Ori Nir 00:02
And then one, two, and three. Hello, everyone. Thank you for joining this Americans for peace now webinar with Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer. Before we start our usual housekeeping notes. This webinar, as you probably all know, is recorded. We will post the video on our YouTube channel and the audio on our podcast please cast that will be done sometime later today. And the other note that you're probably all familiar with as well, is that you are encouraged to ask questions, you can do it at any point in our on our webinar, beginning now. To do it, please use the q&a tool that is at the bottom of your screen. I think it's on the on the bottom left, not the raise hand but the q&a tool. And please keep your questions short because we go through them as we go along with the webinar. One additional note, today's webinar will be shorter than the usual it's going to be only 50 minutes. So we will end sharp on 1250. Benjamin Netanyahu Likud party has reportedly finished its negotiations with its coalition partners, and is set to form a coalition. A government will be sworn in probably in about two weeks or so. It received an extension from the President today a 1010 day extension. Reportedly, an extension will be used to pass legislation in the Knesset that would accommodate coalition partners. This will be the most hardline right wing coalition in Israel's history. It comes in with a revolutionary verb to introduce policies and legislation that will change Israel's very character if implemented. With us to discuss the impact of Netanyahu new government on its impact on the US Israel relationship is Daniel Kurtzer. He's a current scholar former career diplomat. He represented the United States as ambassador in Cairo and in Tel Aviv. He was also instrumental in founding the Israel's baseball league. That's a little known fact. And recently, co authored a Washington Post article with Aaron David Miller headlined Biden should respond boldly to a radical Netanyahu government. And what we want to do today is to talk about the kind of reaction that Washington should the kind of the way in which Washington should react to the incoming Israeli government. Ambassador Kurtzer, then, thank you for joining us on this on this webinar. Before we address this the topic of discussion, I thought it would be interesting to recognize the date today Today's December 9, which is the 35th anniversary of the First Intifada, you probably remember that we met in 1990 when the first defiler was still going on. I had just arrived in Washington from Israel after covering the First Intifada as a journalist for more than two years. And what I wanted to ask you today is what lessons you think we should learn from the First Intifada, which would still be applicable or relevant today.
Daniel Kurtzer 03:42
Well, thank you, Ori, for inviting me. It's good to be with you again. I remember well, book the beginning of the Intifada, and its immediate and long term impact at the time, I was working as an adviser to Secretary of State George Shultz and as a speechwriter on the policy planning staff. And the Secretary realized, as we all did, that there was an inflection point that we had reached, where local Palestinians, those in the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, took into their own hands. The idea of resistance against Israel PLO did not start that first intifada, in fact, they, they ran fast to catch up, but they almost never did. It was really the national guidance committee, as it was called, that set the policy and determined the actions. And so it was important in understanding that the people under occupation had some agency and were prepared to, to go out on the streets and to demonstrate that that agency the the second thing that I think is quite important for today, is the fact that Schultz tried during the Intifada, and Then Baker picked it up. A year or two later tried to translate violence into a political outcome. You know, we've seen in recent years, the outbreak of wars between Israel and Hamas over over issues related to rockets and so forth, and all those wars, kill people and destroy property. And then everybody goes back to what they were doing before. That first intifada demonstrated that you can use that kind of situation as an opportunity for a political breakthrough. It didn't happen right away. Schultz tried, there was a Schultz plan in 1988. And that failed, but it started the process that resulted in the Madrid peace conference, which was across a great procedural breakthrough.
Ori Nir 05:55
Right. And that violence, obviously was, I mean, it was not a nonviolent effort on the part of Palestinians. But it was unarmed. Unlike the Second Intifada, obviously.
Daniel Kurtzer 06:06
That's right. That's right. And I think that, you know, the difference between the two intifadas I think relates directly to that fact. The second intifada caused so many casualties killed and wounded in Israel, that it changed attitudes within the country in a quite demonstrable way. Whereas the First Intifada certainly hardened some attitudes. But it also provided that opening that President Bush and Secretary Baker were able to exploit and to use diplomatically.
Ori Nir 06:40
Then let's get back to the article that you co authored with Aaron Miller. This is this was in the Washington Post a few days ago. You say there that President Biden should respond head on to this incoming Israeli government and you explain what you mean by that. But let me first ask you why. I mean, many people say Israelis have voted, the people have spoken, they democratically elected a government that is of a certain character. Sure, many don't like it. But why should the US take measures to express disapproval? And again, I'm intentionally posing the question in that way. Because I've heard it a lot from both people or people in both Israel and the United States. What What Why should the US react respond at all?
