We Say:

A growing number of people are advocating this "no solution" paradigm - the view that there is simply no way of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, so people should stop trying. The "no solution" argument is heard from both the extreme left and the extreme right, two camps that are eagerly capitalizing on the festering status quo - the diplomatic impasse and the increasingly complicated situation on the ground - to discredit and delegitimize the two-state solution and efforts to achieve it.

The "no solution" argument appeals to those who believe that the status quo is bearable and assume that the situation is static - that the status quo will endure even if Israel signals that it has no intention of ever ending the occupation. They assume that Palestinians, denied even the hope of a political horizon, will not abandon restraint and fight harder and more violently for their freedom. They assume, too, that the de facto détente that Israel has achieved with the Arab world won't crumble.

These assumptions are disconnected from reality, and the premise - that a solution is impossible - is likewise disconnected from reality. A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is possible. Its contours are already well-known. All that is needed is the political will to sincerely pursue and implement it.

Yes, extremists in both Israeli and Palestinian society will reject compromise, but past experience demonstrates that they are not the majority in either society. Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have in the past made significant progress toward mutually-agreed compromise formulas. Even on issues that involve heavy emotional baggage for both sides, such as Jerusalem and refugees, leaders on both sides have devised reasonable parameters which large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians support.

The gaps between the parties, as broad as they may seem, are not unbridgeable. Israelis and Palestinians, as well as international brokers, can benefit from creative proposals such as the Geneva Initiative and other Track II (unofficial) efforts. If Israeli and Palestinian leaders - supported by the US and the international community - reach a reasonable, workable agreement, majorities on both sides would follow.

We Say:

Some opponents of the two-state solution - those who are advocates of Greater Israel stretching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, are adopting this "maintain-the-status-quo" approach. They suggest that the current situation can be tweaked to be bearable for both sides, until Israelis and Palestinians evolve to the point where a permanent, conflict-ending agreement is possible.

This idea is disconnected from reality.The occupation can't be neutered by clever arrangements; corrosive trends that the occupation generates cannot be frozen in time. Any continuation of the status quo, however tweaked, will lead inevitably to more settlement expansion and a deepening of Israel's hold on East Jerusalem - to the point that even if the hoped-for sea changes someday occurred in both societies, there would be nothing left for the newly enlightened peoples to negotiate.

We Say:

This is another effort to manufacture an alternative to the two-state solution. In this case, the idea is to revive interest in the "make-the-Palestinians-someone-else's-problem" scenario, popular in Israel in the 1970s and 1980s with slogans like "Jordan is Palestine" and "Gaza is Egypt."

This is an illusion. Neither Egypt nor Jordan will willingly collude in killing the dream of Palestine. Neither will take on Palestinian populations that would almost certainly be destabilizing, domestically and regionally. Neither will agree to Israel annexing East Jerusalem. And any effort by Israel to force the issue - by trying to dump Gaza in Egypt's lap and force parts of the West Bank on Jordan - would likely cost Israel its peace treaties with both countries.

We Say:

Some today are arguing in favor of a one-state "solution." Anti-Zionists and post-Zionists envision a Palestinian-majority, secular, democratic state. At the other end of the political spectrum, some Israeli right-wingers envision Israel annexing the West Bank, using various ploys to disenfranchise its Palestinian residents and forcing Egypt to take over responsibility for Gaza.

Both visions are illusions. No Israeli government will simply dissolve the State of Israel. And Israel will never be able to justify, even to its closest allies, formalizing its own version of apartheid in the West Bank while turning Palestinians in Gaza into a futureless, stateless people imprisoned on the edge of the Sinai.

We Say:

Those who despair of ever achieving a two-state solution, as well as those who are fundamentally opposed to the two-state solution, want to suggest that there is some viable alternative solution. The reality is that no such alternative solution exists.

There are only two alternatives outcomes if there is no two-state solution. One is an apartheid-like situation - what will soon be an Israeli-Jewish minority ruling over a Palestinian majority. The other is a bi-national state - a prescription for ongoing bloodletting between Jews and Palestinians, two peoples who each aspire to their own state.

While some believe that the price of a two-state solution is too high, the truth is that the price of not having peace will be unbearable for both parties.

We Say:

Preventing further erosion of the Israel-Turkey alliance and repairing the damage that has been done to the relationship in recent years is vital for Israel's own interests. Turkey has for decades been a key ally of Israel. In 1949, Turkey was the first Muslim state to recognize Israel. Since that time, both Israel and Turkey have recognized the importance of this relationship, investing in diplomatic, military/security cooperation, and economic ties.

While historically Israel and Turkey did not see eye-to-eye on every issue, they succeeded in placing the bilateral relationship above any disagreements. Unfortunately, in recent years this has changed. Tensions that came to the fore with the 2008 Gaza War and that have deepened since that time - particularly in the wake of the May 2010 Gaza flotilla debacle - are still straining the Israel-Turkey relationship today.

There is unease in Israel and among many supporters of Israel about Turkey, with a growing sense that Turkey's government is becoming more Islamist and is seeking to project power into the Middle East, including through solidarity with Hamas and through harsh criticism of Israel. In Turkey, there is a growing sense that Israel is deliberately seeking to undermine Turkey-Israel relations. The absence of a credible peace process that can deal with, among other things, the problems in Gaza, perpetuates the kind of crises that drive the escalation in Turkey-Israel tensions.

