Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin, a scholar and writer, is an international political and strategic consultant. She has advised and conducted research on nine national campaigns in Israel over the past twenty years, and has provided research and advising for elections, referendums, and civil society campaigns in fifteen different countries. She is the author of The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel. 

The Long War

Q: There seems to be substantial public (Israeli) support for an all-out war with Hezbollah and Netanyahu is profiting politically from the military success to date. Does this further reduce the chances of public support for a long-term political solution? Is anyone making a case for that that can win public support? Do most Israelis believe that the war can remake the long-term geopolitics of the region, or is it just a necessary tactical response?

A: There is substantial support for a significant assault on Hezbollah, because no one has been making the case that any other way is better. And even then, in more sensitive surveys, attitudes have been somewhat divided. But most significantly, no one is arguing that it’s time to end the war in Gaza, call a ceasefire that could have de-escalated the situation with Hezbollah, and release hostages as well.. But that’s ancient history now; the ground operation has begun and while Israel suggests it will be limited, there’s no way to know how a ground incursion will unfold. In Lebanon, they have a way of expanding – geographically and over time. 

Israelis don’t seriously have an opinion on whether Israel should lead the charge to re-make the region. They’re not political or military strategists, or Middle East experts. But if someone told them they could take a tank and erase all the bad guys in the Middle East, it would sound nice – especially to a population that is dejected, traumatized, and with many displaced for nearly a full year. And no – no leading political figure is seriously making the case for an alternative to military bombardment in all directions. But while there’s some sense of satisfaction in watching Israel re-take the initiative and eliminate longtime enemies, at the same time, people are on edge. For months now, Israelis have been checking on generators (or advertising them on social media), stocking up on water, looking for the nearest shelter.

In terms of public support for Netanyahu - three serious polls have been published since the real escalation in Lebanon began, and Netanyahu is profiting politically – but just slightly. His Likud party went up by a few Knesset seats; but mostly at the expense of his ultra-nationalist coalition partners – meaning he’s not converting anyone from the opposition bloc of voters just yet. Instead, he boosted his coalition this week by moving a chess piece from the other team to his side, former Likudnik Gideon Saar, who seems to have little of his own will these days, and trots along after crumbs of political opportunity. The four seats Saar’s small party adds to the coalition might help Netanyahu last out a full Knesset term, until the next elections are scheduled in 2026. 

Q: What are you seeing in the world of Israeli (vs American, even) public opinion at this time of escalated tension with Lebanon? First the pagers, then the airstrikes on residential buildings, now the news of Nasrallah's death and the reports that the Israeli military may be preparing an invasion force-- that's a rapid change of circumstances in a very short period of time. How are people reacting?

A: This answer is impressionistic, because the few surveys since the major escalation with Lebanon have mostly focused on political issues, or the most general questions. Israelis as usual are never one bloc. Many from the northern border regions, especially exasperated and desperate local council leaders, insist that there must be no ceasefire, there must be a ground operation, and the action must be large-scale. From what I can see, the residents of the north are exhausted and not sure what to think. Residents in other parts of the country feel a sense of satisfaction that Israel is taking back initiative and dealing a serious blow to undisputed enemies; but the dark insecurity and pain over the loss of the hostages – or forsaking them to their fate – casts a pall over people in general. There is very little sense of hope, unless one believes in messianic redemption and the inevitable resumption of settlement activity in Gaza.

Q: Israel's history in Lebanon seems to be full of unintended consequences, including the founding of Hezbollah itself after the First Lebanon War. And yet public sentiment seems to support a ground invasion, despite the risk of a regional war. Is Israel so immune to world and US opinion that it believes it can go it alone, or drag the US into a war with Iran?

A: It's not exactly that Israel is immune to world opinion – Israel is painfully aware of the global opprobrium during this war, but it believes itself to be painfully misunderstood. Other theories Israelis hold include the conviction that the world has an inherent anti-Israel bias and may also be anti-Semitic. The prime minister fuels these convictions in his high- profile forums such as the UN General Assembly. 

Meanwhile, US opinion is not terribly influential: for one, US opinion on Israel is broadly positive. Israeli news has reported on US surveys showing Israel’s rather strong standing among Americans, certainly relative to Palestinians. Secondly, the US President may give pro forma signals about supporting a ceasefire, but everything about US policy says “go go go” to Israel – providing money, weapons and political cover to pretty much every Israeli policy so far. So, if Israelis are counting on unconditional US support for any reckless policy it wants to undertake – they’re probably right. 

Q: Netanyahu seems to be well aware of the impact of his actions on the U.S. election. What can or should the Biden administration do to blunt the increasing sense of chaos and uncertainty in the Middle East?

A: Up until now, there’s a strong argument that the US role and presence in the region has occasionally deterred escalation – for example, by restraining Iran in its attack responding to an Israeli assassination in April. Israel’s own response was clearly restrained too, possibly due to US influence.  But at this point, Israel seems mainly emboldened, and the US presence is seen as a one-way deterrent to Israel’s enemies, while giving Israel a free pass to go very far. Calling for a ceasefire is making the US into a bit of a laughingstock worldwide (at least on social media). It’s time to make it happen, or to stop saying it. 

This is easier said than done, of course. Strong US leadership would mean taking a risk for the sake of using leverage or pressure, publicly or privately, to tamp down both Israel and Iran. It’s a big political risk in the US too; but Americans will ultimately be grateful if the US heads off a major war. If that helps Democrats win the election, it will be the achievement of a lifetime.