Daniel Kurtzer 07:35
Let me introduce my response by noting that the article in the Washington Post was actually the second article that I had written after the Israeli election, in that first article, noting the possibility that there would be some very problematic politicians who might be included in the coalition. I recommended that Prime Minister Netanyahu, reach out to the center in order to form a kind of national unity coalition, recognizing that he needed the far right wing to get elected, but did not need them to govern. In fact, they would present very serious problems for him. Of course, the deal that he would have had to make, to do that would be a Get Out of Jail Free card from whether dance or copied, but it seemed to be a deal that however, unhappily, everybody would enter, it would be better than bringing into the coalition. People who have a demonstrated record of racism, homophobia, you name it. These are awful human beings, who are now about to enter government. Now, Aaron Miller, and I recognize that this was a democratically elected government or will be a democratically elected government. And in a sense, President Biden has already recognized that. But that doesn't mean that our interaction with that government has to be the same. I'll say this, with the word love deal that to distinguish, in 2006, the Palestinians had an election, and Hamas ended up winning it. And you remember, at the time, the President George W. Bush said after that election, this was a free and fair election, and we're not going to deal with the government that emerges, because that government was representative represented by Hamas, an organization that's on terrorism list. Now, I say in the half deal, because there there isn't a direct connection. But the fact is that states have the ability to on the one hand recognize a fair election. That was under two akin in Israel, but to choose to, to, or to decide whether or not the individuals occupying critical posts are those with whom we could work. And so that's what prompted Aaron and me to write the article and to suggest a course of action for the Biden administration. Before the government came into being, as a kind of shot across the bow for the Prime Minister to say to him, Look, you know, we can't interfere in what you do. But you want to know that what you do will have an impact on what we do. And you might want to rethink the direction in which you're heading.
Ori Nir 10:38
So let's let's first, I want to remind people that they're encouraged to ask questions. Again, please do not use the raise hand tool, but the q&a tool, so the q&a tool that's at the bottom of your screen, then let's let's examine the recommendations that you make in the article for the Biden administration. And if we can do we have some time to do it. And more than then, you know, a 700, word op ed. The first one that I wanted to talk a bit of a bit about is, you state that the White House should make clear to Israel that the US and here's a quote, will not provide offensive weapons or other assistance to malign Israeli actions in Jerusalem in the occupied territories, say the United States specifically should warn against efforts to change the status quo or the status of the West Bank and the noble sanctuary, the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, to legalize settlements, and outposts and so on and so forth. If I read this correctly, this is what you're what you're recommending is conditioning USA, which is a matter that the measure that has been taboo for past US administrations is is that really the case?
Daniel Kurtzer 11:55
No, it's not. USAID is already conditioned by what's called the Leahy amendments. Senator Leahy of Vermont years ago, introduced an amendment to I think it was the National Defense Authorization Act, which said that the United States should investigate. And if necessary, take action, if weapons that we provide are used in a manner that doesn't uphold values such as human rights. And so our embassies are tasked with monitoring the utilization of our weapons, and are supposed to file reports when weapons that we have sold or provided are used in that manner. Our Embassy in Tel Aviv, over many years, has had this as one of its mandates we've never actually followed through to take action. But governments, like the Government of Israel knows that we watched the utilization of our weapons. So noting this in advance of weapons sales, is really putting Israel on notice that we're going to pay attention. Now, one of the questions raised is, well, how do you distinguish, you know, offensive and defensive weapons, and it's, it's a valid argument, you know, a bullet is a bullet and a gun is a gun. But the point is, how the weapons are used. And if the new government takes actions, which prompt a Leahy investigation, then our argument is the United States should tell Israel, but we will take action, and it will impact weapons sales.
Ori Nir 13:39
And I know that you've also been instrumental in enforcing US policy regarding settlements, and offsetting US aid of a certain sort. In the past. Maybe you could say a few words about that. Sure.
