, the UN Charter, and other rules of international law.
(b) The Parties recognize each other's rights in their exclusive economic zones in accordance with international law.
3. Israeli Withdrawal
(a) Israel shall withdraw in accordance with Article 5.
(b) Palestine shall assume responsibility for the areas from which Israel withdraws.
(c) The transfer of authority from Israel to Palestine shall be in accordance with Annex X.
(d) The IVG shall monitor, verify, and facilitate the implementation of this Article.
4. Demarcation
(a) A Joint Technical Border Commission (Commission) composed of the two Parties shall be established to conduct the technical demarcation of the border in accordance with this Article. The procedures governing the work of this Commission are set forth in Annex X.
(b) Any disagreement in the Commission shall be referred to the IVG in accordance with Annex X.
(c) The physical demarcation of the international borders shall be completed by the Commission not later than nine months from the date of the entry into force of this Agreement.
5. Settlements
(a) The state of Israel shall be responsible for resettling the Israelis residing in Palestinian sovereign territory outside this territory.
(b) The resettlement shall be completed according to the schedule stipulated in Article 5.
(c) Existing arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip regarding Israeli settlers and settlements, including security, shall remain in force in each of the settlements until the date prescribed in the timetable for the completion of the evacuation of the relevant settlement.
(d) Modalities for the assumption of authority over settlements by Palestine are set forth in Annex X. The IVG shall resolve any disputes that may arise during its implementation.
(e) Israel shall keep intact the immovable property, infrastructure and facilities in Israeli settlements to be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty. An agreed inventory shall be drawn up by the Parties with the IVG in advance of the completion of the evacuation and in accordance with Annex X.
(f) The state of Palestine shall have exclusive title to all land and any buildings, facilities, infrastructure or other property remaining in any of the settlements on the date prescribed in the timetable for the completion of the evacuation of this settlement.
6. Corridor
(a) The states of Palestine and Israel shall establish a corridor linking the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This corridor shall:
i. Be under Israeli sovereignty.
ii. Be permanently open.
iii. Be under Palestinian administration in accordance with Annex X of this Agreement. Palestinian law shall apply to persons using and procedures appertaining to the corridor.
iv. Not disrupt Israeli transportation and other infrastructural networks, or endanger the environment, public safety or public health. Where necessary, engineering solutions will be sought to avoid such disruptions.
v. Allow for the establishment of the necessary infrastructural facilities linking the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Infrastructural facilities shall be understood to include, inter alia, pipelines, electrical and communications cables, and associated equipment as detailed in Annex X.
vi. Not be used in contravention of this Agreement.
(b) Defensive barriers shall be established along the corridor and Palestinians shall not enter Israel from this corridor, nor shall Israelis enter Palestine from the corridor.
(c) The Parties shall seek the assistance of the international community in securing the financing for the corridor.
(d) The IVG shall guarantee the implementation of this Article in accordance with Annex X.
(e) Any disputes arising between the Parties from the operation of the corridor shall be resolved in accordance with Article 16.
(f) The arrangements set forth in this clause may only be terminated or revised by agreement of both Parties.
Article 5 - Security
1. General Security Provisions
(a) The Parties acknowledge that mutual understanding and co-operation in security-related matters will form a significant part of their bilateral relations and will further enhance regional security. Palestine and Israel shall base their security relations on cooperation, mutual trust, good neighborly relations, and the protection of their joint interests.
(b) Palestine and Israel each shall:
i. Recognize and respect the other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from the threat or acts of war, terrorism and violence;
ii. refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other and shall settle all disputes between them by peaceful means;
iii. refrain from joining, assisting, promoting or co-operating with any coalition, organization or alliance of a military or security character, the objectives or activities of which include launching aggression or other acts of hostility against the other;
iv. refrain from organizing, encouraging, or allowing the formation of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries and militias within their respective territory and prevent their establishment. In this respect, any existing irregular forces or armed bands shall be disbanded and prevented from reforming at any future date;
v. refrain from organizing, assisting, allowing, or participating in acts of violence in or against the other or acquiescing in activities directed toward the commission of such acts.
(c) To further security cooperation, the Parties shall establish a high level Joint Security Committee that shall meet on at least a monthly basis. The Joint Security Committee shall have a permanent joint office, and may establish such sub-committees as it deems necessary, including sub-committees to immediately resolve localized tensions.
2. Regional Security
i. Israel and Palestine shall work together with their neighbors and the international community to build a secure and stable Middle East, free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting, and stable peace, characterized by reconciliation, goodwill, and the renunciation of the use of force.
ii. To this end, the Parties shall work together to establish a regional security regime.
3. Defense Characteristics of the Palestinian State
(a) No armed forces, other than as specified in this Agreement, will be deployed or stationed in Palestine.
(b) Palestine shall be a non-militarized state, with a strong security force. Accordingly, the limitations on the weapons that may be purchased, owned, or used by the Palestinian Security Force (PSF) or manufactured in Palestine shall be specified in Annex X. Any proposed changes to Annex X shall be considered by a trilateral committee composed of the two Parties and the MF. If no agreement is reached in the trilateral committee, the IVG may make its own recommendations.
i. No individuals or organizations in Palestine other than the PSF and the organs of the IVG, including the MF, may purchase, possess, carry or use weapons except as provided by law.
(c) The PSF shall:
i. Maintain border control;
ii. Maintain law-and-order and perform police functions;
iii. Perform intelligence and security functions;
iv. Prevent terrorism;
v. Conduct rescue and emergency missions; and
vi. Supplement essential community services when necessary.
(d) The MF shall monitor and verify compliance with this clause.
4. Terrorism
(a) The Parties reject and condemn terrorism and violence in all its forms and shall pursue public policies accordingly. In addition, the parties shall refrain from actions and policies that are liable to nurture extremism and create conditions conducive to terrorism on either side.
(b) The Parties shall take joint and, in their respective territories, unilateral comprehensive and continuous efforts against all aspects of violence and terrorism. These efforts shall include the prevention and preemption of such acts, and the prosecution of their perpetrators.
(c) To that end, the Parties shall maintain ongoing consultation, cooperation, and exchange of information between their respective security forces.
(d) A Trilateral Security Committee composed of the two Parties and the United States shall be formed to ensure the implementation of this Article. The Trilateral Security Committee shall develop comprehensive policies and guidelines to fight terrorism and violence.
5. Incitement
(a) Without prejudice to freedom of expression and other internationally recognized human rights, Israel and Palestine shall promulgate laws to prevent incitement to irredentism, racism, terrorism and violence and vigorously enforce them.
(b) The IVG shall assist the Parties in establishing guidelines for the implementation of this clause, and shall monitor the Parties' adherence thereto.
