Many Israelis assume that what is on the Israeli side of the barrier is part of the "blocs," and what is on the Palestinian side of the barrier is not. However, this ignores the fact that the route of the barrier has been gerrymandered to include as many settlements as possible and to encompass huge areas of adjacent land – the total area of West Bank land that is de facto annexed by the barrier is some twentyfold the size of the built-up area of the settlements in these areas.

This gerrymandering of Israel’s border for the benefit of settlements comes at the cost of vital Israeli interests. First, it undermines the possibility of a two-state solution – without which Israel cannot remain both a democracy and a Jewish state. And second, it sacrifices Israeli security, leaving Israel with a long, convoluted border running near or through the heart of Palestinian populated areas, and leaves large numbers of Palestinians within Israel’s lines of defense. For example:

• In the case of the "Ma'ale Adumim bloc" (east of Jerusalem), the barrier route takes up land many times the size of Ma'ale Adumim, including the area of the planned mega-settlement of E1, a settlement whose construction successive US administrations have recognized as potentially fatal to the two-state solution.
• In the case of the "Givat Ze'ev bloc" (north of Jerusalem), the barrier route extends so far north of the existing settlement that if construction were permitted to fill the bloc, the settlement could expand at least 5 times in size and reach the very edge of Ramallah - bearing in mind that construction is now underway in this "bloc" for a new ultra-Orthodox settlement (whose residents have an average of 7 children).
• In the case of the "Etzion bloc" (south of Jerusalem), the route of the barrier not only captures a huge amount of territory that is not part of the built-up area of the settlements, but it extends deep into the West Bank to include the settlement of Efrat, and in doing so severs Bethlehem completely from the southern West Bank (leaving the city of Bethlehem an isolated enclave between the southern Jerusalem barrier and the Gush Etzion bloc).
• Further north, in the case of the "Ariel bloc" and "Qedumim bloc," these blocs are actually narrow fingers reaching deep inside the West Bank - with the settlement of Ariel, for example, located almost exactly halfway between the Green Line and the Jordan River. Regardless of ideology, it is difficult to imagine a viable peace agreement that leaves these areas under Israeli control.

The term “settlement bloc” has no official, legal definition even in Israel. Rather, it is informal, extremely flexible, and entirely political. In the early years of the settlement movement, the term was used rarely, and then only to refer to areas in the West Bank (and Gaza Strip) where groups of settlements had been established in genuine close proximity to one another and near the Green Line. In contrast, today the term is used to refer to huge and ever-expanding swathes of the West Bank. These “blocs” encompass settlements that are located at great distances from one another and from the Green Line. In this way, the “blocs” are being used to take control over large areas of West Bank land, both through settlement construction and related expansion on the ground aimed at thickening the “blocs” and at expanding them to include settlements located at ever-greater distances from their centers.

Likewise, the term “settlement blocs” has no meaning or legitimacy under international law, which views all settlements as illegal, regardless of their proximity to one another or to the Green Line, irrespective of whether they are located east or west of Israel’s separation barrier, and notwithstanding any alleged Israeli “national consensus.” Consequently, neither settlements located in blocs, nor the blocs themselves, are recognized by the Palestinians or the international community as having any special status. Moreover, construction in the blocs is clearly barred under Phase I of the 2003 U.S.-authored Roadmap, which states: "[The government of Israel] freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements)."

And notably, these “blocs” don’t just include settlements. Many of the “blocs” – as de facto defined by the route of the Separation Barrier – include what even Israel recognizes to be private Palestinian land. Moreover, if one were to take a radius from the center of a “bloc” like Gush Etzion, Givat Ze’ev, or Ariel, a large percentage of the population – in some cases a majority – is Palestinian.

Today it is commonly said that the settlement blocs are part of the Israeli national consensus. Broadly speaking this is true, reflecting the fact that, over the years, almost all Israeli governments have invested heavily in making the settlement blocs seem like an integral part of the state of Israel, even without officially annexing them to Israel.

