September  2009

 

For years Iran's leaders have espoused virulently anti-US, anti-Israel positions. The rise to power of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad - arguably the most anti-Western, anti-Israel, anti-Semitic Iranian leader in history - heightened concerns about Iran's intentions, particularly toward Israel. These concerns have grown over the past decade, as Iran has exported instability by supporting various terrorist groups, and as Iran has tenaciously pursued a nuclear program that could represent an existential threat to Israel and deeply destabilize the entire region.  

 

The June 2009 Iranian elections ended in deeply disputed results.  The subsequent peaceful protests were met with terrible violence and large-scale arrests.  As things stand today, a large portion of Iran's citizens and ruling elites, including inside the religious establishment, still contest the legitimacy of the election results and President Ahmedinejad's continued tenure in office.  At the same time, Ahmedinejad and his cohorts are seeking to suppress further dissent through strong-arm tactics and threats.  It is still unclear what the long-term effects of this contested election and the resulting popular protest will be on Iran, its system of government, or its policies.  The only thing that is clear today is that these elections have profoundly changed Iran.

 

The question for the US is: given the unsettled nature of the political status quo in Iran, but also given that (a) Iran's nuclear program continues to progress and threaten US national interests in the region, in particular Israel's security, and around the world, and (b) the US has other key interests related to Iran, including human rights, Iraq, and Afghanistan, what should US strategy toward Iran look like today?

 

1.  Engagement is still the right policy.

 

We have long advocated serious, sustained, direct US engagement with Iran to address the full range of issues on the US-Iran agenda, including: the urgent need to curb any Iranian effort to develop nuclear weapons; the critical goal of ending Iranian support for extremist organizations in the Middle East; serious and longstanding US concerns about freedoms and human rights in Iran - concerns that are even more pressing today; and the US interest in Iranian cooperation and coordination in efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.  

 

Unfortunately, instead of a determined effort to engage Iran and address these very important issues, under President George W. Bush the US adopted - and promoted internationally - a one-dimensional strategy toward Iran, based on the notion that the U.S. and its allies could threaten, browbeat and sanction Iran into submission. This strategy failed to stop Iran's nuclear program or end its reckless meddling in the region.

 

Given the urgency of the Iranian nuclear threat, as well as the other interests laid out above, we believe that today, in the wake of the Iranian elections, the correct policy for the Obama Administration is to continue efforts to engage Iran on the full range of issues on the agenda.  By their nature these issues do not permit the US to stand aside and put engagement efforts on hold until the Iranian domestic situation has clarified.  Instead, the US should continue to look for all available channels for engagement with Iranian officials and the Iranian people - direct and multilateral diplomatic engagement, engagement through international organizations, track II contacts, and contacts through non-governmental organizations and private citizens.  Through these channels the US should continue to try to achieve progress on the many important issues on the US-Iran agenda, foremost among them the nuclear threat. 

 

2.  Engagement should be based on realistic expectations and a readiness to adapt.

 

While recognizing that engagement remains the correct policy, US policymakers must recognize the limits to what engagement - through any of the potentially available channels - can be expected to achieve in the short-term, given the unsettled nature of the political situation in Iran. 

 

They must also recognize that any engagement strategy will have to evolve and adapt as the situation in Iran evolves.  In the context of a rapidly changing political context in Iran, the US must be ready to adjust its engagement strategy in order to move quickly to take advantage of any new opportunities that may arise.  Likewise, the US must recognize that there may be moments when the best strategy will be to pause, take a step back, and reassess or recalibrate its efforts.

 

3.  Arbitrary deadlines are a mistake.

 

While it is clear that the US cannot afford to put off engagement, it is equally clear that arbitrary deadlines on engagement efforts - accompanied by the threats of new and more "painful" sanctions (and the implied threat of possible military action) - are unhelpful and potentially counter-productive under the current circumstances.  The ongoing upheaval in Iran necessitates the maximum possible US flexibility and adaptability in its engagement strategy, not the imposition of inflexible negotiating deadlines that are oblivious to the very dynamic political situation inside Iran.

 

Given the current political turbulence in Iran, it is unrealistic to expect a diplomatic breakthrough by mid-September 2009.  Rather than insisting on a full response to its overture to negotiate by that date, it would be reasonable for the Obama administration  by that date to take a sounding of the Iranian government's intentions and strategy, in light of the new Iranian domestic political environment and determine how best to proceed.  Insistence on the artificial September 15 deadline in light of these circumstance sends the very problematic message to Iranians (and the world) that the US is not really interested in resolving Iran-related issues through engagement, but rather is simply going through the motions of trying to engage in order to pave the way for harsher sanctions and the possibility of military action in the future. 