6. Multinational Force
(a) A Multinational Force (MF) shall be established to provide security guarantees to the Parties, act as a deterrent, and oversee the implementation of the relevant provisions of this Agreement.
(b) The composition, structure and size of the MF are set forth in Annex X.
(c) To perform the functions specified in this Agreement, the MF shall be deployed in the state of Palestine. The MF shall enter into the appropriate Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the state of Palestine.
(d) In accordance with this Agreement, and as detailed in Annex X, the MF shall:
i. In light of the non-militarized nature of the Palestinian state, protect the territorial integrity of the state of Palestine.
ii. Serve as a deterrent against external attacks that could threaten either of the Parties.
iii. Deploy observers to areas adjacent to the lines of the Israeli withdrawal during the phases of this withdrawal, in accordance with Annex X.
iv. Deploy observers to monitor the territorial and maritime borders of the state of Palestine, as specified in clause 5/13.
v. Perform the functions on the Palestinian international border crossings specified in clause 5/12.
vi. Perform the functions relating to the early warning stations as specified in clause 5/8.
vii. Perform the functions specified in clause 5/3.
viii. Perform the functions specified in clause 5/7.
ix. Perform the functions specified in Article 10.
x. Help in the enforcement of anti-terrorism measures.
xi. Help in the training of the PSF.
(e) In relation to the above, the MF shall report to and update the IVG in accordance with Annex X.
(f) The MF shall only be withdrawn or have its mandate changed by agreement of the Parties.
7. Evacuation
(a) Israel shall withdraw all its military and security personnel and equipment, including landmines, and all persons employed to support them, and all military installations from the territory of the state of Palestine, except as otherwise agreed in Annex X, in stages.
(b) The staged withdrawals shall commence immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be made in accordance with the timetable and modalities set forth in Annex X.
(c) The stages shall be designed subject to the following principles:
i. The need to create immediate clear contiguity and facilitate the early implementation of Palestinian development plans.
ii. Israel's capacity to relocate, house and absorb settlers. While costs and inconveniences are inherent in such a process, these shall not be unduly disruptive.
iii. The need to construct and operationalize the border between the two states.
iv. The introduction and effective functioning of the MF, in particular on the eastern border of the state of Palestine.
(d) Accordingly, the withdrawal shall be implemented in the following stages:
i. The first stage shall include the areas of the state of Palestine, as defined in Map X, and shall be completed within 9 months.
ii. The second and third stages shall include the remainder of the territory of the state of Palestine and shall be completed within 21 months of the end of the first stage.
(e) Israel shall complete its withdrawal from the territory of the state of Palestine within 30 months of the entry into force of this Agreement, and in accordance with this Agreement.
(f) Israel will maintain a small military presence in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the MF and subject to the MF SOFA as detailed in Annex X for an additional 36 months. The stipulated period may be reviewed by the Parties in the event of relevant regional developments, and may be altered by the Parties' consent.
(g) In accordance with Annex X, the MF shall monitor and verify compliance with this clause.
8. Early Warning Stations
(a) Israel may maintain two EWS in the northern, and central West Bank at the locations set forth in Annex X.
(b) The EWS shall be staffed by the minimal required number of Israeli personnel and shall occupy the minimal amount of land necessary for their operation as set forth in Annex X.
(c) Access to the EWS will be guaranteed and escorted by the MF.
(d) Internal security of the EWS shall be the responsibility of Israel. The perimeter security of the EWS shall be the responsibility of the MF.
(e) The MF and the PSF shall maintain a liaison presence in the EWS. The MF shall monitor and verify that the EWS is being used for purposes recognized by this Agreement as detailed in Annex X.
(f) The arrangements set forth in this Article shall be subject to review in ten years, with any changes to be mutually agreed. Thereafter, there will be five-yearly reviews whereby the arrangements set forth in this Article may be extended by mutual consent.
(g) If at any point during the period specified above a regional security regime is established, then the IVG may request that the Parties review whether to continue or revise operational uses for the EWS in light of these developments. Any such change will require the mutual consent of the Parties.
9. Airspace
(a) Civil Aviation
i. The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the multilateral aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (The Chicago Convention) and the 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement.
ii. In addition, the Parties shall, upon entry into force of this Agreement, establish a trilateral committee composed of the two Parties and the IVG to design the most efficient management system for civil aviation, including those relevant aspects of the air traffic control system. In the absence of consensus the IVG may make its own recommendations.
(b) Training
i. The Israeli Air Force shall be entitled to use the Palestinian sovereign airspace for training purposes in accordance with Annex X, which shall be based on rules pertaining to IAF use of Israeli airspace.
ii. The IVG shall monitor and verify compliance with this clause. Either Party may submit a complaint to the IVG whose decision shall be conclusive.
iii. The arrangements set forth in this clause shall be subject to review every ten years, and may be altered or terminated by the agreement of both Parties.
10. Electromagnetic Sphere
(a) Neither Party's use of the electromagnetic sphere may interfere with the other Party's use.
(b) Annex X shall detail arrangements relating to the use of the electromagnetic sphere.
(c) The IVG shall monitor and verify the implementation of this clause and Annex X.
(d) Any Party may submit a complaint to the IVG whose decision shall be conclusive.
11. Law Enforcement
The Israeli and Palestinian law enforcement agencies shall cooperate in combating illicit drug trafficking, illegal trafficking in archaeological artifacts and objects of arts, cross-border crime, including theft and fraud, organized crime, trafficking in women and minors, counterfeiting, pirate TV and radio stations, and other illegal activity.
12. International Border Crossings
(a) The following arrangements shall apply to borders crossing between the state of Palestine and Jordan, the state of Palestine and Egypt, as well as airport and seaport entry points to the state of Palestine.
(b) All border crossings shall be monitored by joint teams composed of members of the PSF and the MF. These teams shall prevent the entry into Palestine of any weapons, materials or equipment that are in contravention of the provisions of this Agreement.
(c) The MF representatives and the PSF will have, jointly and separately, the authority to block the entry into Palestine of any such items. If at any time a disagreement regarding the entrance of goods or materials arises between the PSF and the MF representatives, the PSF may bring the matter to the IVG, whose binding conclusions shall be rendered within 24 hours.
(d) This arrangement shall be reviewed by the IVG after 5 years to determine its continuation, modification or termination. Thereafter, the Palestinian party may request such a review on an annual basis.
(e) In passenger terminals, for thirty months, Israel may maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing appropriate technology. The Israeli side may request that the MF-PSF conduct further inspections and take appropriate action.
(f) For the following two years, these arrangements will continue in a specially designated facility in Israel, utilizing appropriate technology. This shall not cause delays beyond the procedures outlined in this clause.