At the same time, it is also true that most Israelis probably have no idea what is meant by the term “settlement bloc.” Many if not most Israelis almost certainly could not identify what is or is not part of a “settlement bloc” on a map, or mark on a map the areas of the West Bank they believe are part of this so-called national consensus. Indeed, it wasn’t long ago that the whole idea of settlement blocs being part of a national consensus simply didn’t exist. Back in 1993, at the start of the peace process, the large settlements that are today considered part of the national consensus, like Beitar Illit, Modiin Illit, and Ma’ale Adumim, were many magnitudes smaller, both in population and footprint on the ground, and there was not national consensus – real or purported – in support of keeping these settlements, even at the cost of a peace agreement.

It is also important to note that around 20% of Israel's citizens are ethnically Palestinian, and this portion of the population generally does not support the view that Israel should or must hold onto settlement blocs. Thus, when observers - Israeli or non-Israeli - refer to the "national consensus" on settlements, they are by definition excluding the opinions of around one-fifth of the country's citizens. Moreover, even among Israeli Jews there is not an actual consensus, but rather a spectrum of views, including those adamantly opposed to Israel keeping any settlements and those adamantly in favor of Israel keeping all settlements. There are also many Israeli Jews who view the attainment of peace - not the keeping of settlement blocs - as the most important goal of peace negotiations, and who believe that the decision over whether or not Israel will get to keep settlement blocs must be left to the negotiating table.

Some in both Israel and the U.S. have adopted the narrative that confining settlement construction to the blocs would demonstrate an Israeli commitment to peace and the two-state solution. Such narratives are either mistaken or disingenuous, grounded in the view that Israel and/or the U.S. can dictate to the Palestinians what they “need” or must accept in a permanent status agreement. It is precisely this kind of thinking that has continually compromised the ability of U.S. negotiators to act as effective brokers for peace, and that has allowed Israel to get away with insisting that it wants a negotiated solution while undertaking unilateral actions on the ground that are designed to predetermine the outcome permanent status talks.

Supporters of this narrative often cite President George W. Bush’s April 14, 2004 letter to then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as validation of their position, In that letter, President Bush stated that “In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” Notably, those citing this letter generally omit mention of the fact that in the preceding sentence, President Bush stated that any agreement to this effect “should emerge from negotiations between the parties” and in the next sentence added the caveat that "any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities"[emphasis added].

Those omitted lines are the crux of the matter, because giving a green light to any Israeli settlement construction outside of the context of an agreement with the Palestinians contradicts not only what Israel and the Palestinians have previously agreed to, but also the position of every U.S. Administration, from 1967 through at least 2016. Doing so would also be antithetical to the re-starting of any negotiating process that can lead to a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is not simply a matter of rigid principles but of impact on the ground and on political realities: imposing on the Palestinians a policy whereby Israel is permitted to build in “settlement blocs” would directly threaten the possibility for ever achieving a peace agreement with the Palestinians and, in parallel, the ability for there to ever be established a viable, contiguous Palestinian state alongside Israel.

For Israel to today exploit “settlement blocs” to impose new rules on the game and take huge areas of the West Bank off the negotiating table, contradicts the fundamental concept of a negotiated solution. It also discloses to the world the cynicism and disingenuousness behind Israel’s rejection of international actions aimed at maintaining the distinction between Israel and settlements – rejection that has taken the form of outraged claims that the world is seeking to “impose a solution” on Israel.

As for the U.S., a shift in policy to green light Israeli construction in “settlement blocs” would concretely undermine the chances of reaching an agreement on the ground. Politically, it would deprive already weakened pro-diplomacy, anti-armed-struggle Palestinian leaders of their last shred of legitimacy. It would likely end the land-for-peace effort that began in Madrid more than two decades ago, setting the stage for even greater violence than we are seeing today. Likewise, it would be a boon to one-staters of all stripes, including hard-line Palestinians, post-Zionist Israelis, and the BDS movement, who would join Israeli hardliners in celebrating the end of the land-for-peace, two-state era. Such a policy shift would also directly harm the interests and credibility of the United States, putting the U.S. at odds with international consensus and international law settlements, and marking the end of the ability of the U.S. to act in any way as an honest broker of peace efforts.