Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin, a scholar and writer, is an international political and strategic consultant. She has advised and conducted research on nine national campaigns in Israel over the past twenty years, and has provided research and advising for elections, referendums, and civil society campaigns in fifteen different countries. She is the author of The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel. 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

Hello, everyone. I see people slowly beginning to join us as I officially open the webinar. So I'm just gonna take a few minutes and let people in, really two seconds and then we'll get started. I am Madeleine, the Director of Government Relations here at APN. I will be introducing our guest in a moment. I'm currently here in Chicago at the DNC so forgive the background and hopefully reliable wifi. So this is going to be a recorded conversation. If you want to ask questions, you can use the Q and A Chat down at the bottom, and I'll be able to read your questions from there. The raise hand button is not going to work out, so don't use that, please. So yeah, I think we've got a good number of folks who've been able to join so let's get started. Hello and welcome to another Americans for Peace Now webinar. Our guest today is Dr Gershon Baskin. He is the Middle East Director of ICO, The international Communities Organization Middle East. It's a British non governmental organization working in conflict zones with failed peace processes. He's also the director of the Holy Land bond and Impact Investment Fund for building reconciliation in Israel and Palestine; his weekly column in English now appears in The Times of Israel. Dr Baskin holds a PhD in international affairs from the University of Greenwich, and he is an author of multiple books, including in "In Pursuit of Peace in Israel and Palestine." So we are very lucky to have him at this incredibly tense moment. Gershon, thank you for joining us. It's a loaded question, but how are you?

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

The standard answer I give, I don't know if we say online, but not- not good, which is how we all are feeling today, because today we buried three of the bodies of hostages that were recovered yesterday in Gaza, and, yeah, the situation here is definitely not good.

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

That is devastating. And our hearts go out to all of you, and we're obviously mourning and holding our breath for a ceasefire deal. Our main focus today, of course, is this very same ceasefire and hostage release deal. It's clear that people around the world and the mediators sent to the table in Doha want an agreement to stop the violence in Gaza and to bring the Israeli hostages home. But in general, the understanding of how to get from point A, calling for a deal to point B, getting the Government of Israel and Hamas to agree to a deal remains murky for a lot of people. Can you lay out in simple terms what this process actually looks like? Who actually goes to the negotiating table? Is this conversation happening between Israelis and Hamas officials or through intermediaries or other, you know, back channels, things like that, and why Doha, as opposed to anywhere else?

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

Well, a lot of questions. Israel and Hamas don't talk to each other. They've never talked to each other directly. They've never sat in the same room together. I, as an Israeli citizen involved in back channel negotiations, have directly negotiated with Hamas. In fact, I've even spoken to Hamas from sitting in the headquarters of the department responsible for hostages and prisoners in enemy territories from within the Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv, where they asked me to call Hamas. And I called Hamas and then offered the phone to the people I was sitting with in the room in the Ministry of Defense, and they turned red and refused to take the phone, of course, so there is no direct contact, which is why there is a need for mediators. The two most natural mediators to mediate between Israel and Hamas are Qatar and Egypt. Egypt is the long term traditional mediator that has mediated multiple ceasefires between Israel and Hamas. They were the key negotiators in the Shalit negotiations, and have been involved in the relationship between Israel and Hamas since Hamas took over Gaza in 2007. Qatar is hosting the Hamas leadership, the exiled Hamas leadership, and Qatar is also a state which is funded by Hamas, and one could easily say that Qatar is a country that supports terrorism. They have hosted Taliban, they've hosted al Qaeda, they have hosted Hamas, and they have funded Hamas as well. Yet, Qatar is an ally to the United States. Those of you don't know, the largest US military base in the Middle East is in Qatar, and just this past year, the US renewed its lease with Qatar for another 10 years for its military base there. So there are a lot of interests. Qatar also flies one of the most popular airlines in the world, and sponsored the World Cup, and basically wants to be accepted around the world and bends over backwards in order to have its image made rosy with a lobbyist and PR firms hired in Washington and in most of the major capitals of the world. In the United States, which has no relation with Hamas and no ability to pressure Hamas is the natural mediator involved in these talks, because one, there are American hostages amongst the hostages taken. And two, the United States is Israel's backer, and Israel cannot survive without the United States, and I must say that President Joe Biden has taken more of an interest in the Israeli hostages than the Israeli government has. He's met with the hostage families more than the Israeli government has. He's talked about it. He's given more time. It's on his agenda, much more frequently than it is on the agenda of Prime Minister Netanyahu. The Negotiations have been going on for almost 10 months now. There was a negotiated agreement made between Israel and Hamas that brought home 110 hostages back in November. That deal could have continued beyond the seven days in which it was implemented, the agreement was that every day Hamas would issue a list of hostages that they were willing to release, including a women and children. And on the last day, Hamas issued to Israel a list that included, apparently, some names of people were believed to be dead, Israel looked at that as a violation, a breach of the agreement, when I say Israel, I mean Netanyahu, his government and the army at that point where were eager to get back to the war, and rather than carrying out the agreement for more days, bringing home whatever hostages, Hamas was willing to release Israel went back to war. Blamed Hamas for breaching the agreement, went back to war. What's important to note is that from the very beginning of the war, from at least the first month of the war, Hamas was willing to make a deal to release all the civilian hostage that that it was holding all the women, the children, even wounded and elderly, they were willing to release. They were mostly interested in holding those who were defined as soldiers, both young women soldiers and young men soldiers. Those were the people they wanted to hold. The price that they were demanding was determined by Israel to be too much at that point. They were not talking about a permanent end to the war in the first two months of the war, but they were talking about a large release of  Palestinian prisoners. And the Israelis, the government reviewed that as a form of surrender, and they didn't want to make the deal. They believed that the military pressure would free the hostages. Everyone was dreaming of antibi like missions that the special forces would go in, find the hostages and sweep them into freedom. So far, seven hostages have been released through military missions. One of them, the first one was actually because the young woman who was abducted not by a Hamas person, but by a civilian in Gaza who took her as as a sex slave, actually left her to go shopping for some food stuff, and she convinced him to leave her phone, saying she was going to play games. And she then called the Israeli army, and they came and found her. She was the first hostage who was brought home. The military pressure has not released the hostages, and it's not advanced the negotiations on the hostages. In fact, what people don't know is that the deal that was done in November was actually delayed for more than two weeks as a result of the military pressure. Because the deal was being worked out through the Egyptians. They were about to receive a list of names that Hamas was willing to release, and then when Israel started surrounding the city of Gaza and entered toward the Shifa Hospital in Gaza. Hamas froze the process for two and a half weeks. So military pressure has not worked here, and we know now, more than 10 months into the war, that the military pressure has in fact, also killed hostages. The six hostages who just recovered their bodies were taken alive into Gaza. They were very likely killed by Israeli bombs. That's what's believed. I don't know if we'll ever know for real, for sure, what happened to them. They may have been killed by Hamas, but the talk around town here is that they were in fact, killed by Israeli bombs.

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

That is incredibly devastating, and makes such a case for this, you know, diplomatic negotiations, not to mention, of course, that these successful Entebbe style missions that you mentioned have netted significantly high civilian casualties as well. You've been doing peace, building work, and researching peace and its obstacles for a long time. Obviously, every case is different, but I'm curious what makes this conflict and these negotiations different from the ones that have come before and so challenging.