(g) In cargo terminals, for thirty months, Israel may maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing appropriate technology. The Israeli side may request that the MF-PSF conduct further inspections and take appropriate action. If the Israeli side is not satisfied by the MF-PSF action, it may demand that the cargo be detained pending a decision by an MF inspector. The MF inspector's decision shall be binding and final, and shall be rendered within 12 hours of the Israeli complaint.
(h) For the following three years, these arrangements will continue from a specially designated facility in Israel, utilizing appropriate technology. This shall not cause delays beyond the timelines outlined in this clause.
(i) A high level trilateral committee composed of representatives of Palestine, Israel, and the IVG shall meet regularly to monitor the application of these procedures and correct any irregularities, and may be convened on request.
(j) The details of the above are set forth in Annex X.
13. Border Control
(a) The PSF shall maintain border control as detailed in Annex X.
(b) The MF shall monitor and verify the maintenance of border control by the PSF.
Article 6 - Jerusalem
1. Religious and Cultural Significance:
(a) The Parties recognize the universal historic, religious, spiritual, and cultural significance of Jerusalem and its holiness enshrined in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In recognition of this status, the Parties reaffirm their commitment to safeguard the character, holiness, and freedom of worship in the city and to respect the existing division of administrative functions and traditional practices between different denominations.
(b) The Parties shall establish an inter-faith body consisting of representatives of the three monotheistic faiths, to act as a consultative body to the Parties on matters related to the city's religious significance and to promote inter-religious understanding and dialogue. The composition, procedures, and modalities for this body are set forth in Annex X.
2. Capital of Two States
The Parties shall have their mutually recognized capitals in the areas of Jerusalem under their respective sovereignty.
3. Sovereignty
Sovereignty in Jerusalem shall be in accordance with attached Map 2. This shall not prejudice nor be prejudiced by the arrangements set forth below.
4. Border Regime
The border regime shall be designed according to the provisions of Article 11, and taking into account the specific needs of Jerusalem (e.g., movement of tourists and intensity of border crossing use including provisions for Jerusalemites) and the provisions of this Article.
5. al-Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount (Compound)
(a) International Group
i. An International Group, composed of the IVG and other parties to be agreed upon by the Parties, including members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), shall hereby be established to monitor, verify, and assist in the implementation of this clause.
ii. For this purpose, the International Group shall establish a Multinational Presence on the Compound, the composition, structure, mandate and functions of which are set forth in Annex X.
iii. The Multinational Presence shall have specialized detachments dealing with security and conservation. The Multinational Presence shall make periodic conservation and security reports to the International Group. These reports shall be made public.
iv. The Multinational Presence shall strive to immediately resolve any problems arising and may refer any unresolved disputes to the International Group that will function in accordance with Article 16.
v. The Parties may at any time request clarifications or submit complaints to the International Group which shall be promptly investigated and acted upon.
vi. The International Group shall draw up rules and regulations to maintain security on and conservation of the Compound. These shall include lists of the weapons and equipment permitted on the site.
(b) Regulations Regarding the Compound
i. In view of the sanctity of the Compound, and in light of the unique religious and cultural significance of the site to the Jewish people, there shall be no digging, excavation, or construction on the Compound, unless approved by the two Parties. Procedures for regular maintenance and emergency repairs on the Compound shall be established by the IG after consultation with the Parties.
ii. The state of Palestine shall be responsible for maintaining the security of the Compound and for ensuring that it will not be used for any hostile acts against Israelis or Israeli areas. The only arms permitted on the Compound shall be those carried by the Palestinian security personnel and the security detachment of the Multinational Presence.
iii. In light of the universal significance of the Compound, and subject to security considerations and to the need not to disrupt religious worship or decorum on the site as determined by the Waqf, visitors shall be allowed access to the site. This shall be without any discrimination and generally be in accordance with past practice.
(c) Transfer of Authority
i. At the end of the withdrawal period stipulated in Article 5/7, the state of Palestine shall assert sovereignty over the Compound.
ii. The International Group and its subsidiary organs shall continue to exist and fulfill all the functions stipulated in this Article unless otherwise agreed by the two Parties.
6. The Wailing Wall
The Wailing Wall shall be under Israeli sovereignty.
7. The Old City
(a) Significance of the Old City
i. The Parties view the Old City as one whole enjoying a unique character. The Parties agree that the preservation of this unique character together with safeguarding and promoting the welfare of the inhabitants should guide the administration of the Old City.
ii. The Parties shall act in accordance with the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage List regulations, in which the Old City is a registered site.
(b)IVG Role in the Old City
i. Cultural Heritage
1. The IVG shall monitor and verify the preservation of cultural heritage in the Old City in accordance with the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage List rules. For this purpose, the IVG shall have free and unimpeded access to sites, documents, and information related to the performance of this function.
2. The IVG shall work in close coordination with the Old City Committee of the Jerusalem Coordination and Development Committee (JCDC), including in devising a restoration and preservation plan for the Old City.
ii. Policing
1. The IVG shall establish an Old City Policing Unit (PU) to liaise with, coordinate between, and assist the Palestinian and Israeli police forces in the Old City, to defuse localized tensions and help resolve disputes, and to perform policing duties in locations specified in and according to operational procedures detailed in Annex X.
2. The PU shall periodically report to the IVG.
iii. Either Party may submit complaints in relation to this clause to the IVG, which shall promptly act upon them in accordance with Article 16.
(c) Free Movement within the Old City
Movement within the Old City shall be free and unimpeded subject to the provisions of this article and rules and regulations pertaining to the various holy sites.
(d) Entry into and Exit from the Old City
i. Entry and exit points into and from the Old City will be staffed by the authorities of the state under whose sovereignty the point falls, with the presence of PU members, unless otherwise specified.
ii. With a view to facilitating movement into the Old City, each Party shall take such measures at the entry points in its territory as to ensure the preservation of security in the Old City. The PU shall monitor the operation of the entry points.
iii. Citizens of either Party may not exit the Old City into the territory of the other Party unless they are in possession of the relevant documentation that entitles them to. Tourists may only exit the Old City into the territory of the Party which they posses valid authorization to enter.
(e) Suspension, Termination, and Expansion
i. Either Party may suspend the arrangements set forth in Article 6.7.iii in cases of emergency for one week. The extension of such suspension for longer than a week shall be pursuant to consultation with the other Party and the IVG at the Trilateral Committee established in Article 3/3.
ii. This clause shall not apply to the arrangements set forth in Article 6/7/vi.
iii. Three years after the transfer of authority over the Old City, the Parties shall review these arrangements. These arrangements may only be terminated by agreement of the Parties.
iv. The Parties shall examine the possibility of expanding these arrangements beyond the Old City and may agree to such an expansion.
