Q. The Obama administration appears to be engaging in limited military cooperation with Iran against
the Islamic State. How does this sit with Israel?
A. This development leaves the Israeli security establishment very uneasy.
President Obama has declared that the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL and Daish) is a greater danger
than Iran. In parallel, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has apparently approved Iranian cooperation with the US
against IS. Obama promises to present a comprehensive American strategy for dealing with IS this Wednesday--one
that invokes widespread international cooperation and thereby avoids putting US "boots on the ground" in Iraq and
Syria.
Indeed, the US has recruited nine additional non-Middle East countries to work with it in bombing IS targets and
strengthening allies on the ground, meaning the Iraqi army and "moderate" Syrian opposition groups. But in terms of
immediate assets, Iranian military and intelligence capacities are apparently much more available. And Iran shares
the objective of putting a collapsed Iraq back together as a means of braking IS's militant Sunni Islamist drive
into the heart of the Arab Middle East. Both Iran and the US have been arming and advising Kurdish Peshmerga forces
who currently (in the absence of a functioning Iraqi army) lead the fighting against IS on the ground.
Apparently to ease the way toward cooperation in the field with the US, Iran may have replaced Quds Force commander
Qassem Suleimani on the Iraqi battlefront with General Ali Shamkhani. Suleimani remains active primarily in Syria,
where he is responsible for Iran's role in massive atrocities against the civilian population; Shamkhani, in
contrast, served as defense minister under President Mohammad Khatami, an earlier reformer who was popular with the
West. But this may simply be Iranian sleight-of-hand: Suleimani was photographed last week at an Iraqi combat
site.
Precisely how the US and Iran will collaborate--or are already collaborating--in Iraq has not been made entirely
clear. About 10 days ago they seemingly worked together--the US from the air, Iranian advisers on the ground--in
assisting a force reportedly made up of Kurds, Iraqi Shiite militias and Iraqi army units to lift the siege on the
Shiite Iraqi town of Amerli. And American and Iranian military personnel may have met in Kurdistan.
Israeli security sources are watching these developments with concern for two reasons. One is the notion that if
the US and Iran can cooperate against militant Sunni Islam, this may render it easier for them to achieve a nuclear
deal by November 24--one that involves international concessions to Iran that Israel might find threatening. The
other is that, as matters stand, a victory over IS in Iraq by any coalition, with or without Iran, tends to
stabilize that country as a Shiite-ruled ally of Iran. And this in turn facilitates geostrategic access and support
by Tehran to Syria's brutal Assad regime and to its Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah ally, which sits on Israel's northern
border and threatens it with as many as 100,000 rockets.
Q. So, does Israel prefer that IS take over large parts of Iraq and Syria and threaten Jordan, Saudi
Arabia and Lebanon? Or can it acquiesce in US collaboration with Iran against IS?
A. Here it is important to note that, in Israeli eyes, the direct threat posed by Iran's militant Shiite Islam is
as great as that posed by IS. In this sense, most Israelis would take issue with Obama's downgrading of the Iranian
threat noted above. Even if a nuclear agreement with Iran is reached--one that Israel will almost certainly have to
acquiesce in, however serious its concerns and however loud its protests--Iran will still remain a very proximate
threat to Israel by virtue of its constant calls for the destruction of the Jewish state and its active support for
Syria and particularly Hezbollah. The Hezbollah rocket and tunnel threat is not on the negotiating table when the
P5 + 1 sit down with Iran to discuss its nuclear program. But it is very much on Israel's mind following its
experience in the recent war with Hamas.
Accordingly, from the Israeli standpoint, however ominous the threat posed by IS, there are strategic benefits to
be gained vis-a-vis Iran if IS cripples Iraq, because this materially hampers Iran's access to the Levant. That is
why in early July PM Netanyahu declared his support for an independent Kurdistan in what is today northern Iraq.
Not only does Israel empathize with another embattled Middle East minority breaking free of Arab control; an
independent Kurdistan means a dismembered Iraq, and that weakens Iran.
Washington, in contrast, seeks a reunited Iraq under a (democratically elected) Shiite majority. The US has
invested huge blood and treasure in this enterprise. Last month, it was the plight of ancient Iraqi minorities
threatened by IS that alerted the American public. Now, following the gruesome beheadings of Americans by IS that
were broadcast worldwide, Washington has a score to settle with IS. Further, the US and particularly Europe
(basically, the nine countries including Canada and Australia that pledged to support the US effort) fear the
export of Islamist terrorism to their soil by IS--as if Iran and its proxy Hezbollah had not been exporting
terrorism against Jewish targets as distant as Argentina for decades.