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

Yeah. Well, the obvious level is that we are experiencing we, I mean, Israelis and Palestinians, are experiencing the biggest trauma that we have experienced in 76 years. For Israelis, and I think this is for Jews around the world, or Jews who identify as Jews around the world. October 7th, more Jews were killed at one place at one time than at any time since the Holocaust. And to be honest, we in Israel have not left October 7th. We're still there. The stories are still being told every day. We're reliving it every day in the media, on the television, in our newspapers, on the radio, the victims of October 7th, having their stories told and new discoveries made every day. So we haven't moved to October 8th. We're still living that trauma. And Palestinians, with now over 40,000 people killed in Gaza, the numbers are probably more likely above 50,000 because there are thousands unaccounted for people underneath the rubble of buildings that have been demolished. 2 million people are homeless in Gaza, with no places to go back to. Gaza has been destroyed. Has been flattened. Its civilian infrastructure demolished. Schools, universities. There were seven working universities in Gaza before the war. Now there are none. They've all been flattened, governmental institutions, buildings, you name it, streets, roads, water infrastructure, sewage infrastructure. Gaza is a humanitarian disaster, and Palestinians, whether they be in Gaza, inside of Israel, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or in the Palestinian diaspora, are reliving the Nakba of 1948 for them, it's revisiting the catastrophe that happened to them 76 years ago, and they are reliving it every day. The pictures that they see both in their telegram accounts and in Whatsapp on Instagram and in other places on Arabic television stations, is much more graphic than anything you will ever see on an American television network or in Israel. In Israel, we don't see the humanitarian disaster of Gaza whatsoever. We see the physical damage that's been done to Gaza, but we don't see the human suffering. And now people are dying there from disease. There are hundreds of 1000s of people there with dysentery, with diarrhea and other skin ailments that are spreading. And there's hepatitis spreading there. It's now given the first cases of polio in Gaza disease that was eradicated from the world. So this is a total disaster, and that's the prism through which we in Israel and in Palestine are viewing the world. Now, what that means, essentially, in terms of looking at each other, is that Israelis and Palestinians are incapable of thinking coherently about it tomorrow, in which peace might be an option, yet there are two big surprises that's come out of this war so far. One of them is the rebirth of the two state solution. I've been a supporter of the two state solution since 1975 when I was starting university, and yet I thought in the last years that it was no longer alive, that it was dead, it was no longer a viable option, and all of a sudden it's back in front of us. And there are now, I think, 153 countries around the world that have recognized the state of Palestine, and more are coming down the road, and the two state solution is what's being talked about in the international community, again, is the only option for bringing about Israeli and Palestinian peace, that doesn't mean that it's around the corner. But if there's one thing that should be clear to anyone who's coherent and rational is that this has to be the last Israeli Palestinian war. We can't keep doing this. This has to end, and there needs to be a solution. And the second surprise of this war happened on April 13, April 14, when Iran sent 340 rockets, missiles and drones to Israel, and the regional defense of alliance was born without negotiations and without agreements, and the countries surrounding Israel, including Saudi Arabia, with the help of the United States and Great Britain, defended Israel against the Iranian attack, that should be a telling sign for us about the future place where negotiations on Israel-Palestine need to take place, because the solution can be found within the region, not another Pax Americana, an American led peace process. We need the United States, perhaps, to initiate this. But the solutions for us are all in the region, creating a new architecture of stability, security, economic development, cross boundary cooperation, dealing with climate change and all the other things that the rest of the world deals with. That's where this, the Israeli, Palestinian solution, will be found eventually. So that's the good side of it. The bad side is, of course, that Israel and Hamas don't have a willingness right now to make an agreement to end the war, there are great gaps between the Israeli side and the Hamas side and what they want. And again, when I say the Israeli side, I mean Prime Minister Netanyahu and his cabinet, because the Israeli military and intelligence believe that the deal that's on the table should be accepted, but the government of Israel refuses to end the war, refuses to withdraw the IDF from Gaza, demands to have a physical presence along the Gaza Sinai border, which is called the Philadelphia corridor, 14 kilometers of road where there were smuggling tunnels and where Hamas armed itself. And that border must be secured, but it doesn't have to be secured on the Gaza side of the border; it can be secured on the Egyptian side of the border with American finance, technology and personnel supervising and monitoring that the border is, in fact, sealed. There are other solutions that need to be reached. And the other big gap between Israel and Hamas is on the issue of Palestinian prisoner releases. Hamas wants 1000s of prisoners released. Mostly they want the 600 Palestinian prisoners who are serving life sentences for murdering Israelis released. Israel is willing to release some of them. It wants a veto on the names, and it demands that all the life sentences serving prisoners would be deported forever. And Hamas does not agree to that, so the gaps remain far apart, in my view. And with this, I'll end and we can take more questions. The deal that's on the table is not a good deal, the deal that the mediators negotiated is not good, not good for Israel, not good for Hamas, because it is a six week deal in the first phase, during which time 33 hostages will be released, what they call the humanitarian release. I don't know what that means, because after 10 months in captivity, they're all humanitarian cases, but 33 hostages would be released. Negotiations would continue on expanding the ceasefire and the redeployment of Israeli forces, and negotiations would further take place on the release of Palestinian prisoners and medicinal hostages. And I don't know why this has to be drawn out over months, and why the mediators aren't putting down on the table a deal which talks about all 109 hostages in one in one pulse with the end of the war in four to six weeks and a redeployment of Israel out of Gaza. This is what needs to happen. That's the deal that needs to be on the table. We have reached the point where the mediators can no longer negotiate, and if they have integrity, they will stand up and publicize what they've been trying to do, and tell the world that they are ceasing their efforts to mediate until the Israelis and Hamas are ready and the three heads of the Israeli negotiating team, the head of the Mossad Dadi Barnea the head of the Shabak Ronen Baland the Israeli army general in charge Nitzan Alon,  should all also, if they believe that a deal could be taken and Netanyahu is blocking it, they should notify Netanyahu that they are not willing to negotiate anymore if they have integrity, unless Netanyahu gives them a mandate. One last sentence here, when David Meidan from Mossad was given the job by Netanyahu to reach a deal with Hamas for freeing Gilad Shalit, David asked Netanyahu, what's my mandate? And Netanyahu said to him, bring him home. The negotiators on the Israeli side have not heard from Netanyahu in the last 10 and a half months to bring them home. That has not been the primary directive of Israel in this war.

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

That is, I mean, exactly what it appears on the surface, but it never gets easier to hear. I want to turn to some of the dissonance between Netanyahu and the negotiators, and also some reports that we're hearing out of the Biden administration, because I think there's, you know, different reporting coming from different parties. You know, several times now you've heard from the Biden administration that Netanyahu has agreed to, oh, you know, working framework, or something like that, and that they're, they're ready to go only for Bibi to then turn around and say, "No, I didn't." One you know what is actually true? But also you know,What is the philosophy behind this? Some people think it's, you know, the US trying to force his hands. Other people think it's more that the US and negotiators have figured it out, and then Netanyahu, you know, disagrees. Um, but is this something that is damaging to you as credibility as a mediator in this process?

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

Yeah, when President Biden presented what he called the Netanyahu plan back in May, it seemed to me that President Biden went beyond what Netanyahu had, in fact, agreed to. The main point on which President Biden went beyond what Netanyahu agreed to was when he said that once the six week ceasefire begins and negotiations are ongoing, even if they don't reach an agreement on phase two, the ceasefire would stay in place. That, to the best of my knowledge, is not what Netanyahu agreed to or what Netanyahu said, and I think that Biden was trying to force Netanyahu's hand, but it soon became very clear, because in the negotiations themselves, the Israeli team put all these red lines and conditions on the table that they were told by Netanyahu to deliver to the Egyptians and the Qataris. And then Hamas simply issued statements saying that what Biden said is not what Israel agrees to, that Israel doesn't agree to ending the war and Hamas was demanding an obligation that the war would end. In fact, what I believe, and pretty much know for sure, is that the United States assured the Qataris and the Egyptians that once the ceasefire began, it would continue. It would become what Biden called the sustainable ceasefire. That's what the Qataris and the Egyptians told Hamas. And then when the Israeli negotiators came up and said, No, if the negotiations don't reach a conclusion by the end of the first six weeks, Israel will resume the war. And it was very clear that Netanyahu had no intention to end the war. Now it's very clear that even though  Secretary Blinken and President Biden both said that Israel agreed to the American bridging proposals, which we don't have all the details of, Netanyahu spoke yesterday to two different groups of families of soldiers who were killed in Gaza, who were on the right wing of the Israeli maps, Netanyahu supporters. And in those meetings, Netanyahu was quoted as saying that we will not end the war. We will not withdraw from Gaza, and Israel will remain on the Philadelphi corridor. This, I imagine, is not in full accord with what was painted as the American bridging proposals, and of course, Hamas immediately rejected it. Hamas, today, in the telegram account of Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades,the military wing of Hamas, put out a call to Egypt and Qatar to stop mediating until Israel gets serious about the negotiations, as they wrote, that's the state of the negotiations right now. The gaps are still very far apart, and I remind everyone that 109 Israeli hostages are still in Gaza, and the war continues every day, with more and more people getting killed. One thing is absolutely sure to me and clear, is that the longer Israel stays in Gaza, the more I can guarantee that there will be armed insurgency against Israeli soldiers, and Israeli soldiers will come back dead from Gaza, and the easier it is for Hamas to recruit new recruits, because they recruit their young people from bereaved families and people have lost their homes, which is almost every single person in Gaza. And while the hatred and anger against Hamas is reaching a boiling point amongst residents of Gaza, as long as the Israeli army remains in Gaza, they will have new recruits. There is no total victory over an ideology, over an idea, and Hamas is more than a government and more than a military. It is an idea, and is it an ideology and it grew out of an opposition to the occupation, out of opposition to what people believed was a peace process that was doomed to fail, and it remains that way, the only way to effectively fight an ideology like Hamas, which promises its people the glory of death for Palestine is to promise the Palestinian people that they can live for Palestine, that there is a Palestine they can live for, that there is a political horizon, there is a hope. There is something to live for. I mentioned earlier. There were seven working universities in Gaza, with 10s of 1000s of students every year studying everything from computers to law to medicine to everything, and when they completed their studies, they had no jobs and no future. And that was why there was nearly 70% youth unemployment of Gaza people under the age of 30 unemployed nearly 70% before the war. So this war didn't happen in a vacuum. There's history here that led up to where we got to. 