(f) Special Arrangements
i. Along the way outlined in Map X (from the Jaffa Gate to the Zion Gate) there will be permanent and guaranteed arrangements for Israelis regarding access, freedom of movement, and security, as set forth in Annex X.
1. The IVG shall be responsible for the implementation of these arrangements.
ii. Without prejudice to Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli administration of the Citadel will be as outlined in Annex X.
(g) Color-Coding of the Old City
A visible color-coding scheme shall be used in the Old City to denote the sovereign areas of the respective Parties.
(h) Policing
i. An agreed number of Israeli police shall constitute the Israeli Old City police detachment and shall exercise responsibility for maintaining order and day-to-day policing functions in the area under Israeli sovereignty.
ii. An agreed number of Palestinian police shall constitute the Palestinian Old City police detachment and shall exercise responsibility for maintaining order and day-to-day policing functions in the area under Palestinian sovereignty.
iii. All members of the respective Israeli and Palestinian Old City police detachments shall undergo special training, including joint training exercises, to be administered by the PU.
iv. A special Joint Situation Room, under the direction of the PU and incorporating members of the Israeli and Palestinian Old City police detachments, shall facilitate liaison on all relevant matters of policing and security in the Old City.
(i) Arms
No person shall be allowed to carry or possess arms in the Old City, with the exception of the Police Forces provided for in this agreement. In addition, each Party may grant special written permission to carry or possess arms in areas under its sovereignty.
(j) Intelligence and Security
i. The Parties shall establish intensive intelligence cooperation regarding the Old City, including the immediate sharing of threat information.
ii. A trilateral committee composed of the two Parties and representatives of the United States shall be established to facilitate this cooperation.
8. Mount of Olives Cemetery
(a) The area outlined in Map X (the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives) shall be under Israeli administration; Israeli law shall apply to persons using and procedures appertaining to this area in accordance with Annex X.
i. There shall be a designated road to provide free, unlimited, and unimpeded access to the Cemetery.
ii. The IVG shall monitor the implementation of this clause.
iii. This arrangement may only be terminated by the agreement of both Parties.
9. Special Cemetery Arrangements
Arrangements shall be established in the two cemeteries designated in Map X (Mount Zion Cemetery and the German Colony Cemetery), to facilitate and ensure the continuation of the current burial and visitation practices, including the facilitation of access.
10. The Western Wall Tunnel
(a) The Western Wall Tunnel designated in Map X shall be under Israeli administration, including:
i. Unrestricted Israeli access and right to worship and conduct religious practices.
ii. Responsibility for the preservation and maintenance of the site in accordance with this Agreement and without damaging structures above, under IVG supervision.
iii. Israeli policing.
iv. IVG monitoring
v. The Northern Exit of the Tunnel shall only be used for exit and may only be closed in case of emergency as stipulated in Article 6/7.
(b) This arrangement may only be terminated by the agreement of both Parties.
11. Municipal Coordination
(a) The two Jerusalem municipalities shall form a Jerusalem Co-ordination and Development Committee ("JCDC") to oversee the cooperation and coordination between the Palestinian Jerusalem municipality and the Israeli Jerusalem municipality. The JCDC and its sub-committees shall be composed of an equal number of representatives from Palestine and Israel. Each side will appoint members of the JCDC and its subcommittees in accordance with its own modalities.
(b) The JCDC shall ensure that the coordination of infrastructure and services best serves the residents of Jerusalem, and shall promote the economic development of the city to the benefit of all. The JCDC will act to encourage cross-community dialogue and reconciliation.
(c) The JCDC shall have the following subcommittees:
i. A Planning and Zoning Committee: to ensure agreed planning and zoning regulations in areas designated in Annex X.
ii. A Hydro Infrastructure Committee: to handle matters relating to drinking water delivery, drainage, and wastewater collection and treatment.
iii. A Transport Committee: to coordinate relevant connectedness and compatibility of the two road systems and other issues pertaining to transport.
iv. An Environmental Committee: to deal with environmental issues affecting the quality of life in the city, including solid waste management.
v. An Economic and Development Committee: to formulate plans for economic development in areas of joint interest, including in the areas of transportation, seam line commercial cooperation, and tourism.
vi. A Police and Emergency Services Committee: to coordinate measures for the maintenance of public order and crime prevention and the provision of emergency services;
vii. An Old City Committee: to plan and closely coordinate the joint provision of the relevant municipal services, and other functions stipulated in Article 6/7.
viii. Other Committees as agreed in the JCDC.
12. Israeli Residency of Palestinian Jerusalemites
Palestinian Jerusalemites who currently are permanent residents of Israel shall lose this status upon the transfer of authority to Palestine of those areas in which they reside.
13. Transfer of authority
The Parties will apply in certain socio-economic spheres interim measures to ensure the agreed, expeditious, and orderly transfer of powers and obligations from Israel to Palestine. This shall be done in a manner that preserves the accumulated socio-economic rights of the residents of East Jerusalem.
Article 7 - Refugees
1. Significance of the Refugee Problem
(a) The Parties recognize that, in the context of two independent states, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace, an agreed resolution of the refugee problem is necessary for achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace between them.
(b) Such a resolution will also be central to stability building and development in the region.
2. UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative
(a) The Parties recognize that UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative (Article 2.ii.) concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees represent the basis for resolving the refugee issue, and agree that these rights are fulfilled according to Article 7 of this Agreement.
3. Compensation
(a) Refugees shall be entitled to compensation for their refugeehood and for loss of property. This shall not prejudice or be prejudiced by the refugee's permanent place of residence.
(b) The Parties recognize the right of states that have hosted Palestinian refugees to remuneration.
4. Choice of Permanent Place of Residence (PPR)
The solution to the PPR aspect of the refugee problem shall entail an act of informed choice on the part of the refugee to be exercised in accordance with the options and modalities set forth in this agreement. PPR options from which the refugees may choose shall be as follows;
(a) The state of Palestine, in accordance with clause a below.
(b) Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap, following assumption of Palestinian sovereignty, in accordance with clause a below.
(c) Third Countries, in accordance with clause b below.
(d) The state of Israel, in accordance with clause c below.
(e) Present Host countries, in accordance with clause d below.
i. PPR options i and ii shall be the right of all Palestinian refugees and shall be in accordance with the laws of the State of Palestine.
ii. Option iii shall be at the sovereign discretion of third countries and shall be in accordance with numbers that each third country will submit to the International Commission. These numbers shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that each third country shall accept.
iii. Option iv shall be at the sovereign discretion of Israel and will be in accordance with a number that Israel will submit to the International Commission. This number shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that Israel shall accept. As a basis, Israel will consider the average of the total numbers submitted by the different third countries to the International Commission.
iv. Option v shall be in accordance with the sovereign discretion of present host countries. Where exercised this shall be in the context of prompt and extensive development and rehabilitation programs for the refugee communities.