Daniel Kurtzer 13:57
Look, I want to put into context first, that one of the things I'm very proud of was being part of several administrations that set in motion US Israel Strategic Dialogue and strategic cooperation. So this is not a long term punitive set of actions. It's rather part of a fabric of relations which the United States and Israel have woven over time. What you're referring to in the question is back in the period the run up before the Madrid peace conference, Israel asked for $10 billion in loan guarantees to resettle Soviet Jewish immigrants in Israel. Now, on the one hand, the administration was proud to have played a role in opening the gates of the Soviet Union for emigration. It was one of the achievements of the Reagan and the Bush administration. So we definitely wanted to help. But when we said to at that time prime ministership, Hear that we did not want any of our money used to resettle those immigrants to the occupied territories. The Prime Minister balked said he would not agree to that condition. And we ended up knocking heads until the Prime Minister tried to override the President's position in Congress, he failed. We did not provide the loan guarantees at the time that he wanted it. But we did provide them shortly thereafter, once the Madrid peace conference had been arranged. So it's an example of the effective utilization of American I would call it pressure. But on an issue that was extraordinarily important deferral, we were trying to bring together Arab States and Israel in a way that they had never talked before in an international conference leading to direct negotiations. And we didn't want an influx of perhaps a million Soviet Jewish immigrants, to start populating settlements and undercut the very negotiations that we were hoping to launch.
Ori Nir 16:08
Another recommendation that you mentioned, is has to do with the interaction between the US administration and the more extremist elements of this government. And you right there, that sorry, yeah. And you right there that the Biden administration should make clear that to Israel, that the Biden ministration will will have no dealings with the vendors not which party and their ministries if they continue to espouse racist policies and actions. Now, Secretary of State Biden Blinken, in his speech at the J Street conference earlier this week, said that the US will judge Israel's incoming government by its actions, not by the members of the government of the government. Do you think that Washington should avoid contact with Ben Vereen smart rich until they prove through actions that they are worthy interlocutors? Or do you think the opposite should be the case? In other words, you know, innocent until proven guilty? If, if you wish, what do you think? Yeah, well,
Daniel Kurtzer 17:22
look, in practical terms, there's no reason to have contact with them now, before they enter the government. And I think it's reasonable to allow a period of time to take place to see whether what they have promised to do is what they actually do. Or we don't have to run after them on day one, we should see whether or not they carry out the rather awful things that they have said publicly they intend to do. So I think Secretary Blinken is right. We don't have to make a big announcement about boycotting them. We don't have to, you know, make a show of it. But in practical terms, I think we should see how they act, how they comport themselves. If in fact, they are intent upon governing reasonably, and they don't do the things that they promised to do. Well, then it's that would be business as usual. But, you know, actions here are going to speak as importantly as words. And I think we ought to see those actions, in view of the terrible words that these people have used to define the policies that they promised implement.
Ori Nir 18:35
Then I got to zoom out a little bit and refer to something that you pointed out, which I think is an interesting distinction. You pointed out in the article that previous crisis that the United States had with Israel had to do with it were in the context of peace negotiations. In other words, they had to do with differences of opinions regarding policy, more specifically policy on Israeli Palestinian affairs. What we have now what we have today is a crisis that has to do with values with character. And I'm sure that you heard and perhaps even uttered the truism that the special relationship between the US and Israel and it is a special relationship is based on shared values. Does it still make sense to even talk about shared values? Now that we have a government that includes such a sizable to harnessed component?
Daniel Kurtzer 19:37
I hope it still is useful to talk about shared values, and I hope that the government that emerges from the coalition talks, in fact demonstrates that those values are still shared. That's not clear based on what we've heard from Ben Vera, smoke Trichur, Avi, Ma, OHS and others with regard to their intentions. So again, we're into the question of words and actions. And it's very troubling now, that you're right, as we said in the article that previous differences of you have normally related to peace process, whether it's settlements or negotiating positions or whatever. This is, in a sense far deeper, because it cuts to the fabric of, of really what binds the two countries together. Now, we also made clear in the article regarding our security relationship, that nothing should change, we are still and should remain committed to Israel's security and well being. But what kind of Israel is it going to be? In this respect? I, I've seen references I haven't seen the quotes yet to comments made by a Foxman, the retired director of the anti Defamation League, who has also called into question, his own lifetime commitment to Israel. If Israel hits in a direction that these guys say they want to lead it. So you know, this is not to peace process policy wonks. They know suggesting to put some pressure on Israel. This is far more fundamental and far deeper, and therefore should prompt everyone left center and right to think about this.
Ori Nir 21:27
We have quite a few questions already piling up from from the attendees. And I again, like to encourage people to post questions using the q&a tool. The first one that I'd like to read out to you, Dan comes from Nimrod Novick, who I'm sure you know quite well from your diplomatic experience. And what he's asking is whether you can assist the administration's appetite to follow your and And Aaron's recommendations.