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

So, you mentioned how you know Hamas has said we don't want to talk anymore until you're serious and you're ready to have your negotiator actually represent what you know, the government of Israel is willing to concede. I want to talk about some of the other carrots and sticks, as one might phrase it. What can the United States do here or other intermediaries to kind of urge the parties or push the parties into it. You know, I had a question, a chat from someone who wanted to ask about the use of US military assistance, and whether you know some of the arms transfers we're seeing, or, you know, the National Security memorandum which the Biden administration issued earlier, much earlier, this year and later certified that Israel was in compliance with international and US humanitarian law, which one might argue is not accurate, and certainly members of Congress have pushed back against that assessment. So I wanted to ask you what kinds of tools do you think would actually get Bibi to the table? 

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

So it's not only Bibi and the United States has serious diplomatic tools, carrots and sticks in your diplomatic toolbox. Vis a vis Israel, the Egyptians and the Qataris have significant carrots and sticks that they could use against or with Hamas. For the United States there's the doomsday leverage. The Doomsday leverage is the political cover that the United States provides for Israel in the international arena, mostly the Security Council with the US veto. That is very significant. And the other doomsday point of leverage is also you mentioned, is the shipment of bombs to Israel to drop on Gaza and the United States could say to Israel, we're not going to fuel the war in Gaza anymore. We have your back if you're attacked by Iran, if you're attacked by Hezbollah, there are US warships right now in the Mediterranean, in the Red Sea and in the Persian Arab Gulf, there to protect Israel, and that's really important. But there is absolutely no reason why the United States should be fueling the war in Gaza at this point. And it should have been stopped, in my view, a long time ago. But this is certainly something that the US can hold over Israel and say, No more. This war has to end. You're going to end it. We're not going to provide you with those bombs anymore. And that's a blow to Israel. I don't know how much of a blow it is to the Israeli arsenal. I think that Israel has a lot of weapons stockpiled, but for Israel to be hit in that way by almost it's only ally left in the world today is devastating, and it's the kind of devastation that could actually lead to bringing down Netanyahu, if we remember back to the days of Yitzhak Shamir, when we have the massive immigration from the former Soviet Union and over policy on the Israeli Arab track in the US threatened Israel not to issue loan guarantees for Israel to have money to build housing for the million Russians who are coming. That led to the downfall of Yitzhak Shamir in the and the election of Yitzhak Rabin in 1992 that had a direct impact on the Israeli electorate. So this is very important. It could be done. The Egyptians have leverage on Hamas, because Egypt is the lifeline of Gaza. There are also 160,000 Gazans who escaped Gaza and are now living illegally in Cairo. And amongst them are Hamas people, not just civilians who ran away, you at the financial means to run away, but they're also Hamas people there. And Egypt hosts Hamas people. There's a Hamas office in Cairo. It facilitates the movement of Hamas people around the region. So there's a lot of leverage there. And the Qataris, of course, are hosting a Hamas leadership. The Qataris could say to the Hamas leadership. Your families have to pack their bags tomorrow. They're no longer welcome here. And if you don't bring agreements in the day after tomorrow, you all have to leave as well. And of course, Qatar funds their stay in Qatar, and has funded billions to Gaza over the years, so they have leverage that can be used. And I don't think it's being used. I don't think these doomsday weapons have been taken out of the diplomatic toolbox and they need to be.

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

We agree with you on that. We very strongly feel that US military assistance should reflect our values and our policy priorities. I want to talk a little bit about some of the other potential motivations in here, and you know, external forces urging Netanyahu. There's news recently, I'm sure you saw or reports, I should say, not, confirmed that former President Trump and Netanyahu had a conversation recently where Trump may have urged Netanyahu to delay the agreement, as it's obviously been hurting Democrats in the campaign. Do you see any relationship between negotiations and American politics? Obviously, negotiations and more are impacting us. But is that? Does that go two ways?

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

No, I think it's playing here. And I think that the fact that the Biden administration and the Kamala Harris campaign want this issue removed from the campaign agenda is very significant. I hope it reflects itself in the policies of President Biden. I think we've seen some pretty firm statements from Kamala Harris about the need to end the war. Ironically, we've seen similar statements from Donald Trump. Perhaps the only issue on which there is agreement between Democrats and Republicans right now is, as Trump said, to end the war quickly. Of course, Trump believes probably that there is an ultimate victory, and if Israel just bombs the hell out of Gaza, more than they've already done, that would lead to ending the war. I don't know what that man thinks. He's the most dangerous person in the world, and he's unpredictable, so we really don't know what he thinks, but I think this is part of the issue. There were rumors about the Trump Netanyahu conversation. It was denied by the prime minister's office that such a conversation took place. That doesn't mean that it didn't. There is no doubt that Netanyahu was a Republican, and Netanyahu wants Trump to win those elections. There's no doubt that when he was planning to make his speech in Congress, had President Biden not stepped out of the race, he would have been speaking in the US Congress to Donald Trump, and his message would have been, I'm your man. I'm not weak. I don't surrender. I'm going to beat them. It would have been the pumped up testosterone message that Donald Trump likes to hear. He was a little thrown off base when Kamala Harris stepped in and started rising quickly in the polls, and then had to confront the possibility that she actually might be the next President of the United States, and he had to modify his speech. But we know where Netanyahu stands, and it's entirely possible that Trump and Netanyahu agreed not to end the war, which wouldn't take very much convincing, because Netanyahu doesn't want to end the war. When this war ends, there will be an overwhelming majority for new elections in Israel. There already is, but there's an argument of, should it happen before the war ends or not? Netanyahu has lost his popularity in Israeli society. He's been gaining the polls recently, but there's still no way, if elections were held today, that he could make a coalition. No way. And an overwhelming majority of Israelis, 80 more than 80% of Israelis want a national investigation into what happened on October 7th and what led up to October 7th and what happened after October 7th, and that's a national commission headed by a Supreme Court judge with the ability to meet subpoena witnesses, including The prime minister and documents, and to issue in penalties and punishments, or indicate that they should be issued and Netanyahu doesn't want that. Netanyahu is going to try to avoid that by trying to create a governmental commission of inquiry in which the government sets the mandate and appoints the people, and basically it's a commission with no teeth, and would be meant to cover up Netanyahu's responsibility. So all these issues are very important to American relations with Israel. Israel is more dependent on the United States today than it has ever been, and that's very clear to every single Israeli.

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

I'm going to ask a question that will hopefully inject some positivity into this conversation. Obviously, it's a really, really challenging topic, and I'm sure we're still going to go back to some of the difficult elements of it. But this question comes from Ori Nir, our now retired but very beloved Vice President of Communications. No longer at APN, of course. So Ori, Hi, glad to have you on. He writes, asking about an article you wrote in January in the Jerusalem Post predicting that the trauma from October 7 will help the Israeli left gain power. Do you still believe that? And can you walk us through your thinking there.