Priority in all the above shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon.
5. Free and Informed Choice
The process by which Palestinian refugees shall express their PPR choice shall be on the basis of a free and informed decision. The Parties themselves are committed and will encourage third parties to facilitate the refugees' free choice in expressing their preferences, and to countering any attempts at interference or organized pressure on the process of choice. This will not prejudice the recognition of Palestine as the realization of Palestinian self-determination and statehood.
6. End of Refugee Status
Palestinian refugee status shall be terminated upon the realization of an individual refugee’s permanent place of residence (PPR) as determined by the International Commission.
7. End of Claims
This agreement provides for the permanent and complete resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. No claims may be raised except for those related to the implementation of this agreement.
8. International Role
The Parties call upon the international community to participate fully in the comprehensive resolution of the refugee problem in accordance with this Agreement, including, inter alia, the establishment of an International Commission and an International Fund.
9. Property Compensation
(a) Refugees shall be compensated for the loss of property resulting from their displacement.
(b) The aggregate sum of property compensation shall be calculated as follows:
i. The Parties shall request the International Commission to appoint a Panel of Experts to estimate the value of Palestinians' property at the time of displacement.
ii. The Panel of Experts shall base its assessment on the UNCCP records, the records of the Custodian for Absentee Property, and any other records it deems relevant. The Parties shall make these records available to the Panel.
iii. The Parties shall appoint experts to advise and assist the Panel in its work.
iv. Within 6 months, the Panel shall submit its estimates to the Parties.
v. The Parties shall agree on an economic multiplier, to be applied to the estimates, to reach a fair aggregate value of the property.
(c) The aggregate value agreed to by the Parties shall constitute the Israeli “lump sum” contribution to the International Fund. No other financial claims arising from the Palestinian refugee problem may be raised against Israel.
(d) Israel's contribution shall be made in installments in accordance with Schedule X.
(e) The value of the Israeli fixed assets that shall remain intact in former settlements and transferred to the state of Palestine will be deducted from Israel's contribution to the International Fund. An estimation of this value shall be made by the International Fund, taking into account assessment of damage caused by the settlements.
10. Compensation for Refugeehood
(a) A "Refugeehood Fund" shall be established in recognition of each individual's refugeehood. The Fund, to which Israel shall be a contributing party, shall be overseen by the International Commission. The structure and financing of the Fund is set forth in Annex X.
(b) Funds will be disbursed to refugee communities in the former areas of UNRWA operation, and will be at their disposal for communal development and commemoration of the refugee experience. Appropriate mechanisms will be devised by the International Commission whereby the beneficiary refugee communities are empowered to determine and administer the use of this Fund.
11. The International Commission (Commission)
(a) Mandate and Composition
i. An International Commission shall be established and shall have full and exclusive responsibility for implementing all aspects of this Agreement pertaining to refugees.
ii. In addition to themselves, the Parties call upon the United Nations, the United States, UNRWA, the Arab host countries, the EU, Switzerland, Canada, Norway, Japan, the World Bank, the Russian Federation, and others to be the members of the Commission.
iii. The Commission shall:
1. Oversee and manage the process whereby the status and PPR of Palestinian refugees is determined and realized.
2. Oversee and manage, in close cooperation with the host states, the rehabilitation and development programs.
3. Raise and disburse funds as appropriate.
iv. The Parties shall make available to the Commission all relevant documentary records and archival materials in their possession that it deems necessary for the functioning of the Commission and its organs. The Commission may request such materials from all other relevant parties and bodies, including, inter alia, UNCCP and UNRWA.
(b) Structure
i. The Commission shall be governed by an Executive Board (Board) composed of representatives of its members.
ii. The Board shall be the highest authority in the Commission and shall make the relevant policy decisions in accordance with this Agreement.
iii. The Board shall draw up the procedures governing the work of the Commission in accordance with this Agreement.
iv. The Board shall oversee the conduct of the various Committees of the Commission. The said Committees shall periodically report to the Board in accordance with procedures set forth thereby.
v. The Board shall create a Secretariat and appoint a Chair thereof. The Chair and the Secretariat shall conduct the day-to-day operation of the Commission.
(c) Specific Committees
i. The Commission shall establish the Technical Committees specified below.
ii. Unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, the Board shall determine the structure and procedures of the Committees.
iii. The Parties may make submissions to the Committees as deemed necessary.
iv. The Committees shall establish mechanisms for resolution of disputes arising from the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement relating to refugees.
v. The Committees shall function in accordance with this Agreement, and shall render binding decisions accordingly.
vi. Refugees shall have the right to appeal decisions affecting them according to mechanisms established by this Agreement and detailed in Annex X.
(d) Status-determination Committee:
i. The Status-determination Committee shall be responsible for verifying refugee status.
ii. UNRWA registration shall be considered as rebuttable presumption (prima facie proof) of refugee status.
(e) Compensation Committee:
i. The Compensation Committee shall be responsible for administering the implementation of the compensation provisions.
ii. The Committee shall disburse compensation for individual property pursuant to the following modalities:
1. Either a fixed per capita award for property claims below a specified value. This will require the claimant to only prove title, and shall be processed according to a fast-track procedure, or
2. A claims-based award for property claims exceeding a specified value for immovables and other assets. This will require the claimant to prove both title and the value of the losses.
iii. Annex X shall elaborate the details of the above including, but not limited to, evidentiary issues and the use of UNCCP, “Custodian for Absentees' Property”, and UNRWA records, along with any other relevant records.
(f) Host State Remuneration Committee:
There shall be remuneration for host states.
(g) Permanent Place of Residence Committee (PPR Committee):
The PPR Committee shall,
i. Develop with all the relevant parties detailed programs regarding the implementation of the PPR options pursuant to Article 7/4 above.
ii. Assist the applicants in making an informed choice regarding PPR options.
iii. Receive applications from refugees regarding PPR. The applicants must indicate a number of preferences in accordance with article 7/4 above. The applications shall be received no later than two years after the start of the International Commission's operations. Refugees who do not submit such applications within the two-year period shall lose their refugee status.
iv. Determine, in accordance with sub-Article (a) above, the PPR of the applicants, taking into account individual preferences and maintenance of family unity. Applicants who do not avail themselves of the Committee's PPR determination shall lose their refugee status.
v. Provide the applicants with the appropriate technical and legal assistance.
vi. The PPR of Palestinian refugees shall be realized within 5 years of the start of the International Commission's operations.
(h) Refugeehood Fund Committee
The Refugeehood Fund Committee shall implement Article 7/10 as detailed in Annex X.