Daniel Kurtzer 21:59
Well, first of all regards to Nimrod, whom I've known longer than the anniversary of the Intifada, and it's a very deepened and really nice friendship. Look, what we've seen in in the first two years of the administration is a relative unwillingness to move forward on some of the issues that we'd like them to move forward, for example, the peace process, you know, better relationship with Palestinians, but on the other hand, not reopening the consulate, not pressing for not even negotiations, but not pressing the peace process. So there's been a hesitation on the part of the very busy and preoccupied administration not to engage, except where violence kicks in, as it did in May 2021. In the war between Israel and Hamas and in Gaza. The question and I think Secretary Blinken addressed this, in his speech, is whether or not this is different. Whether or not the US can sit back and not pay attention and see Israel take actions that will move Israeli policy in such a direction, that it will be impossible ever to reconstitute a peace process, let alone focus on a possible two state solution. You know, if all the outposts that are illegal under Israeli Law, are magically waived to be legal, which of course all of this contradicts the commitment that Israel has made to the United States to dismantle illegal outposts. But if now these outposts are made legal, and if more infrastructure is built that ties settlements together, and disadvantages Palestinian life, let alone the idea of political and geographical continuity continuity for a possible state to drive Palestinians out as much as possible through actions on the ground. The administration may be forced to take actions that it frankly has not wanted to, in large part because it has so many other issues on the agenda. So the answer to Nimrod is I don't know. But, you know, as we said at the beginning of the conversation, this is a different kind of inflection point, you know, first intifada was one, maybe the Second Intifada Camp David second intifada was a second. And I think we're at a third point now where Israel may have finally decided to drive its policy off a cliff in a manner that will be inconsistent with American interests and values.
Ori Nir 24:48
Sort of following up on numerals question, I'd like to ask you a question that has to do with assessing current administration policies toward Israel Palestine. It's a complex Question. So I'll you know, I'll help you throw it. If you forget,
Daniel Kurtzer 25:05
I'll give you a complex answer. So that's okay.
Ori Nir 25:08
So I'm sure that you've heard recently a formulation that is new to my ears, which is that the US gold us objective now is to ensure equal parts of trying to remember exactly how it was put, but something like equal parts of freedom, security and justice or something along these lines for both Israelis and Palestinians, which tune sound like a framing that has to do with human rights, rather than statehood and sovereignty. But also, we do hear from the administration, we heard it in Lincoln's speech at J Street, that this administration is very much committed to the two state solution as a goal. So the first question is, how do you interpret this this new formulation? And secondly, if the imperative of the administration at this time ought is and ought to be keeping the path open toward the two state solution? What should the White House ask other players other than Israel to do Palestinians, Arab regimes, a part of it is in your article with maybe you can elaborate on it. So there's two questions here.
Daniel Kurtzer 26:35
Sure. So remind me of the second one when we get to it, because the first answer will will be a little bit complex. Yeah. And it gets into the the tall grass of peace process minuti. There is a view being espoused by some that the two state solution is dead and buried. And the parties ought to be encouraged to pursue a rights based approach, meaning that you take what has become effectively a one state reality without equality, and turn it into something more equal, where Palestinians enjoy equal rights, equal opportunities, equal justice, in a situation in which Israel remains the dominant player as continued occupation. The administration has taken note of that, but doesn't agree with it. And that's why they've always coupled that statement. And I can't remember it word for word either. But you got it pretty close. They've coupled that statement with a reminder that we still pursue the to state outcome, but realistically don't believe that we can restart the process of getting there under current circumstances, and that the way that might be available to restart that process, at some point is to build rights and to build the economy and to build avenues for equal justice. So there's a major difference here between those who have given up on two states and say, well, let's just go for the equal rights, even if it means a one state reality, and then later, we can argue for a one state juridically as opposed to the administration, which is saying, No, we haven't given up on two states. But in the meantime, there's no reason for Palestinians not to enjoy some better measure of equality. And that's why, you know, there's activities designed to try to build institutional capacity, economic development, and so forth. You know, back in the 1980s, the Reagan administration tried something called the quality of life initiative, which was a bottom up approach, you know, if you made life better for Palestinians, they would be better off and therefore more willing to negotiate. But the quality of life didn't work, not because we couldn't deliver more for the Palestinians. But because the Palestinians rightfully want to know where it's heading, is there a political vision or a political outcome to which the process is leading. So I think the administration is trying to signal that the outcome, the vision is still two states, but don't resist the idea of making your life's a little bit better if we can do so. As long as it's in that context of creating the conditions where at some point we might get to negotiations. Now, on your on your second point, we did address it briefly in the article by noting the incapacity of the Palestinian Authority right now it's weak. It's been unwilling to stop or to take actions to stop the growing violence. The there's a