A Changing Iran - A Challenge for US Policy
September 2009
For
years Iran's leaders have espoused virulently anti-US, anti-Israel positions.
The rise to power of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad - arguably the most
anti-Western, anti-Israel, anti-Semitic Iranian leader in history - heightened
concerns about Iran's intentions, particularly toward Israel. These concerns
have grown over the past decade, as Iran has exported instability by supporting
various terrorist groups, and as Iran has tenaciously pursued a nuclear program
that could represent an existential threat to Israel and deeply destabilize the
entire region.
The
June 2009 Iranian elections ended in deeply disputed results. The subsequent peaceful protests were
met with terrible violence and large-scale arrests. As things stand today, a large portion of Iran's citizens
and ruling elites, including inside the religious establishment, still contest
the legitimacy of the election results and President Ahmedinejad's continued
tenure in office. At the same
time, Ahmedinejad and his cohorts are seeking to suppress further dissent
through strong-arm tactics and threats.
It is still unclear what the long-term effects of this contested
election and the resulting popular protest will be on Iran, its system of
government, or its policies. The
only thing that is clear today is that these elections have profoundly changed
Iran.
The
question for the US is: given the unsettled nature of the political status quo
in Iran, but also given that (a) Iran's nuclear program continues to progress
and threaten US national interests in the region, in particular Israel's
security, and around the world, and (b) the US has other key interests related
to Iran, including human rights, Iraq, and Afghanistan, what should US strategy
toward Iran look like today?
1. Engagement is still the right policy.
We have
long advocated serious, sustained, direct US engagement with Iran to address
the full range of issues on the US-Iran agenda, including: the urgent need to
curb any Iranian effort to develop nuclear weapons; the critical goal of ending
Iranian support for extremist organizations in the Middle East; serious and
longstanding US concerns about freedoms and human rights in Iran - concerns
that are even more pressing today; and the US interest in Iranian cooperation
and coordination in efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.
Unfortunately,
instead of a determined effort to engage Iran and address these very important
issues, under President George W. Bush the US adopted - and promoted
internationally - a one-dimensional strategy toward Iran, based on the notion
that the U.S. and its allies could threaten, browbeat and sanction Iran into
submission. This strategy failed to stop Iran's nuclear program or end its reckless
meddling in the region.
Given
the urgency of the Iranian nuclear threat, as well as the other interests laid
out above, we believe that today, in the wake of the Iranian elections, the
correct policy for the Obama Administration is to continue efforts to engage
Iran on the full range of issues on the agenda. By their nature these issues do not permit the US to stand
aside and put engagement efforts on hold until the Iranian domestic situation
has clarified. Instead, the US
should continue to look for all available channels for engagement with Iranian
officials and the Iranian people - direct and multilateral diplomatic
engagement, engagement through international organizations, track II contacts,
and contacts through non-governmental organizations and private citizens. Through these channels the US should
continue to try to achieve progress on the many important issues on the US-Iran
agenda, foremost among them the nuclear threat.
2. Engagement should be based on realistic
expectations and a readiness to adapt.
While
recognizing that engagement remains the correct policy, US policymakers must
recognize the limits to what engagement - through any of the potentially
available channels - can be expected to achieve in the short-term, given the
unsettled nature of the political situation in Iran.
They
must also recognize that any engagement strategy will have to evolve and adapt
as the situation in Iran evolves.
In the context of a rapidly changing political context in Iran, the US
must be ready to adjust its engagement strategy in order to move quickly to
take advantage of any new opportunities that may arise. Likewise, the US must recognize that
there may be moments when the best strategy will be to pause, take a step back,
and reassess or recalibrate its efforts.
3. Arbitrary deadlines are a mistake.
While
it is clear that the US cannot afford to put off engagement, it is equally
clear that arbitrary deadlines on engagement efforts - accompanied by the
threats of new and more "painful" sanctions (and the implied threat of possible
military action) - are unhelpful and potentially counter-productive under the
current circumstances. The ongoing
upheaval in Iran necessitates the maximum possible US flexibility and
adaptability in its engagement strategy, not the imposition of inflexible
negotiating deadlines that are oblivious to the very dynamic political
situation inside Iran.
Given
the current political turbulence in Iran, it is unrealistic to expect a
diplomatic breakthrough by mid-September 2009. Rather than insisting on a
full response to its overture to negotiate by that date, it would be reasonable
for the Obama administration by that date to take a sounding of the
Iranian government's intentions and strategy, in light of the new Iranian
domestic political environment and determine how best to proceed.
Insistence on the artificial September 15 deadline in light of these
circumstance sends the very problematic message to Iranians (and the world)
that the US is not really interested in resolving Iran-related issues through
engagement, but rather is simply going through the motions of trying to engage
in order to pave the way for harsher sanctions and the possibility of military
action in the future.
Some
outside parties have argued that a US-imposed deadline for ending engagement
efforts is necessary to avoid Iran deliberately stalling the process in order
to continue its nuclear program.