(i) Rehabilitation and Development Committee
In accordance with the aims of this Agreement and noting the above PPR programs, the Rehabilitation and Development Committee shall work closely with Palestine, Host Countries and other relevant third countries and parties in pursuing the goal of refugee rehabilitation and community development. This shall include devising programs and plans to provide the former refugees with opportunities for personal and communal development, housing, education, healthcare, re-training and other needs. This shall be integrated in the general development plans for the region.
12. The International Fund
(a) An International Fund (the Fund) shall be established to receive contributions outlined in this Article and additional contributions from the international community. The Fund shall disburse monies to the Commission to enable it to carry out its functions. The Fund shall audit the Commission’s work.
(b) The structure, composition and operation of the Fund are set forth in Annex X.
13. UNRWA
(a) UNRWA should be phased out in each country in which it operates, based on the end of refugee status in that country.
(b) UNRWA should cease to exist five years after the start of the Commission's operations. The Commission shall draw up a plan for the phasing out of UNRWA and shall facilitate the transfer of UNRWA functions to host states.
14. Reconciliation Programs
(a) The Parties will encourage and promote the development of cooperation between their relevant institutions and civil societies in creating forums for exchanging historical narratives and enhancing mutual understanding regarding the past.
(b) The Parties shall encourage and facilitate exchanges in order to disseminate a richer appreciation of these respective narratives, in the fields of formal and informal education, by providing conditions for direct contacts between schools, educational institutions and civil society.
(c) The Parties may consider cross-community cultural programs in order to promote the goals of conciliation in relation to their respective histories.
(d) These programs may include developing appropriate ways of commemorating those villages and communities that existed prior to 1949.
Article 8 - Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee (IPCC)
1. The Parties shall establish an Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee immediately upon the entry into force of this agreement. The IPCC shall be a ministerial-level body with ministerial-level Co-Chairs.
2. The IPCC shall develop and assist in the implementation of policies for cooperation in areas of common interest including, but not limited to, infrastructure needs, sustainable development and environmental issues, cross-border municipal cooperation, border area industrial parks, exchange programs, human resource development, sports and youth, science, agriculture and culture.
3. The IPCC shall strive to broaden the spheres and scope of cooperation between the Parties.
Article 9 - Designated Road Use Arrangements
1. The following arrangements for Israeli civilian use will apply to the designated roads in Palestine as detailed in Map X (Road 443, Jerusalem to Tiberias via Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem –Ein Gedi).
2. These arrangements shall not prejudice Palestinian jurisdiction over these roads, including PSF patrols.
3. The procedures for designated road use arrangements will be further detailed in Annex X.
4. Israelis may be granted permits for use of designated roads. Proof of authorization may be presented at entry points to the designated roads. The sides will review options for establishing a road use system based on smart card technology.
5. The designated roads will be patrolled by the MF at all times. The MF will establish with the states of Israel and Palestine agreed arrangements for cooperation in emergency medical evacuation of Israelis.
6. In the event of any incidents involving Israeli citizens and requiring criminal or legal proceedings, there will be full cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities according to arrangements to be agreed upon as part of the legal cooperation between the two states. The Parties may call on the IVG to assist in this respect.
7. Israelis shall not use the designated roads as a means of entering Palestine without the relevant documentation and authorization.
8. In the event of regional peace, arrangements for Palestinian civilian use of designated roads in Israel shall be agreed and come into effect.
Article 10 - Sites of Religious Significance
1. The Parties shall establish special arrangements to guarantee access to agreed sites of religious significance, as will be detailed in Annex X. These arrangements will apply, inter alia, to the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem, and Nabi Samuel.
2. Access to and from the sites will be by way of designated shuttle facilities from the relevant border crossing to the sites.
3. The Parties shall agree on requirements and procedures for granting licenses to authorized private shuttle operators.
4. The shuttles and passengers will be subject to MF inspection.
5. The shuttles will be escorted on their route between the border crossing and the sites by the MF.
6. The shuttles shall be under the traffic regulations and jurisdiction of the Party in whose territory they are traveling.
7. Arrangements for access to the sites on special days and holidays are detailed in Annex X.
8. The Palestinian Tourist Police and the MF will be present at these sites.
9. The Parties shall establish a joint body for the religious administration of these sites.
10. In the event of any incidents involving Israeli citizens and requiring criminal or legal proceedings, there will be full cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities according to arrangements to be agreed upon. The Parties may call on the IVG to assist in this respect.
11. Israelis shall not use the shuttles as a means of entering Palestine without the relevant documentation and authorization.
12. The Parties shall protect and preserve the sites of religious significance listed in Annex X and shall facilitate visitation to the cemeteries listed in Annex X.
Article 11 - Border Regime
1. There shall be a border regime between the two states, with movement between them subject to the domestic legal requirements of each and to the provisions of this Agreement as detailed in Annex X.
2. Movement across the border shall only be through designated border crossings.
3. Procedures in border crossings shall be designed to facilitate strong trade and economic ties, including labor movement between the Parties.
4. Each Party shall each, in its respective territory, take the measures it deems necessary to ensure that no persons, vehicles, or goods enter the territory of the other illegally.
5. Special border arrangements in Jerusalem shall be in accordance with Article 6 above.
Article 12 - Water: still to be completed
Article 13 - Economic Relations: still to be completed
Article 14 - Legal Cooperation: still to be completed
Article 15 - Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees
1. In the context of this Permanent Status Agreement between Israel and Palestine, the end of conflict, cessation of all violence, and the robust security arrangements set forth in this Agreement, all the Palestinian and Arab prisoners detained in the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prior to the date of signature of this Agreement, DD/MM/2003, shall be released in accordance with the categories set forth below and detailed in Annex X.
(a) Category A: all persons imprisoned prior to the start of the implementation of the Declaration of Principles on May 4, 1994, administrative detainees, and minors, as well as women, and prisoners in ill health shall be released immediately upon the entry into force of this Agreement.
(b) Category B: all persons imprisoned after May 4, 1994 and prior to the signature of this Agreement shall be released no later than eighteen months from the entry into force of this Agreement, except those specified in Category C.
(c) Category C: Exceptional cases - persons whose names are set forth in Annex X - shall be released in thirty months at the end of the full implementation of the territorial aspects of this Agreement set forth in Article 5/7/v.
Article 16 - Dispute Settlement Mechanism
1. Disputes related to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be resolved by negotiations within a bilateral framework to be convened by the High Steering Committee.
2. If a dispute is not settled promptly by the above, either Party may submit it to mediation and conciliation by the IVG mechanism in accordance with Article 3.
3. Disputes which cannot be settled by bilateral negotiation and/or the IVG mechanism shall be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the Parties.
4. Disputes which have not been resolved by the above may be submitted by either Party to an arbitration panel. Each Party shall nominate one member of the three-member arbitration panel. The Parties shall select a third arbiter from the agreed list of arbiters set forth in Annex X either by consensus or, in the case of disagreement, by rotation.