So long term succession crisis, that is, it's going to be with us for quite some time. And it's, it's really a shell of a of a governing authority. And so we did suggest we argued that Palestinians get their act together, and try to figure out how they're going to how they're going to reach the point where if negotiations are possible, they can present themselves as a negotiating partner. And we did call specifically on the Abraham accord countries, but before that, just Palestinians, what would that mean, putting their act together? If so, you know, if you think in Grand terms, it's kind of a constitutional convention, where you bring the various factions together. And you kind of sit in a room, you know, we call the Philadelphia they can do it in Ramallah. And you try to figure out what it is you want. Do you want a two state solution? Do you want Confederation? Do you want one state? Do you want something else? And secondly, try to figure out how you're going to organize yourselves? Is it God, is a Palestinian entity going to be a democratic? Is it going to be parliamentary system is going to be presidential system, they've kind of willy nilly ended up where they are, I think without deep thoughts, having gone into it, and now that you have a sclerotic leadership, you know, Alamance is a is a fine person. But you know, what do they say he's in the 18th, year of a six year term or something like that, that there's been no opportunity for Palestinians, to speak their peace and to decide how they want to govern themselves. So they really want to take this opportunity when they're not being asked to negotiate to figure out who they are, what they are, where they want to go with their their politics. Lastly, then on the Abraham accord states, you know, it's wonderful that some Arab states have normalized relations with Israel, it is 75 years overdue. It's something of which those of us who worked on Madrid are very proud, because we launched this in the multilateral talks that followed Madrid, in the Casablanca economic summit process. This started 3030, year 25 years ago, in bringing Israel Arab states together, and finally, for additional Arab states have decided that their own interests dictate establishing a normal relationship with Israel. But in so doing, they've largely ignored except for Morocco. But certainly three of them have almost affirmatively ignored the fact that there still is a Palestinian Israeli issue, which needs to be resolved. And reality is that their new relationship with Israel, gives them the ability to interact with Israel on the Palestinian issue in a way that they couldn't before. You look at all the investment and the travel and the tourism and so forth between Israel and the UAE and Israel and Bahrain. I hope those countries are using that to tell the Israelis look, we want to build the relationship. But you got to figure out how to make peace with Palestinians because they are part of this region and part of our national interests. So we argued for that as well.
Ori Nir 33:44
Yeah, yeah, we've seen an interesting kind of small window into the sentiment of the Arab public and in those countries and other countries at the, the Soccer World Cup now. It was kind of an interesting glimpse. I'd like to take another question from our audience here. And this one comes from my friend Martin raffle. You may know him Dan from his longtime affiliation with adjacent PA. So Martin's writing is writing concerns about Israel's settlement and human rights practices in the occupied territories long have existed but the US always refrain from holding back weapons, both defensive and offensive. What are the red lines that should move the US to finally move in that direction?
Daniel Kurtzer 34:36
Well, first of all, hello to Jim. Yes, we we've known each other quite this is like a family event. That this morning.
Ori Nir 34:44
We are community. Yes,
Daniel Kurtzer 34:45
yes, exactly. You know, there's there are there's a line which could get crossed, that makes settlement activity in the past chain. Change into annexation activity in the future. And I don't know how to draw that line right now, I don't know whether it's another 10 outposts or the legalization of the outposts or the road connection or the infrastructure connection. I think that's something that needs to be considered very, very deeply. But at some point, there's a sea change between the settlements against which we have railed for 40 years or more. And the transformation of the settlement enterprise into the annexation, its enterprise. You know, a couple of years ago, it looked like Israel might start annexing as a result of the way they read the Trump plan. And that didn't happen. And we're unlikely to see a kind of formal announcement or a headline that says Israel is annexing the territories. So that's why it's hard to calculate where that line is, that gets crossed. But I think it's imperative for parties that have a stake in this conflict like the United States to make a determination at some point, as that line gets crossed, Israel has to know that there are consequences. And I think that's what Aaron and I were trying to say in shorthand, as already noted, in 700 words,
Ori Nir 36:33
I'd like to ask you another question that that I think, will reflect a certain sentiment that I see here, we have a lot of questions being asked on the q&a. Something that I've been hearing from quite a few people, and I have to say, bothers me very much. And that is, there's a certain attitude of people wanting to just wash their hands of Israel, I have to say it's with a really with a heavy heart. What people are saying is, look, there is a certain trajectory of the demographic in Israel, the demographic of the segment of Israeli society that is predisposed to object to any kind of compromise with the Palestinians is growing in in such measures that they are now in the government and they and they don't seem to be. And they seem to be having a hold on the government, you know, going forward to state solution is becoming more and more difficult to attain. Is there is there a point at all and in another word, and another aspect of it perhaps, which is maybe a positive thing is that Israel is thriving economically, the GDP per capita is great. It doesn't really need foreign assistance. It can leave on his own live on its own. Why Why bother?