This argument does not hold water. According to the US Constitution, the
conduct of foreign policy is a prerogative of the President. If and when
the President decides engagement - or waiting for engagement - with Iran has
exhausted its usefulness, he has the authority to take action at that time. He is not required to issue threats or
articulate deadlines in advance. Efforts
to compel the President to set out a deadline tied to some arbitrary date or
event would seem to disclose less a fear of Iranian delay tactics and more a
desire to tie the President's hands with respect to Iran engagement efforts and
limit his foreign policy options going forward.
As we
have argued in the past, any diplomatic effort to resolve US issues with Iran
will not be easy - rather, it will almost certainly be a long and arduous
process, the success of which is by no means a foregone conclusion. We believe, however, that such an
effort is indispensable if the U.S. is serious about dealing with the
challenges Iran poses to U.S. foreign policy and to U.S. national
security. We are not suggesting
that any future options should be foreclosed, but only that flexibility is
vital to any credible and potentially successful US strategy to engage
Iran. President Obama must have
the flexibility to pursue such engagement and should reject efforts by any
outside party to impose artificial and arbitrary deadlines on him. It should be left to the President to
decide, in his own time, if and when the diplomacy option has truly been
exhausted, or if and when Iran is cynically manipulating diplomacy to try to
run out the clock and continue its nuclear program.
4. The proposed new "crippling" sanctions
should be rejected.
Most of
the world is outraged by what is happening in Iran today. There is a strong desire to do
something - anything - to tangibly punish the Iranian regime for its behavior
toward its own people. This desire
has crystallized around new "crippling sanctions" originally proposed well
before the elections - sanctions explicitly designed to paralyze the Iranian
economy.
Such an
approach was questionable before the elections. A strategy of deliberately inflicting suffering on civilians
- who would bear the brunt of "crippling sanctions" - in order to compel them
to put pressure on their government, is morally and ethically dubious. Moreover, the efficacy of such an
approach is also dubious. Examples
of cases where such sanctions have caused tremendous human suffering but failed
to force a change in governmental policy include Iraq, Cuba, Gaza, and, in
fact, Iran itself, where decades of US and international sanctions did little
to weaken the Iranian regime in the eyes of its people. The present leadership's loss of
legitimacy stems not from frustration over the impacts of international
sanctions, but from popular outrage over the regime's efforts to manipulate and
subvert the domestic political process.
Such an
approach is even more questionable today.
Not only do the original criticisms of such a strategy still stand, but
the current political instability in Iran creates the very real risk that such
new sanctions will have serious unintended consequences. Rather than weakening the regime
and convincing it to stop its nuclear program, the proposed new sanctions could
feed the Iranian government's narrative that the current popular protest is
foreign-inspired and foreign-supported, giving the Iranian authorities a
pretext to discredit and further persecute critics and protesters. Moreover, new sanctions that make
the lives of the Iranian people more difficult could provide the government a populist
point around which to try to mobilize solidarity and, potentially, sympathy.
We have
long argued that sanctions can be a powerful tool for putting pressure on Iran,
and we have thus supported, and continue to support, targeted sanctions against
Iran's government and its leaders, an entire regime of which are already in
place. However, pursuing sanctions
that target the Iranian people, rather than their leaders, is a morally and
strategically perilous path that the Obama Administration must reject.
5. Now is the time to send positive
signals to the Iranian people.
For
years the US has spoken to Iran and the Iranian people almost exclusively in
the language of sanctions and threats. Today, the US should be looking for ways
to demonstrate concrete support for and solidarity with the Iranian
people. This requires a different
approach - one that genuinely signals to the Iranian people that the US does
not view them as enemies, is not seeking to undermine their lives, and is not
trying to interfere in their domestic politics.
This
could mean carefully calibrated public statements of support, including
sustained focus on the human rights situation inside Iran. It could also mean clear articulation
of a US strategy that does not view the deliberate infliction of suffering and
poverty on the Iranian people as an acceptable political tool.
In
addition, it could involve tangible changes in US policy. For example, American citizens of
Iranian descent (and all other US citizens) are presently barred from providing
most funds or goods to any Iranian organization or individual, including
hospitals, orphanages, and schools - a policy that seems predicated on the
belief that alleviating the suffering of Iranian citizens indirectly helps the
regime, and therefore must be barred.
The US could send a powerful positive signal to the Iranian people by
beginning the process of de-criminalizing charitable giving to legitimate
causes in Iran and establishing responsible legal mechanisms to permit and facilitate
such funding.
Such an
effort to signal support for the Iranian people can and should exist
side-by-side with US efforts to engage at the political level. US foreign policy is not and never
should be viewed as a zero-sum game, wherein the US must be "all-in" either
with a foreign government or its people.
Indeed, throughout the world the US maintains constructive diplomatic
relations with governments while at the same time criticizing the conduct of
those governments with respect to the rights of the citizens of those states,
and maintaining a range of programs aimed at helping those populations.