Article 17 - Final Clauses
Including a final clause providing for a UNSCR/UNGAR resolution endorsing the agreement and superseding the previous UN resolutions.
The English version of this text will be considered authoritative.
The Negotiators
The Israeli Team:
Yossi Beilin, former Minister of Justice and MK (Meretz)
MK (Labor) Amram Mitzna
MK (Labor) Avraham Burg, former Speaker of the Knesset
MK (Labor) Yuli Tamir, former
The end of the previous post didn't get through. Here it is.
Article 17 - Final Clauses
Including a final clause providing for a UNSCR/UNGAR resolution endorsing the agreement and superseding the previous UN resolutions.
The English version of this text will be considered authoritative.
The Negotiators
The Israeli Team:
Yossi Beilin, former Minister of Justice and MK (Meretz)
MK (Labor) Amram Mitzna
MK (Labor) Avraham Burg, former Speaker of the Knesset
MK (Labor) Yuli Tamir, former Minister of Immigrant Absorption
MK (Meretz) Haim Oron, former Minister of Agriculture
MK (Meretz) Yossi Sarid, former Minister of Education
Former Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak
Brigadier General (res.) Giora Inbar, a former division commander in Lebanon
Brigadier General (res.) Gideon Sheffer, former director of the IDF Personnel Branch and Deputy Director of the National Security Council
Brigadier General (res.) Shlomo Brom, former Head of the Strategy Staff
Colonel (res.) Shaul Arieli Aryeh Arnon, a leader of Peace Now
Nehama Ronen, former M K (Likud)
Amoz Oz, author
David Grossman, author
Zvia Greenfield, author
Dr. Menachem Klein, scholar and Jerusalem expert
Yoram Gabay, economist
The Palestinian Team:
Yasser Abed-Rabbo, former Minister of Information and Culture
Nabil Qassis, former Minister of Tourism
Qadoura Fares, Palestinian Legislative Council member
Mohamed Horani, Palestinian Legislative Council member associated with
Fatah/Tanzim
Samih al-Abed, Palestinian Legislative Council member
Bashar Jum'a, Palestinian Legislative Council member
Dr. Nazmi Shuabi, Palestinian Legislative Council member
Gheith al-Omri, Palestinian Legislative Council member (from the
Negotiations Support Unit)
Jamal Zakut, Palestinian Legislative Council Member
Hisham Abdel Raziq, Prisoners Affairs Minister
Ghadi Jarei, member of the Prisoners Committee and Fatah Nazmi Jub'a; and
General Zoheir Manasra, former Governor of Jenin and Head of Preventative Security in the West Bank
Dear Mr. Levitt,
I think it is quite futile to try to argue with a religious settler.
However, if the question why the former (socialist) elite resents the contemporary settlements in Judea and Samaria has been asked it has to be answered.
All settlement activities before the establishment of Israeli state have been enacted under the umbrella of the British mandate, no matter whether did the British like it or not. The British mandate provided all-embracing legitimacy to the Zionist project in general, and conflicts between the Zionists and the British Mandatory Government were actually localized within the frames of their bilateral relations. The whole Western world accepted the Balfour Declaration and the British role in Palestine as one that was aiming to help the Jews to establish here a national home. Therefore the whole Western world did not see the conflicts between Zionists and the British Palestine as something jeopardizing international stability and law.
However, AFTER the establishment of the state and AFTER the international recognition of Israel's armistice borders of 1949 was obtained any further settlement activity beyond these borders constituted and constitutes an effrontery to the whole world-order and a colossal breach of the international law.
Any talk about peace or war with the Arabs (whoever they are) is here beside the point. It is not the question whether the Arabs will once live in honorable peace with us, or not. Israel rudely trespasses the international law, not only by keeping the military occupation of the Palestinians for forty years, but by allowing our civilian citizens to settle on the occupied territories (Judea and Samaria are NOT part of the Israeli state) and to keep there their homes. Israel by its own (our own, unfortunately) hands acts to hasten the deligitimation of our statehood in the eyes of the Western world. One has to remember: the very existence of Israel is enabled by the recognition and by diplomatic and economic support of the Western world. Some people stubbornly refuse to refer to this fact. By keeping settlements in Judea and Samaria we bravely and assuredly act to ruin ourselves (with joy and song on our lips).
I think, this could be quite clear to any person who would like to look upon our existence with sober glance. The problem with many of the "patriotic" settlers and their supporters is that they cherish their mindset, no matter what the situation in reality is. This mindset nurtures their very identity and you do not have any chance to convince them in your vision, however good would be your argument. The striking sign of this dialogue of the deaf is manifested by the readiness of several honorable gentlemen to converse with a person who refuses to disclose his identity.
Dear Mr. Plavin,
I’d like to make three points.
First, you and I are in basic agreement.
Second, the religious settler’s resistance to ideas and information which are at odds with their passionate beliefs is a very common human reaction. Still, like the rest of us, at their core they care about the welfare of their children and of others, about their fellow human beings and about justice. So, they will not remain obdurate forever.
Third, hopefully, our correspondence is being read by many people, and the positions of these people spread clear across the political spectrum. We owe it to them and to ourselves to respectfully expose our thinking and information in discussions such as those initiated by bar_kochba.
B’Shalom,
Joel
To Mr Plavin:
My name is Yaakov Ben-David. I live near Tel Aviv. I will try to remember to use that name from now on. You stated:
-----------------
However, AFTER the establishment of the state and AFTER the international recognition of Israel’s armistice borders of 1949 was obtained any further settlement activity beyond these borders constituted and constitutes an effrontery to the whole world-order and a colossal breach of the international law.
----------------
What you state here, is of course, incorrect. The Israeli Supreme Court and US State Department International Legal Dept. have ruled the settlements are LEGAL because the territories have the status of "disputed" (similar to Kashmir) and the 1922 League of Nations Mandate allowing Jewish settlement in the entire territory of the Palestine Mandate is LEGAL as you yourself pointed out. Yes, there are international tribunals that have claimed that the settlements are illegal, but I don't know what jurisdication, if any, they have in the matter.
You also stated:
-----------------------
Therefore the whole Western world did not see the conflicts between Zionists and the British Palestine as something jeopardizing international stability and law.
------------------------
That is also untrue. That is why the British unilaterally abrogated the rights of Jews to immigrate to mandatory Palestine and to purchase land there in 1939 by way of the MacDonald White Piper. Of course, the Arabs always, to this day, rejected the Mandatory right of Jews to settle in mandatory Palestine. That is why there were regular outbreaks of violence there.
To Mr Levitt:
I am sure you are aware that the Geneva agreement has no binding nature, either legally or morally whatsoever. The Israelis who signed represent the Left-wing fringe of the Israeli political spectrum. They certainly don't speak for me.