Daniel Kurtzer 37:59
So that's also a complex question. And it brings to mind I think it was Churchill, who said about the United States that the United States always does the right thing after it's exhausted all other alternatives. A lot of us want to believe that that's going to be the case with Israel, that the people of Israel have made a choice, they're heading in a very, very bad direction. And at some point, we'll see the light and head back towards a more reasonable position, whether it's center center right center left, but wherever it is, it will not include these seriously faulted people with seriously faulted ideologies, and seriously faulted ideas of what Israel should be and what its policy should be. So I would argue against giving up on Israel, not just because it's successful economically, and doesn't need the United States. Yeah, it can go its own way. And, in fact, Yossi Beilin, and I argued a couple of years ago that Israel ought to go its own way, in terms of independence from USAID, because that will free them from the kind of pressure that Herman Miller and I are suggesting might be brought to bear independent countries, like Israel, that's quite wealthy, don't need handouts from the United States. They need access to technologies defense equipment, but that's a different a different issue. So I I think the people who want to give up on Israel may be motivated by you know, positive motives that they've tried hard and they haven't succeeded and they can't do anything more. Some may be motivated by not so kind motives, you know, waiting for this moment when they can heap all kinds of challenges on Israel. But that's I think that's wrong. Israel's too important for the United States, it's too important for the Jewish community. It's too important for for most of the world, to simply wash one's hands. I think you have to work with the country work with the prime minister that, you know, at the center of our article was the idea of working with the Chinese Yahoo, to avoid the problems that look like they're coming at us head on. And hopefully, you know, he will. He'll stop before we reach that point.
Ori Nir 40:35
And are you are you mentioning Netanyahu specifically? Obviously, he's going to be the prime minister, but also because he probably is the person who is the most attuned to the United States and most and knows the in those bests than anyone else. The nature and the importance of the US Israel relationship.
Daniel Kurtzer 41:03
I think that's for sure. You know, a lot has been written about the fact that even though he has some ideological views that are consistent with the way things are heading, he's also risk averse. And I think that's true. I worked with him very productively when I was ambassador and he was the finance minister. We helped him and the finance ministry get Israel out of some very significant economic problems. So you know, he's not a wild eyed ideologue, or not a crazy man about to take the reins of power. As you noted, he also knows the United States now. I hope he doesn't get fooled by this idea that somehow he can rely upon his Republican friends. Our midterm elections have demonstrated that the Republicans are not as powerful as he may have thought they were during the Trump years. The fact that Biden's has Biden has held on to the Senate, with some question marks now with Senator cinemas defection, the house is still very close. It's it was not a train wreck for the Democrats. And I think that's on Yahoo has always had his finger on the American pulse. Who will recognize that he's got to take American thinking into account as as the government moves forward.
Ori Nir 42:36
Yeah, we have with us and I'm hoping that we can also ask him to turn on his camera. Jim Klutznick, the chair of our board, who wanted to join us and say a few words. I see that we're nearing the end of our of our webinars. So maybe I'll ask Jim to say a few closing words. Hi, Jim. Thanks for joining.
Jim Klutznick 43:01
Thank you. Mr. Kurtzer, I didn't mean to cut you off. But I very much appreciate. Appreciate what you've been saying today. I want to point out that by the way, I used to be on the advisory board. And if the new studies and I don't know if Abraham did he is still around.
Daniel Kurtzer 43:24
I believe he is. If you're still around, but he's retired. Yes. Yes,
Jim Klutznick 43:28
I know a lot of you've seen please give him my best regards.