At the same time, the Obama administration faces huge problems as it seeks to navigate the mess in Iraq and Syria.
American air power alone will almost certainly not turn the tide of fighting in either country and American "boots
on the ground" are hardly an option, especially as mid-term elections approach. Other than the Kurds, there are no
obvious moderate allies in either country with the capability of exploiting US aid and training in order to make a
difference. Yet the moment Obama commits to stopping IS, he cannot afford to contemplate a very public failure.
Hence his need for Iran. And hence references by American officials to a campaign that will continue into the term
of the next US president.
Of course, Israel for its part also has much to fear from IS along with only slightly less fanatic Islamist groups
like al-Nusra, now firmly implanted along Israel's Golan border. There now appears to be an IS branch in Egyptian
Sinai as well, along Israel's southwest border; last week it beheaded four Egyptians. And an IS affiliate beheaded
two Lebanese soldiers on the Syria-Lebanon border as well. The concern over IS's advances is shared by neighboring
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Arab countries that border on Syria and/or Iraq and are genuinely alarmed over territorial
advances by Sunni extremists (though a variety of wealthy Saudis have in the past helped finance those same
extremists, and Saudi Arabia beheads far more people than has IS). Hence it's difficult for all concerned to
protest when Washington appears to be embracing, however tentatively, the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" mantra
in Iraq and possibly even Syria.
Here, two very unlikely solutions or developments would prove ideal for Israel and its moderate neighbors. One is a
genuine US-Iran rapprochement, anchored in a nuclear deal but expanding to regional issues, that effectively
neutralizes the Iran/Hezbollah threat to Israel. A second is for militant Sunnis to fight it out with militant
Shiites in the relatively empty desert of northwest Iraq-northeast Syria until both sides are exhausted--echoing PM
Menachem Begin, who wished "success to both sides" in the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s (IS forces have reportedly
even staged raids inside Iran.) Barring such unlikely developments, Israel has cause for concern. The
Netanyahu-Obama relationship, which was never good and has recently been hurt by the failed peace process, the war
in Gaza and the Etzion Bloc land "annexation" (see last week's Q & A), is now liable to deteriorate further
over even a "gesture" of US-Iranian cooperation on the battlefields of Iraq.
Q. Apropos the Gaza war, has any progress been registered toward stabilizing the Israel-Gaza
ceasefire?
A. Virtually none. At present, all concerned parties appear to be working at cross purposes.
Thus, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas warned on Sunday in Cairo that Hamas-Fateh reconciliation was
endangered because Hamas was not honoring its commitment to "one rule, one law and one gun". Fateh will cease
dialoguing with Hamas unless the latter agrees that "arming will be the responsibility of the Palestinian state",
Abbas added. Elsewhere, it was reported that Abbas blamed Hamas for planning a new intifada in the West Bank with
the aim of deposing him, and that the PA was arresting Hamas activists in the West Bank. Hamas claims the main
divisive issue is the PA's failure, or inability due to US-led banking sanctions, to pay the salaries of Hamas
civil servants in Gaza, as originally agreed.
If Palestinian unity is going nowhere, neither are the talks scheduled to begin shortly in Cairo to discuss heavy
issues like Hamas's demand for air and sea ports and Israel's appeal to "demilitarize" the Gaza Strip. The
demilitarization demand was dismissed on Sunday by none other than FM Avigdor Lieberman, whose Foreign Ministry
launched a call for a United Nations force to monitor Gaza rebuilding and prevent Hamas from rearming. In parallel,
a "senior diplomatic source" (probably Lieberman) asserted on Sunday that Hamas is already rebuilding attack
tunnels and producing rockets--a claim not backed by the Israeli security community.
A UN presence in the Gaza Strip would require a new Security Council resolution, which was on the agenda toward the
end of the recent Gaza war but has dropped out of sight for lack of Israeli backing. One reason is Netanyahu's fear
that such a resolution would establish the 1967 lines as the point of departure for a new peace process--a
provision the prime minister still objects to, though he reportedly hinted otherwise to Secretary of State Kerry
before the collapse of the US-sponsored peace process. So Lieberman's UN initiative is as much about his political
rivalry with Netanyahu as about the stabilization of Gaza.
Returning to Abbas, he not only claims to have made no progress with the reconciliation agreement that lies at the
heart of efforts to develop and amplify the Gaza ceasefire. His plan to "solve" the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in
three years with UN backing was apparently rejected last week by Kerry as unacceptably unilateral.
To sum up, "working at cross purposes" may turn out to be an understatement. At this rate, we are heading for
renewed fighting between Israel and Gaza, possibly sooner than expected.