Regarding the Palestinians who signed...who exactly do they represent? I notice Abu Mazen's name isn't there. Neither are those of HAMAS people. If you recall, the Palestinians held parliamentary elections after this paper was signed, HAMAS ran on a platform of explicit rejection of any recognition of Israel, and they won. Also, Arafat was still alive when it was signed, he was the official head of the Palestinians, and he also didn't sign it.
I see the names of 7 members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. It has 88 members IIRC, so this is less than 10%
So who do they represent?
Dear Mr. Ben-David,
You are correct. Neither party is bound by the Geneva Accord. The negotiations were entered into by people who were not willing to see the peace effort end with Tabba. I have read that Arafat was more supportive of the negotiations than Sharon, who saw them as a threat, but I have not run into evidence that this was so.
The value of the Accord is not that it is binding law. Its value is that it demonstrates that there are Israelis and Palestinians, who have devoted their professional lives to promoting the welfare of their peoples, who are willing to negotiate the issues which others have said can never be resolved through negotiation. And, that these negotiators, who were clearly antagonists when the negotiations began, have been able to find mutually acceptable solutions.
Reviewing what I have been writing, I am afraid that I have been ignoring Tom Mitchell’s most germane point, that there have been many other bitterly angry and seemingly irresolvable conflicts between people that have been resolved through negotiations.
B’Shalom,
Joel
I hadn't noticed the last batch of entires above before filing my new post re Christian Zionists. So I am going to backtrack a little and try for the last word on these exchanges -- not a comprehensive last word, since that would entail very substantial work, but some closing thoughts.
There's an interesting legal issue regarding Israeli settlement in the West Bank. As best as I recall, only two nations -- Jordan and Pakistan -- every accepted Jordan's sovereignty over the West Bank. That is what renders the area "disputed territory," and that is the basis for the Israeli claim that they are not in violation of Geneva when they establish settlements there.
Whatever the legal intricacies, the exchange of views on this makes me yawn. Even were it crystal clear that Israelis have the legal right to establish settlements in the West Bank, it is a dumb thing to do -- as events now so painfully show, as might have been seen at the very outset of the settlement movement.
The danger of arguing that there's no difference between, say, early settlement of Hadera and post '67 settlement of, say, Ariel is that it invites those who legitimately question Ariel to raise questions about Hadera as well. That is: If the legal (and/or moral) claims to the two are regarded as equivalent, do we not jeopardize the legitimacy of the entire Jewish state?
I am left, every time I read the "logic" of those who say there's no hope, wondering whether they bother to ask themselves what (if anything) Israel and its friends can do to nurture hope? It is altogether too easy to say, "there's no way Arabs can be trusted, there is no Palestinian partner for peace," and then simply to walk away. To walk away and then what? Await a better day, brought about by other forces? Wait for a eureka moment on the Palestinian side, one that leads them to beg Jewish apology for their inability to accept their defeats as decisive, or to have been too self-centered? What? Or are there not things Israel can do to encourage Palestinian moderation? Surely, for example, the seizure of privately held Arab land for the construction of Jewish settlements does not encourage Palestinian moderates. And so forth -- the examples are endless.
There is no deus ex machina -- or, if there is, it is by definition unpredictable. The burden, therefore, for those who truly seek peace is to ask themselves, every day, whether their actions make peace more plausible or less.
Many mistakes have been made by all parties to the conflict. It is not easy to convince Palestinians that they have a partner for peace. In their view, Israel's intentions are imperialistic. And the Israeli, for their part, also gave a bill of disappointing particulars. So?
Dear Mr. Fein,
You show with perfect clarity that the purpose of those thinking about "tovat haklal" regarding Israel is to find a ray of hope. It is a hope for prolonged peaceful and productive existence of Israel, and as such it is a noble aim.
In this relation I would disagree with you in regard of your remark that Yaakov Ben-David thoughts about the legality of our settlements in Judea and Samaria are yawn-producing, boring. In his separate letter he rightly stresses that those who think like him present here a very large, confident and well organized minority, many of whom carry arms. This minority clearly has an intimidating effect upon all Israeli population, and as far as I can read the situation, the settlers are deeply proud about this.
The problem with Yaakov Ben-David's argument is not that it is wholly wrong (the wrongness of his arguments does not matter so far as he believes otherwise and so far as he is free not only to pursue his believes but also to implement them). The problem is manifested by the double drama of your readiness to yawn hearing him and by the clear overbearance in his attitude to your position.
You ask about hope regarding Israel's future. I am deeply convinced that the hope lies in the capacity of people like you to speak to people of the settler's persuasion on equal foot IN THEIR OWN VIEW.
Alas, this is the main problem.
The culture of overbearance, very frequently of rude overbearance toward anybody who does not belong to their circle permeates the settlers' discourse. Your words are not worthy of their contemplation. In YOUR eyes you conduct an intelligent exchange of views, out of love to klal-Israel. However, in the view stemming of the settlers discourse you are usually (with very few exceptions)a vehicle to forcefully promote their own views, empowered by their symbiotic relations with our high army command and by total philosophical disability of our government to provide reasonable alternative spiritual course.
I think, the place where hope should be looked for is philosophy and humanistic inspiration that could be found in Israel in arts, poetry, and to some degree in local scientific research, as well in social projects that enhance human dignity.
This would sound ridiculous to the great majority of Israelis; and this is a result of our long and largely unconscious spiritual impoverishment. The road back in nowadays' conditions would be extraordinary difficult.
I respond to this last though aware that in this world, given there's a more recent main post, what little I have to say is likely to be unnoticed. (But in Olam Haba . . . )
Yes, Mr. Plavin, the things you note in tour penultimate paragraph to offer some basis for hope. But here, my purpose is to work towards sustaining at least a shred of hope -- not optimism, but hope -- on the peace question, As to the settlers and their mode of argument -- a mode that long antedates their relationship with the high army command (I had more than a few occasions to talk with them, or, more accurately, to be lectured to by them, years back, and finally gave up), I am at a loss. I see little chance that the government with be able to "provide a reasonable alternative spiritual discourse," at least until the nature of government is restructured and the decisive role of the religious parties is broken. And even then -- Yitzhak Ben Aharon once said to me that nothing in the Jewish experience gave rise to optimism regarding our capacity for self-government, and complained as well that politics in Israel failed to attract the best and brightest. A weak Knesset, a weak government, a weakening High Court.
Yet among those I admire in Israel, many of them involved in the pursuit of peace/justice, there are more than a few who operate on a decidedly spiritual foundation. I write to contribute, as best I can from this great distance, to their morale, to their resolve, to their strength.
Thank you for your comments. And now, onward.
Thank you for that.