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

Yeah, I had a piece published today in The Times of Israel called "RE-rebuilding Hope." So it's also a hopeful piece. And I have a very close Palestinian friend named Samer Sinjalawi, someone that you should definitely host. Samer is a member of the Fatah leadership in opposition to Mahmoud Abbas. He's amongst the young generation who want democracy and accountability and is against corruption and believes that the major task of the Palestinian leadership has to be to make peace with Israel. Samer visited Kfar Aza two weeks after the war, and was filmed in a documentary, I think, made by the American by the ADL. I think the film was made in which he stood up and said, I'm sorry. I'm here to voice my disgust and remorse by what happened in my name. I didn't do it, but it was done in my name, and we have crossed moral red lines that should never be crossed. And it was quite a remarkable statement, and I've spoken a lot with Samer at universities and to Israeli audiences and Jewish audiences and and other international meetings, and even Palestinian audiences, and I rediscovered something that I knew a long time ago, which is the power of remorse. If there is going to be a renewed peace process out of the trauma that we're living, it will be when Israelis and Palestinians of courage stand up and say, this was done in my name, and I'm sorry, we should never cross these moral red lines again, what we've done to each other, we should never do again. This is very powerful when I talk about rebuilding hope. It's about recognizing that even when this war is over, there will remain 7 million Palestinian Arabs and 7 million Israeli Jews living on the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. We're not going anywhere. When I made that recognition back in 1975 after spending a year in Israel on Young Judaea Year Course, I came back and tried to understand what this intensive Zionist experience was that I lived over the course of the year, and I had already known that Israel was going to be my home. One of the first conclusions I came to was that if Israel truly wants to be as it defines itself, the democratic nation state of the Jewish people. We cannot rule over another people and deny them their right to self determination that we claim for ourselves. Nor can we deny equal rights to the 2 million Palestinian citizens of the State of Israel. It simply doesn't work. We are neither the democratic nation state nor the democratic nation state, or the Jewish people, when between the Jordan River and the and the Mediterranean Sea, there is no longer a Jewish, a clear Jewish minority, and most of the Palestinians living here don't enjoy democracy. So that kind of awakening is something that needs to happen, and I believe will happen. Our problem, our main problem, is our total lack of leadership. We have no leadership of inspiration, not in Israel and not in Palestine at this point. And this is really terrible, the arena of potential politicians out there beyond Netanyahu are not inspiring and are not leaders, and are not people who can make brave decisions, because we know what needs to be done. The return of the two state solution is the best thing that can happen to all of us, and with all the obstacles in place, it can still be done. And there are formulas to make it happen, but the first prerequisite for that happening is leadership. And I believe, having been part of 40 weeks of demonstration against the attempt to overthrow our judicial system here, and then weeks and weeks and months of demonstrations since the war began here for the hostages and now for new elections, there's a whole new generation of Israelis who have risen into positions of leadership, of leading mass protest movements in Israel, and I know that amongst them is the future leadership of the State of Israel. And I know from my Palestinian friends and colleagues that I work with that there are new leaders out there who are not willing to adopt the strategy that has failed them for 76 years. My friend Samer, for instance, says, If I were the foreign minister of Palestine, I would close 100 of the 110 embassies that we have around the world, and I would open up 10s of 100 branches of the Palestinian government in towns and cities all around Israel, because Israel, The Israeli people, as Samer says, are not the enemy. They're our solution, and we will get what we need to get when we learn how to address Israeli fear. It's Israeli fear that's our enemy, and not the Israeli people. It's through working with the Israeli people that we will get our freedom. And I think that's a very positive, uplifting message, and if more people can recognize that we can find the path forward.

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

Agreed. So I do have questions from some of the chat about how Palestinians, or some Palestinians have consistently said no two states, although I will say that many Palestinians don't say that. And, you know, at times I think we're seeing polling where it's not necessarily no two states, but it's like a lack of belief that two states can happen at the most hopeless point, not necessarily about popularity of an actual two state solution. But can you speak to that question if you know…

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

There is no such thing as a one state solution if we believe there was one before October 7th. October 7th proves that it's not a viable reality, that we can live together in peace in one single state, a unitary state, a civilian state, a democratic secular state. It doesn't exist in reality. We have to face the fact that for more than 100 years, Jews and Arabs have been killing each other in this land over territory and identity. It's who owns this land and who gives its identity to it and who takes its identity from it. It's really interesting. If you read the Israeli and Palestinian decorations of independence, they are mirror documents of each other, and they both claim that they are the people of this land, and they have given their identity to this land, and they have taken their identity from the land and their mirror images of each other. So if the war people have been willing to fight and die over whose land this belongs to? The idea that we are willing to give up our identity to create a state which does not reflect our nationality or ethnicity or our religion is on a different planet. It's not the planet in which Israelis and Palestinians live. I know many Palestinians who say one state or two states. I don't care, you Israelis negotiate between yourselves and decide and tell us what you want, and we'll accept it. Many Palestinians would prefer one state solution, because they see all of Palestine as theirs, and they would like to live in any place in Palestine. But if there was a viable two state option, most Palestinians would say, Yes, I'll take it. If it's going to guarantee me my freedom, my equality, the end of the Israeli occupation and my suffering, I'll take it. And I think there's a great deal of validity in that statement that we Israelis need to negotiate amongst ourselves before we even start negotiating with the Palestinians, because we are deeply divided in this society on what kind of solution, if any, we want to the Palestinian issue. So I think it's, it's, it's a very valid argument when Palestinians say, we don't know what you want, tell us what you want, and then we'll know how to deal with it. So I really think that's a challenge to us. And I think that models like "A Land for All or "Two States One Homeland" provide a lot of inspirational answers on how we Jews can see the whole land of Israel as being our homeland, and how Palestinians can see all the land of Palestine as being their homelands without necessarily having sovereignty over all of it. We can have a differentiation between citizenship and residency rights, just like exist in the European Union, you could be a Polish citizen living in Berlin with all the rights to a German living in Berlin except the right to vote for the German parliament. You vote in the Polish parliament, but you live in Berlin as an equal citizen there or resident. We could have a similar situation here eventually, where there are Palestinians living in Israel as equal rights, not only the Palestinian citizens of Israel, but also Palestinians from Gaza, from the West Bank, from the diaspora, as well as Jews legitimately living in the state of Palestine. I like to remind people that when we read the Torah Portion every Shabbat, every week, we're not telling the stories of the beaches of Tel Aviv. We're telling the stories of the hills and the valleys of Judea and Samaria. That's where our heritage lies. And whether there is a border, a green line, which is a hard border, an open border, it doesn't reduce the reality that that's part of our ancient heritage, just as Palestinians Haifa, Ramle, Acre, and  Lud are part of their homeland and part of their heritage and part of their memory. So maybe there are ways that we can find to expand the current ideas that we know of as the classic two state solution, and find other ways of implementing it. In the plan written by Ehud Olmert when he was negotiating with Mahmoud Abbas back in 2008 he, for instance, proposed that the Old City of Jerusalem would have no sovereign and there wouldn't be an Israeli flag. There wouldn't be a Palestinian flag over the Old City of Jerusalem, which is one square kilometer, a tiny piece of land where all the holy places are, there would be five countries that would serve as guardians of the Old City: the United States, Israel, Palestine, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. And it's a brilliant idea because it recognizes the Jewish connection and the Muslim connection, and also makes Jerusalem, the important part of Jerusalem, the Old City of Jerusalem, into an international city where everyone can have a piece of it, but we don't own it. Jerusalem belongs to the world. It doesn't belong to one of us.

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

That's so well said, and what a beautiful vision that you paint. Not to bring it back down to less beautiful ideas. I have a couple questions in the chat from folks. One, I think we can answer quickly, because you did speak about this bit. But I do have a question from someone who asks about whether or not any dispute over oil rights plays a part in this conflict. I'm just going to go ahead and take that, which is, there is no oil there.