This erosion of the Israel-Turkey bilateral relationship has serious potential negative ramifications for Israel, depriving Israel of an important and politically powerful ally in the region - an ally that has, and in the future can, represent a bridge to the Arab and Muslim worlds. This erosion also strains U.S.-Turkey relations, with potential negative ramifications for U.S. national security interests in the region, including its policies vis-à-vis Iraq, Iran and Syria.

We Say:

Anyone who cares about Israel and peace, security, and stability in the Middle East must be concerned at the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. An Iran armed with nuclear weapons represents an alarming scenario that neither the U.S. nor Israel, nor for that matter, the world, can afford to dismiss. However, they must be equally concerned about reckless talk about military action, or reckless actions that discredit diplomacy and leave military action as the only option. They must also be outraged and appalled by those who cynically seek to transform a decision about war - with all of its national security implications for both Israel and the United States - into a false test of pro-Israel credentials.

The U.S. must deal soberly with the serious challenges posed by Iran. A decision to go to war is too important to be turned into a political football. It is imperative, given the stakes involved, that the U.S. remain committed to a responsible course of diplomacy, backed by sanctions and supported by the international community. As demonstrated by past experience, engaging Iran is not easy; indeed, it will almost certainly continue to be a frustrating, arduous process whose success is by no means a foregone conclusion. But such an effort is indispensable if the U.S. is serious about dealing with the challenges Iran poses to U.S. foreign policy and to U.S. national security, as well as to Israel and the region.

Policymakers should not give in to those who, for reasons of ideology, partisan gain or political expediency, are agitating for war. For years, Israeli and U.S. experts - people with direct experience in intelligence, defense, and national security decision-making - have made clear that military action against Iran will only delay, not stop, Iran's nuclear program and will likely have far-reaching and dangerous consequences for the U.S., Israel, the region and, indeed, the world. They have also made clear that the best chance for avoiding war is tough, sustained, robust diplomacy, in tandem with sanctions against the Iranian regime. Such diplomacy should not be constrained by preconditions or arbitrary deadlines.

This is not to suggest that all options, including military action, should not remain on the table. However, it must be recognized that military action is the least desirable and by no means inevitable option of last resort. Any discourse about war must be sober and fact-based, involving an objective weighing of all options and a clear-eyed accounting of possible consequences. It must be a discourse in which the voices of reason and wisdom from America's - and Israel's - own military and intelligence communities are not marginalized in favor of the kind of dangerous ideologues and fantasists who took the U.S. down the path of war in Iraq.

We Say:

Peace agreements based on a balance of interests have a demonstrated track record of success. Under such treaties, Israel's partners, like Egypt and Jordan, have as much interest as Israel in ensuring their stability. Such treaties, more than anything else, address Israel's fundamental security needs.

Trust, while desirable, will never be the sole, or even the primary, basis of such agreements. Peace agreements, in the Middle East and elsewhere, require far-reaching verification measures and guarantees. These measures may involve both the parties to the treaty and third-party monitors and guarantors. Even if Israelis were convinced that all Palestinians were prepared to embrace Israel, any peace agreement would still include comprehensive security arrangements to ensure that - no matter what might happen among the Palestinians or in the region - Israel's security would be protected.

Only over time can former enemies build mutual trust. This process can only begin once the core issues of the conflict are resolved. As time passes and the historic resentments recede into memory, and as people on both sides experience the tangible benefits of peace, warmer relations between governments and peoples can begin to be built.

We Say:

This assertion presupposes that in seeking peace with its neighbors, Israel is acting out of benevolent or generous motivations. According to this logic, peace is a gift that Israel will give to the Arabs, but only once they earn it.

The reality is that seeking sustainable, viable peace agreements, and reaching them urgently, is an Israeli self-interest. Indeed, without a peace agreement, Israel's very existence as a Jewish state and a democracy is at risk. Israel must pursue peace, first and foremost, because of what Israelis need and deserve, irrespective of whether Israelis (or others) feel Arabs have "earned" it or "deserve" it.

We Say:

Incitement against Israel and Jews is a serious problem that must not be ignored or dismissed, particularly in light of the Jewish people's painful history. It plants the seeds of hatred in successive generations and helps cultivate a culture of intolerance toward Israel and Jews. Expressions of hatred and incitement to violence clearly don't advance the cause of peace.

However, making the total elimination of hatred and incitement a condition for peace negotiations is a prescription for making things worse, not better.

Continuing the status quo of Israeli occupation will only deepen Arab resentment and hatred of Israel. It will also deepen Israeli demonization of the Palestinians. The fact is that incitement and hatred go both ways. Friends of Israel tend to focus on Arab inflammatory rhetoric, but there is no shortage of hateful rhetoric on the Israeli side as well, in addition to Israeli policies toward the Palestinians that the Arab world (and much of the rest of the world) views as offensive, racist, or unjust. Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim incitement must also be rejected. A fundamental tenet of democracy is that discrimination and incitement against any people based on their religion or ethnicity is unacceptable, and neither acts by extremists nor profound political disagreements change this.

Hatred, incitement, and racism are all serious obstacles to peace. Combating this problem must be an important element of U.S. bilateral relations and regional policy in the Middle East and around the world. Both sides must work to contain and eliminate them, and the Palestinian Authority deserves credit for the extensive and ongoing efforts it has made in recent years to address this problem.

Efforts to achieve peace - and the eventual achievement of peace between Israel and her neighbors - are aimed at providing security, stability and well-being to both Israelis and Arabs. Such efforts, if successful, offer the best way to change negative and antagonistic attitudes on both sides.