Daniel Kurtzer 43:32
I shall, yes.
Jim Klutznick 43:35
The I think this last election, which I look at is being sort of crafted for the benefit of one one person. And to get as you put it, get the Get Out of Jail Free card is now starting to backfire on him with the cash carry characters he's helped put into a position of governing Israel. And what I want to point out is that the Israelis have been annexing the West Bank for a long time. De facto annexation is probably better for them with because they don't have to announce it. It's just government will. It's just government information does announce it. And if these people get in to power, I know you and I already talked about giving them a chance to prove themselves and that's probably correct. But other bad people have been elected democratically in other parts of the world over the years. And these people seem to be in that vein, regardless of whether or not Danielle who is an ideologue or not. He's, he's practical, particularly for his own benefit in this case. And my my question to you is because because annexation Sin has been going on constantly, no matter what goes on here, the Israelis will continue to annex by just setting up their illegal. And by the way, illegal is a funny term because it's within the illegal within their laws, sort of like a kangaroo court in many respects. And I've been trying to figure out how you break this core guardian, Gordian knot. And it seems to me, you touched on the lack of Palestinian leadership. But there's I shouldn't say the lack of there is a leadership. But it's not effective at this point. And it seems to me like you create bread, you need a starter dough. And the starter dough to me in this case, is leadership. And I really like to know what your understanding is of the possibility of leaders emerging. Because I think that's if you have an active Palestinian leader, which we don't at this point, after all these years, that sort of forces the issue, there's got to be some way to try to get this thing started. And that's my my question. That's my thought. That's my question to you. Do you see any prospect whether you can name people or not of how we can how the Palestinians can actually become active players here, as opposed to watching this de facto annexation take take place in front of their eyes?
Daniel Kurtzer 46:27
Yeah, Jim, thanks for that question. Look, I've been a canary in the coal mine for 40 years on creeping annexation. You know, when, when there were 50,000 settlers, instead of several 100,000, I was railing against settlements and writing memos to the Secretary of State in the need to see that stops. So what we're seeing now is, you know, something rolling downhill and gathering momentum. And a government that's about to come in, that will not only keep that momentum up, but probably find a way to, you know, jet propulsion it down the hill. But you're also right, that it's not a question of not having a partner if Palestinians have to be the partner of Israel. So that's always been a an idea that people have used to argue against negotiations, but it's a wrong idea. You've put your finger on the correct issue, which is, is there a Palestinian leadership, or leaders that can emerge that, you know, will turn will turn the direction of Palestinian politics. I had the first substantive conversation with Yasser Arafat in 1993, after the Oslo signing, I was in Tunisia and he called, he knew I was there. And he called to see me and I sat, sat with him for three hours. And I said to him at the time, you know, you have a unique opportunity to be the Nelson Mandela and George Washington, of the Palestinian national movement, you can define whatever it is that Palestine National Movement is going to do. But it has to be a vision, you have to it can't just be going back and recreating the PLO in Gaza and Jericho or in the West Bank and Gaza. And our thought wasn't up to the test, as it turns out, at Lawson has not been up to the test. And that does raise the question, is there? Or will there be a Palestinian leader or leaders who can emerge to do this? The one thing I have tried to hesitate doing is to name names. Because I don't want to I don't want to have a situation where having said a name I've I've put the curse on on the person. But there are there are smart Palestinians, including those who have worked in the Palestinian Authority and achieved a great deal and institutionalizing good governance and building capacity and improving the economy. Couple of them were pushed out, but they're there, which means Palestinians have the smart people and people with vision who can do this question is how they reemerge in policymaking for and I go back to the point I made to Ori it may require some kind of a national convention of sorts, in which they play this out and they fight and yell at each other and come up with different ideas, but also come up with a leadership that can move those ideas forward. Well, I guess the only thing I would ask you is if you can't name names, particularly on a session like this, maybe you can write us a note. You know, we're in the peace process business. And we go there from time to time was going there again in March and give us some hence we thought I whispered sorry, if you will whisper Ori. I know he's a good communicator. He'll get it back. Okay. Thank you very much for joining us today. Okay.
Ori Nir 50:12
Yeah. So, I'd like to thank you both Jim and Dan, for joining us. And I'd like to thank all of the people who joined us on this webinar. It brings this this brings it to an end. I want to wish everyone a good weekend. Shabbat Shalom and happy holiday season. And again, then thank you very much for joining us on this webinar.