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

No we don't have oil. We have gas fields. And there is a Gaza gas field that Ariel Sharon granted the rights to, to Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians. And they have negotiated agreements with other gas companies in the world to do the drilling. They thought that they had an anchor customer in the Israeli Electric Corporation that was going to be the main purchaser, and made the investment of about two $50 million to drill the gas. But the Israeli Electric Corporation pulled out of that deal many years ago, and the owners of the field, I think it's Shell today, but I'm not 100% sure, are not going to spend two $50 million when a war is going on and with a gas can't be safely pulled out of the ground and sold to customers around the world, and the Palestinians are really banking on the Gaza gas field as part of their economic miracle that will save them in the future.

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

Thank you. Yeah. So like you said, this war is about identity and that connection to the land. So that brings me, you know, to one of the potential, one of the kinks, we should say, in this EU version of Israel and Palestine in the future, and that is violent settlers and how to deal with them. Obviously, we can get into the executive order that President Biden had issued earlier this year, and the ways that that's been implemented. So we can talk about that briefly, and we have, like, very little time left, so I'm sorry

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

Do you mean the immediate response to violent settlers, or in future peace...?

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

I think in a future agreement, because right now we have, the United States is putting on some significant pressure, and we're sanctioning violent settlers and those who support them.

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

And don't forget the International Criminal Court in The Hague as well. 

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

Yes, that's although less enforceable within Israel, but sure, exactly.

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

It makes Israel a lot smaller for a lot of people who are going to have warrants of arrest against them issued in any event, in the long term, presuming that we do reach a two state solution, and there is an agreed border between Israel and Palestine, it will involve annexing a maximum of 4.4% of the West Bank in exchange for equal territory within Israel. I say 4.4 because that's the maximum amount of land available within Israel proper that could be swapped with the Palestinians, but that would include between 75 and eight 80% of the settlers. Remember, the overwhelming majority of settlers live in two settlements, which are ultra orthodox, Beitar Illit and Modi'in Illit. That's the bulk of the settlers with the but the main problematic population are the ones who live on the central mountains of the West Bank and in Samaria, and they are the most problematic and the most violent of them. And they're simply going to have to be two things that are done. One is that in the agreement, there has to be an agreement of the State of Palestine that Jews can live in the state of Palestine, it is not reasonable to expect that the state of Palestine would be you nine Jews should be welcome to live there, not as settlers, not as armed militia, not as people with special rights, but living under Palestinian sovereignty, under Palestinian law. I think that there will be very few settlers who will agree to that. But nonetheless, as a matter of principle, Palestine, as a democratic country in the future, should have a Jewish minority. Minorities are good for democracies. They help us be better democracies. And Palestine should have one in salaam Fayyad, the former Palestinian Prime Minister, once said to me, we would welcome Jewish citizens of our state or residents of state, and we will grant them exactly the same rights that the Palestinian citizens of Israel get, which I thought was a brilliant statement to encourage Israel to grant Palestinian citizens of Israel greater freedom and greater rights. In any event, the violence settlers will have to be dealt with in a way that they understand. Their weapons will have to be taken away by the Israeli army who gave them their weapons, and they have to be notified of a time schedule that when the Israeli army will no longer be there to protect them, and they have a choice to come home to Israel proper, or to the settlements that will be part of the annex lands where they can remain in Israel, remain in Judea and Samaria, or stay there and face whatever consequences they may have so. We cannot tolerate a minority group of spoilers to prevent the people of Israel and the people of Palestine from enjoying peace. We were not serious about this enough during the Oslo peace process, and this is one of the lessons of that failed process. There are many lessons of the failed process, but dealing with the spoilers with much more determination and much more clarity is something that's going to have to be dealt with when we have negotiations again. There are also Palestinian spoilers who use violence and will use violence to destroy the chances of peace as well.

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

Yes, well, the right on both sides have clearly fueled each other, and that's obviously part of what's gotten us to this situation. Speaking of the right, we have very little time left, and this is a huge question, so I apologize, but I'm going to combine a few questions from the chat. The crux of it is, does this conflict help preserve or does this current war help preserve Netanyahu's political situation? Obviously, he's highly unpopular, but at the same time, you know he's able to prevent elections from happening. We know that he needs to stay in power in order to, you know, prevent his own personal legal troubles from catching up to him. So can you talk a bit about that? Is this personal, you know, desire to save himself part of why we haven't seen a deal yet.

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

Yeah, there's no question that Netanyahu is putting his own personal political interest ahead of the interest of the country. And the problem of Netanyahu is not his legal problems. That's the least of it. The corruption that he represents in Israeli societies, is the minority of the problem that we face with Netanyahu. Netanyahu strategically designed and implemented a plan which removed the peace option with the Palestinians from the table when you consider that we had five rounds of elections where the issue of Palestine wasn't even discussed. The two state solution wasn't discussed at all. Instead, we were talking about managing the conflict, or reducing the conflict, or anything but resolving the conflict, and the empowerment of Hamas and Gaza and the weakening and delegitimation of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank was Netanyahu's strategy, which he successfully implemented to remove Palestine from the agenda. He succeeded in convincing Donald Trump, and who managed to, surprisingly convince the Emirates and Bahrain to do the Abraham Accords, in which they tossed the Palestinians under the bus and broke out of the Arab Peace Initiative, which the Arab states help from to from 2002 until today, and Netanyahu, was able to convince a majority of Israelis and a majority of people in the world that the Palestinian issue could be managed. We don't have to deal with it. But October 7th changed that. On October 7th, the Palestinian issue blew up in our faces, and we will never return to a situation where we can ignore it, never so the problem with Netanyahu staying on is not his legal problems, but his continued commitment to prevent Israel from ever negotiating a genuine peace with the Palestinian people, and that will limit our ability to make peace with the Saudis and other Arab countries and Islamic countries. And we need to do that. We need to get rid of Netanyahu, because he endangers our security. He endangers the well building and the moral code of the State of Israel. He is a disaster. He is a person who believed, before October 7th, and he said this, that he would go down in history as the greatest leader of the Jewish people since Moses, when, in fact, he will go down as the worst leader that the Jewish people have ever had. And that's how he needs to be written in the history books. It is unimaginable, I shouldn't say unimaginable, because it is actually imaginable, but it is disastrous to imagine that, after all he has done and his refusal to take responsibility and to deflect the responsibility for October 7th on to everyone except himself, mainly the Israeli army and the intelligence, who are definitely to blame for what happened on October 7th. He is the head, and he is responsible, and if Israel reelects him to be Prime Minister, that's a signal to me, as someone who's dedicated my life to this country and has been living here for 46 years that this place is not repairable, and that will be the saddest day in my life. I can't believe that we could arrive on that day. We shouldn't-- We should never be there. We should never allow this man to be re-elected as the prime minister of this country, and that's the task of every single one of us in America, and here to ensure that this guy can never be back as the leader of this country.

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

I wholeheartedly agree. So I'm going to, I think, think this is a perfect point to end, because I know we have a lot of questions left and a lot more we could talk about, but I think that each question is going to require another like, 20 minutes, and I don't want to keep folks for that long. So thank you. 

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

Everyone can contact me if you want. My email is gershonbaskin@gmail.com one word, I'm on Twitter and on X, whatever it's called. On Facebook, on Instagram, you can find me easily, or Whatsapp.

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

Wow. Well, thank you for that very generous offer. You've already been so generous with your time, and now I know we're all going to be bugging you with our questions, because this, unfortunately, doesn't seem to be resolving as quickly as I think we had all hoped it would. I know when we scheduled this webinar, in our hearts, we were all really, really crossing our fingers that we'd be having a different conversation about how this hostage release deal had been achieved. So next time we speak, we will be

 

Dr. Gershon Baskin: 

 

Inshallah. 

 

Madeleine Cereghino:

 

Yes, so thank you to everyone. Thank you. Gershon. See you all next time.

 

Yossi Alpher is an independent security analyst. He is the former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, a former senior official with the Mossad, and a former IDF intelligence officer. Views and positions expressed here are those of the writer, and do not necessarily represent APN's views and policy positions.

August 14, 2024- Americans for Peace Now strongly condemns the Israeli government’s announcement of approval for a new settlement, Nahal Heletz, between Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The settlement is deliberately designed to disrupt the contiguity of an eventual Palestinian state, as acknowledged by Finance Minister and settler leader Bezalel Smotrich.