 

Some outside parties have argued that a US-imposed deadline for ending engagement efforts is necessary to avoid Iran deliberately stalling the process in order to continue its nuclear program.  This argument does not hold water. According to the US Constitution, the conduct of foreign policy is a prerogative of the President.  If and when the President decides engagement - or waiting for engagement - with Iran has exhausted its usefulness, he has the authority to take action at that time.  He is not required to issue threats or articulate deadlines in advance.  Efforts to compel the President to set out a deadline tied to some arbitrary date or event would seem to disclose less a fear of Iranian delay tactics and more a desire to tie the President's hands with respect to Iran engagement efforts and limit his foreign policy options going forward.

 

As we have argued in the past, any diplomatic effort to resolve US issues with Iran will not be easy - rather, it will almost certainly be a long and arduous process, the success of which is by no means a foregone conclusion.  We believe, however, that such an effort is indispensable if the U.S. is serious about dealing with the challenges Iran poses to U.S. foreign policy and to U.S. national security.  We are not suggesting that any future options should be foreclosed, but only that flexibility is vital to any credible and potentially successful US strategy to engage Iran.  President Obama must have the flexibility to pursue such engagement and should reject efforts by any outside party to impose artificial and arbitrary deadlines on him.  It should be left to the President to decide, in his own time, if and when the diplomacy option has truly been exhausted, or if and when Iran is cynically manipulating diplomacy to try to run out the clock and continue its nuclear program. 

 

4.  The proposed new "crippling" sanctions should be rejected.

 

Most of the world is outraged by what is happening in Iran today.  There is a strong desire to do something - anything - to tangibly punish the Iranian regime for its behavior toward its own people.  This desire has crystallized around new "crippling sanctions" originally proposed well before the elections - sanctions explicitly designed to paralyze the Iranian economy. 

 

Such an approach was questionable before the elections.  A strategy of deliberately inflicting suffering on civilians - who would bear the brunt of "crippling sanctions" - in order to compel them to put pressure on their government, is morally and ethically dubious.  Moreover, the efficacy of such an approach is also dubious.  Examples of cases where such sanctions have caused tremendous human suffering but failed to force a change in governmental policy include Iraq, Cuba, Gaza, and, in fact, Iran itself, where decades of US and international sanctions did little to weaken the Iranian regime in the eyes of its people.  The present leadership's loss of legitimacy stems not from frustration over the impacts of international sanctions, but from popular outrage over the regime's efforts to manipulate and subvert the domestic political process.

 

Such an approach is even more questionable today.  Not only do the original criticisms of such a strategy still stand, but the current political instability in Iran creates the very real risk that such new sanctions will have serious unintended consequences.   Rather than weakening the regime and convincing it to stop its nuclear program, the proposed new sanctions could feed the Iranian government's narrative that the current popular protest is foreign-inspired and foreign-supported, giving the Iranian authorities a pretext to discredit and further persecute critics and protesters.   Moreover, new sanctions that make the lives of the Iranian people more difficult could provide the government a populist point around which to try to mobilize solidarity and, potentially, sympathy.

 

We have long argued that sanctions can be a powerful tool for putting pressure on Iran, and we have thus supported, and continue to support, targeted sanctions against Iran's government and its leaders, an entire regime of which are already in place.  However, pursuing sanctions that target the Iranian people, rather than their leaders, is a morally and strategically perilous path that the Obama Administration must reject.

 

5.  Now is the time to send positive signals to the Iranian people.

 

For years the US has spoken to Iran and the Iranian people almost exclusively in the language of sanctions and threats. Today, the US should be looking for ways to demonstrate concrete support for and solidarity with the Iranian people.  This requires a different approach - one that genuinely signals to the Iranian people that the US does not view them as enemies, is not seeking to undermine their lives, and is not trying to interfere in their domestic politics.  

 

This could mean carefully calibrated public statements of support, including sustained focus on the human rights situation inside Iran.  It could also mean clear articulation of a US strategy that does not view the deliberate infliction of suffering and poverty on the Iranian people as an acceptable political tool.

 

In addition, it could involve tangible changes in US policy.  For example, American citizens of Iranian descent (and all other US citizens) are presently barred from providing most funds or goods to any Iranian organization or individual, including hospitals, orphanages, and schools - a policy that seems predicated on the belief that alleviating the suffering of Iranian citizens indirectly helps the regime, and therefore must be barred.  The US could send a powerful positive signal to the Iranian people by beginning the process of de-criminalizing charitable giving to legitimate causes in Iran and establishing responsible legal mechanisms to permit and facilitate such funding.

 

Such an effort to signal support for the Iranian people can and should exist side-by-side with US efforts to engage at the political level.  US foreign policy is not and never should be viewed as a zero-sum game, wherein the US must be "all-in" either with a foreign government or its people.  Indeed, throughout the world the US maintains constructive diplomatic relations with governments while at the same time criticizing the conduct of those governments with respect to the rights of the citizens of those states, and maintaining a range of programs aimed at helping those populations.