In formally approving the first new settlement to be announced since 2017, the Israeli government is defying the Biden Administration and the international community, who rightfully insist that new settlements are an obstacle to a resolution of the conflict. The location of this settlement also encroaches on the Palestinian village of Battir, home to ancient hillside agricultural terraces that have been designated a world heritage site by UNESCO.

It is clear that people around the world– and the mediators sent to the table in Doha– want an agreement to stop the violence in Gaza and to bring the Israeli hostages home. But the general understanding of how to get from point A (calling for a deal) to point B (getting the Israeli government and Hamas to agree to a deal) remains murky. To shed some light on the circumstances surrounding this round of negotiations, we sat down with Dr. Gershon Baskin, a veteran peace activist and longtime researcher of the Israel/Palestine conflict and peace process.

Maxxe Albert-Deitch is Americans for Peace Now's Strategic Communications Coordinator. Prior to joining APN, she worked as a historian, focusing on research and projects engaging in ethnohistory, archaeology, and conflict transformation in Israel and Palestine. She earned a Master’s degree in History from the College of William and Mary.

Stop for a moment.

Take a deep breath.

Exit out of your social media apps. Yes, even Instagram– the cute dogs and the memes about Mr. Pommel Horse Guy and the endless barrage of photos of hostages who are still missing and Palestinian kids who are starving will still be there when you log back in.

Count to ten, or thirty, or sixty. However long it takes to slow your thoughts.

Tomorrow will be, according to many, the saddest day in the Jewish calendar– it’s Tisha B’Av, when we remember the destruction of both Solomon's Temple by the Neo-Babylonian Empire and the Second Temple by the Roman Empire. It’s a fast day– we’re meant to reflect on the hardships that the Jewish people have endured. Some communities focus on just the destruction of the Temples. Others expand the meaning of the day and talk about the Holocaust, the expulsions from England and Spain, the deaths of martyrs and prophets throughout Jewish history and mythology alike.

Madeleine Cereghino  00:00

Welcome to this Americans for Peace Now webinar. I am Madeleine Cereghino, APN’s director of government relations. Since October 7th, the Israeli government has launched a massive annexation effort– displacing Palestinians, expanding existing settlements, and doubling the resources available to settlements– “legalizing” more than 70 illegal outposts along the way. Under Netanyahu and Smotrich’s governance, emboldened settlers have essentially been granted carte blanche for land seizure, crop and livestock destruction, and violent altercations with Palestinians– all with minimal consequences.

 

To discuss these alarming updates, we are joined by Lior Amichai, the executive director of our sister organization, Shalom Achshav (Peace Now), which has recently released a report detailing the recent annexation effort.

 

Let’s begin with the findings of the report. Can you give us an understanding of the situation in the West Bank? What do you see as the main drivers behind the significant increase in the establishment of new outposts, the advancement of construction plans, and the rise in settler violence? Can you shed light on the factors contributing to this, and are there specific policy changes or political dynamics within the coalition that may have influenced these troubling trends? And, following the 10/7 terrorist attacks, have you observed a further uptick?

 

Lior Amihai  03:09

So many things are going on while rightly so, the major focus is on Gaza and perhaps on escalation or things that could happen from who knows what Iran is, Hezboll and the things that are already happening in the north of Israel and South Lebanon, etc. Nevertheless, there is another drama that's happening, and that is what the Israeli policy towards the occupied territories is, and specifically its annexation efforts in the West Bank. And this report that we highlighted, or that we just published, sort of summarizes the most significant "achievements" of this government that is doing in the occupied territories in order to advance them. Is there background noise that's happening? We are just having in the parallel room just next to me, they are just finishing another conference of activists-- is the noise okay?

 

Madeleine Cereghino  04:07

you're coming through clearly. Thank you.

 

Lior Amihai  04:09

Okay, good. So if it does cut through, please tell me, and I'll ask them to be slightly quiet. I think what is really significant about this is in it, of course, it has implicate wider implications on Gaza in the on the possibility of ending this war and returning of the hostages. And of course, on the grander scheme of things, you know, the Israeli Palestinian conflict and possibly the Israeli Arab conflict, and, of course, the tensions with Iran. But nevertheless, this is a big drama, and it's happening in things that are going, many of them slightly unnoticed. Some are getting so little more attention, but nevertheless, this is a big drum now, since this war began, and I'm going to try to sort of highlight what we highlight in our report that. It's very short so you can read them, because it summarize all the key events. And each one of these, you can go and dig deeper, and we have like, small reports on each one of them. But what we've seen so this is since the war began, basically, is that settlers established 25 new settlements, as we term them as outposts, so unofficial recognized Israeli settlements. Now this is huge. This is 25 new communities have been established since the war began. So while Israel is at war, at efforts that settlers are taking action and establishing communities. And of course, the whole system is supporting this. So the military is not enforcing its law on it or its orders on it. They're not evacuating them in the country. They're protecting them, etc. Roads are on a massive scale. Have been opened up, have been paved. Dozens of miles of roads are being built and were built since the war began, and just these two things together, outposts and roads have, of course, what we put our focus on, severe political significances. They also have directly effect on Palestinian communities and livelihood and on the occupation levels that they feel. So once you have a road to an outpost, a new outpost, and a road to it that prevents Palestinians who work the land near to enter or Palestinian communities, it harms their freedom of movement and such. It leads to massive settler balance, which I'll also touch about, etc. So we've got these two major things that are directly on the ground. The government also declared 25 or 24,000 dunams of land as what they term state lands. State plans is public land. It means that it's taking land and saying, Oh, this land began belongs to the public, and the public is the state of Israel. And we know that these lands were, are or will be allocated for the use of the interest of settler and settler groups and settlements etcetera. This is just to give you. This is half of the amount that was declared since the Oslo Accords and to date, so half of the amount that the Government of Israel declared as state plans since the 1990s since 1992 to this day, 50% of it was during since the war. The government also advanced nearly 9000 housing units within existing settlements through the planning procedures, something that we systematically follow, again, very a large amount, it recognized five new settlements. Now, until a couple of years ago, the official policy of the state of Israel that it doesn't establish new settlements. Therefore, the phenomena of the outpost, we seeing the, you know, the the illegal settlements, or the unauthorized settlements, which are the outposts. Now, you know, just another government decision. Five new settlements are established. They're also in the process of recognizing unauthorized outpost as official settlements. They did that to three of them and and this is in the wider, again, the policy of the government, and is, by the way, preceding previous governments, but recent ones that all outputs this government has put significant, significant emphasis on this is that all the outposts are eventually going to be legalized some way or another, and they are in the process of this. And three of them, they did legalize as neighborhoods of existing settlements. This is one of the ways that they do that 70 of these outposts, the government is transferring funds to them. Now this is officially, now, you know, this is, I'll just say a word about this, because we argue and we prove and we show that the government is supporting, materially wise and financing outposts since they're established, basically through many ways, through regional councils and such. It never did so directly like this. Now the government made a decision to fund 70 outposts, unauthorized outpost by government funding. So now the ministry is funding an unauthorized or an illegal outpost, according to Israeli Law, directly, just because they're on a list that they make. So they wrote, okay, these 70 outposts, whatever, whichever outputs we put on this list, the government will now find--  this is law. And so this is what they did. This is This is unprecedented. This is the first time it happened. They also established settlements in Hebron, which is always dramatic. I won't go into that, but because Hebron is a Palestinian cities, apart from East Jerusalem, which a lot of things are happening there as well, which I won't deal with, unless you want me to, but Hebron is... so East Jerusalem and Hebron are both the only cities Palestinian cities where there are settlements within them directly. And so another settlement was established in Hebron. So. I'll just highlight a few more things. One finance wise, the government is exploding the settlements with money. Smotrich-- we showed leaked statements or speaking into his crowd, and we leaked this to the New York Times. We recorded it, and we gave them to them, where he says that 7 billion, this is nearly, let's say 8 billion would be about. So nearly $2 billion are now being transferred approved government funding to roads for settlements in a five year plan. So this is a lot of investment, and I'll say why this is so significant. This is also so what I said before, these unauthorized roads that they built, or the illegal roads that the they're building, have a significant effect on Palestinian livelihoods, etc, the seven, the $2 billion roads that the government is funding for settlements. This is sort of the heart of the or this is the, the core policy that needs to be done in order to to establish settlements, settlements because they're in an occupied territory, because they're deep in the West Bank, many of them, the you know, the Israeli public doesn't want to go there. When does the Israeli public goes? When do they go and live to the settlements? When there's a new road, a nice road, a highway becomes then settlements become suburbs. And the settlers know this, and we have published reports over this. In this history, like in we've several reports on this, showing that once you have a big highway, a new road, then the settlement grows significantly. They also established. You know, there's other funding that we can I can mention millions of dollars or shekels that going to settlements as such. The other thing, the last thing that I'll say before maybe I'll just, you know, I won't talk about settler violence if you want, because there's so much you can say, but I'll just say, in a sense, about subtler violence is that it's, it's, you know, the most cruel thing that you know one could imagine. And it's getting, I think, more international awareness to this one, due to the sanctions that are being posed by the United States and others on certain settlers, but also in the ICJ decision just from was it two weeks ago, or something like that? But also because they are a political tool, or a tool to achieve political ends, and they use such a violence in occasions where other mechanisms of taking control over Palestinian territories or the occupied territories is not at hand, and also to intimidate the Palestinian population. And this is just going, you know, it's, it's a regular routine in the most intensive way and in the place right now we're really since the October 7, it's not clear anymore how much you know the distinguish between settlers and the military is as hard as it ever was. Many of these violent settlers have are recruited by the military, are now officially part of the safeguarding community of these outposts or settlements. And of course, the scale and the violence is is as tough as it ever was. But lastly, what I want to also talk about is what I think most of you probably heard is, of course, the the annexation elements. Now, what I've said until now, these are all what we term, or the jargon terms de facto annexation, right? You build a settlement, it's you can argue that it's a de facto annexation. What this government is doing is doing it to your annexation, a legal annexation. And it's doing it by taking, basically by taking a building, a ministry for the settlements, and transferring authorities and responsibilities from the military to that ministry. And Smotrich is that minister. So he's the Minister of Finance. He's also minister of the settlements. And he established the settlement division. And the settlement division is responsible for settlers and land issues. And within this ministry, within this settler division, you have legal advisors, I think 26 who are civilians, who work for his ministry. And you have, so you're basically, basically established the ministry of settlements structure to the head of it, and you have the settlement division responsible for this. Now, why is this so significant because now you have, for example, two legal two different legal advisors for the West Bank. You have military legal advisors who are responsible for Palestinians, and you have civilian legal advisors who are responsible for settlers and land issues and such. So. And you know, when you talk to legal experts, they tend to highlight that, you know the occupation is, you know the mandate of Israel to occupy the territories is from international law. And even you know in the military that you know the Civil Administration, the military body that is responsible for Palestinian issues or civilian issues, knows that it has to regard that. It has to regard it, you know, it's, it's, it's, it's not a question. They know that they have to regard international law. And when they justify the their policies, which are, you know, settlement policies, and we argue, we, you know, criticize them, and we showcase them and we highlight them. We say how bad they are. They have to argue it in international law terms, and they justify it through this. When they take private Palestinian land, they say, Oh, well, it's for security issues. They need to take that into consideration. They can't otherwise. And in few places, it challenges them. Now it's much more severe than this, because now these civilians, these legal advisors, don't have to take any of this into account. They, on the contrary, their only interest, or their main interest, or their main obligation, is to fulfill the interests of the minister or of the Israeli public, because they're not committed, they're not part of the military occupation anymore. They're now a ministry of the State of Israel. Now I'll say that I'm turning this to ministry. Of course, Smotrich and the Israeli government spokespeople will say, Oh, it's not a military. It's not a new ministry. You know, peace now is is lying about this. But I will argue that what we revealed in The New York Times was that the Government of Israel knows that it can't today, in today's climate, annex the occupied territories. And so what they're doing is what they did since the start of the occupation, was to sort of Yeah, Israel bluff or will fool the international community. We're not building new settlements. It's an outpost, right? That's the argument, right? They're only outposts. They're small, they're insignificant, they're illegal, or even according to Israeli law. And then time comes and they retractably legalize them, and they become full settlements. What's happening now with annexation? They're doing annexation. They build this new ministry, but it's not a new ministry. It's a ministry within the minister of defense. And it's not a new department for settlement division. It's within, it's under the civil administrations. It's part of the military. But what was and but we know, and the people who are in the details, know that actually they have these authorities, which differentiates them from the military, and that it's, it's in in, in fact, a new ministry in, you know, in its essence, and what we revealed in The New York Times is that Smotrich said it in his words, which makes it much more easier for us to make This argument, because Smotrich basically said, or exactly said, Look, we couldn't annex it right now in today's climate, so we annexed it, and today it's annexed. And the other significant thing that he said, that the highlight, is that Netanyahu is fully on board. So Netanyahu is supporting this. And it's not just he's led by Smotrich. It's not just that. It's not just doing things and you can't and snow can't stop him. Sources is saying Netanyahu is on board, is fully on board, and he's supporting this full heartedly now. So these are, like, the major things that are happening on the ground. And of course, they have a lot of implications, and maybe we'll want to discuss them. I'll just say that they have a lot of implications on Palestinians and human rights issues first and foremost. And from our perspective on the political scheme is a force. It's a significant for the two state solution in Israel's relations to these territories, and, of course, in the prospering of ending this war, which seems much harder when Israel is arguing and making actions in order to say, well, the two state solution is off the table forever and will always occupy these these territories.

 

Madeleine Cereghino  19:13

Thank you, Lior, you've given us quite a lot to digest. I think I'd like to jump in to the legal elements that you touched on just now first, can you start before we really get into it? I had a question about from someone about where these kinds of settlements are occurring, whether it's area A, B or C, and I think if you could talk one where it's occurring, but also about the differences in the three areas and their administration, and what has changed from the administration under the guise of what Oslo envisioned it to now that we have this, you know, Ministry of settlements, as you say, and the kind of changes that have occurred under Smotrich. Much, yeah, if you could just give us a kind of a rundown there.

 

Lior Amihai  20:05

So look, I think you can get really nuanced and detailed about it, so, but I'll try not to do that. I'll try to be in the bigger picture. Because I think in the details it's, it's really difficult and hard to follow, but, but basically saying that until Oslo, until the 1990s then Israel had the direct occupation on the, you know, on the Palestinians. And also established the system where you know you, you know you, created the Palestinian Authority as an interim government, you know, before a Palestinian state. And this interim period, which was supposed to last for five years, decided that, you know, the Palestinians won't have a state immediately. It'll go through several stages, and throughout these stages they will receive more and more authorities on the ground. And the way they divided the territories, the the occupied 10 was to A, B and C, where areas a is full control of the Palestinian Authority. Area B was some control of the Palestinian Authority and full control of the Israeli security and security issues. And Area C was where, and that's where all the settlements are, and that's where 60% of the territories are, is where Israel still maintains full direct occupation now, the settlements and the outposts, and what we're seeing now, and all what I've talked to largely goes in Area C, like predominantly, it's all effective area C. Israel is terming this as you know, their fight for Area C. They're trying to take control over it and the and, and I'll say one more thing, you know, these settlements and outposts and these 25 you know, it's not like random, it's not, oh, there's an empty hilltop. Let's conquer that. It's really strategized, and it's in order to cut the West Bank into pieces. It's order to prevent development of Palestinian communities, and it's order to prevent growth of Palestinians like so community grows, then, okay, we'll block that, and we'll build a sub, an outpost there, and there'll be subtler violence, and we'll take their land and such. And this government took this a further step. And just think it was a couple of weeks ago or just recently, also decided to take authorities on demolition of Palestinian houses in quite a large portion in Area B. And again, you can go into the details, but this is a part of the Oslo Accords Netanyahu when he became prime minister back in 1996 installed this element into the courts where there was a a big portion, think it's about 40,000 acres. I'm reminding the that the Palestinian Authority had the authority to plan there, but Israel did not allow them to plan there, so something like that. And but throughout the years, Palestinian Palestinians still build there. And now they're saying, oh, Israel has the authority to demolish the Palestinian houses there the Palestinians built over the years. This is something that was never in Israel's authority to do. On the contrary. So now they're also taking control over areas a certain area B, that they didn't do so in the past.

 

Madeleine Cereghino  23:26

Thank you. So what we're seeing really is not just that kind of, like you said, creeping annexation, where we're seeing ongoing establishment effects on the ground, but now there's legalized elements to it coming. You know, not that annexation, not that the settlement construction and demolitions weren't coming from the top down, but now we're seeing it as like a really legally mandated structure. That's troubling to say the least. I did want to talk a little bit more about this kind of legalizing of outposts. And you mentioned that you know, settlements aren't chosen random, or aren't necessarily randomized. They're they're part of the larger strategy. Is that also how the legalization of outposts works, and what exactly you know goes into that.

 

Lior Amihai  24:21

Okay, so again, if we go really briefly, then the Oslo Accords, when Israel signed the Oslo Accords, Israel also said that it won't build any more settlements. And indeed it stopped. This was, of course, I know, officially Israel for a very long time, let's say like this, officially, Israel didn't build new settlements in the occupied territories. It just didn't, since they are still upwards. But then immediately after it said that two things happened. One is that the settler population grew dramatically, predominantly because of the roads and the bypass. Was in the highways that it built for these settlements as due to the Oscar cores. And the second is that dozens and hundreds of settlements were established, but were termed outpost and unauthorized. And for many years, the entire world was looking into these outposts, and the Government of Israel was saying, Oh, look, they're really small. They're insignificant. They're not official part of the State of Israel. They have no political significance for a two state solution. And don't mind them, like, let's go back to the negotiations and talk about the big picture. And don't mind these outposts, but they were being established like, you know, mushrooms after the rain, just happening constantly. Now and again over the years. Israel official statement was that these are illegal in at some point, I think it was 2017 or so, Israel changed its policy. They said, You know what? We're going to legalize some of them, and whoever we can, we'll legalize those that are not on private land, we'll try to legalize and and so on. And then what we're seeing now is sort of the peak of this policy, and what this government is doing now, which has never done before. It's one systematically trying to legalize all of these outposts, so they're building so now there's so all of these outposts are now saying our policy is to legalize all of them, and it's doing so by officially legalizing them and by contributing finances to those that are still illegal. And now they've established this big lease list of 70 outposts which we don't know, I think we don't know the the term that wasn't published with settlements, which outposts are on this list. But it's pretty much all dominant the or it's, it's almost all of the the community outposts. And now they're funding them directly, through millions of shekels through ministry governments. What they're also doing is establishing dozens of outposts that are also illegal but are known as agricultural farms. And these agricultural farms, why are they so significant? Because the settlers, the settler leadership, study this in their own words. And if you heard of Amana and their leaders, they've zambish. They basically said it look, in order to take over, to build an outpost or to build a settlement, you need a couple dozen people, a couple of dozen families. You need infrastructure. You need finances. We have another trick. Let's build these outbursts. Well, the purpose is to take over, control over the territory by just having one family there. And we'll take we'll build these farms, which are farms of one families, or of one family, or couple families or one individual with a few hilltop youth, and will throw them at certain places. And they'll not only take the hilltop that the the farm is built, but they'll also work the lands around them. And they're taking thousands of dunams of land, in practice, on the ground, and preventing Palestinian access to these territories and a huge contribution to settler violence and and friction between the populations is due to these out these outposts as agricultural farms. And the government, of course, is establishing them systematically and since 2017 but very much so in recent years and again, since the war. These of these 25 outposts, I think roughly 20 of them are agricultural farms.

 

Madeleine Cereghino  28:46

Thank you. I want to come back to the issue of agricultural farms and settler violence. But before we do, um, you know, you've mentioned a couple times now the government directly funding outposts. I know we've talked about the nearly 2 billion in roads for settlements and outposts that you guys were able to uncover, but what specifically Could you share about what the government is funding within the outposts?

 

Lior Amihai  29:14

So first of all, there's the business as usual, only on steroids, and this is government funding to settlements and settler issues and and settler ideology, which the government has, really, you know, built the ministries for this. So you have, for First of all, Minister Smotrich, who is the, you know, an ideologist, you know, from the heart of the settlement and settler sort of ideologist, you know, messianic sort of settlers. Who is worked on this for many years, indicated finance minister and the minister of the settlements. So now he's not only in charge of Israel's money, he's also very easily, sort of paved the way for it to cut to the settlement because he's also the the minister within the Ministry of Defense, or, you know, as what I said here. The settler minister. So that's like, something that, something that this government is doing, which was, you know, it's on the big level, and and the other thing that they're doing, so they've built this. So they got Minister Smotrich. They have other ministers like Stroke, who's in charge of this in other ministries, and that are funding them directly, on much severe scales. And what I said before, and I'll repeat it again, is that they're funding the outposts now. You know directly, you know it's so what if it's illegal, according to Israeli law? Let's fund them. And they're transferring money to that as well. I don't know if you wanted to go into further details about but I think this is like, the like. The message is that, you know, we're not, there's nothing like we're I'll say it this way. Minister stroke, who said it was, you know, published, said, this is a miracle. We are now living miracle. And it's true, because if you're now a settler ideologist, who you know the Israeli public doesn't care for and largely speaking, doesn't care for the outposts and messianic views, doesn't care for stopping them, but doesn't care for this ideology. They are now the government. They are now living the fantasy of doing whatever they they can, and that is to finance them, to establish them, and to change the legal practice. Now, there are them things that they can do. They can't fully annex the territories, right? They know international the community, can still say this is way too much. Smotrich said yesterday, right? I don't know if you saw that. "If we could, we would starve the population of Gaza, but we can't." So there are still limitations to what they want to do. And they want, of course, to annex the territories and to expel the Palestinian population and so on. This they can do, but they can go very close, and they're now annexing them without calling it official annexation, but they're actually annexing the territories and building as many settlements as they can, and financing them and doing whatever they want.

 

Madeleine Cereghino  32:18

So I have a question in the chat, why aren't these activities being challenged in the courts? And if they are, what are the courts doing about them? Look, get into obviously, you know the dual track of trying to annex the West Bank and also trying to undermine the judiciary, and perhaps why those are parallel goals for the right in Israel.

 

Lior Amihai  32:49

Okay, so I'll start by the first thing question, and I'll go back to your point, which I think is super important. But look, it's like the the court system in Israel, first of all, they are being challenged and peace now, you know, we're the front line of challenge, trying to challenge these other human rights organizations are also doing this, of course. So the court is definitely a tool that we use and other groups use in order to prevent expose challenge government policies and actions, but it's, you know, we've learned something over the decades of doing this, and that it's, it's a very limited tool. There are few victories, or few successes, but at the end of the day, it's far from being a successful intervention in preventing settlement policies and actions that are being occurred. And there are several justifications for this, and of course, the government the courts, just don't want to go into this issue. It's such a harsh political or such a sensitive political issue for the courts to deal with. You know, they know that if they touch this issue, then you know the discourse of the government against them will be as harsh as possible. And again, the climax of it was, of course, what we've seen in the government attempts to weaken the legal system in Israel, which which is very good on some other things, just not on issues regarding to the occupation. And so the courts really don't want to do this. At some points, they do because, you know, and we can go to the several few success stories that there are two, but the largest Speaker This court doesn't want to do it. They don't want to deal with it. They find their own excuses. If it's security issues, if it's within the authorities of the government to do whatever they want, if it's to buy time, and then they allow the government to respond and not to respond, etc, and and they they really buy into, largely speaking, to the government arguments that you know that's trying to fool the system. So now. For example, the the settlement ministry. You know, they didn't build the settlement ministry, as I stated one thing, they built the ministry within the Ministry of Defense. And this whole settlement division that I talked about, which is the, basically the ministry of settlements. It's still under a military body. Now, the military body, or the military gave in a military order the responsibilities and authorities to that settlement division to do whatever they want. So the military does it. It took this response from it, but they did it under a military order. So for the courts to intervene and say that this is an illegal order is a very hard thing for the courts to do in Israel. If they'll do so, they'll be just undermined immediately. So it's so the courts, the message of the courts are very weak and very weak as sort of being understanding. So I would say they're not brave, to say the least, on this issue, and they're not taking it's not a stand that I think the courts, the courts in Israel, are willing to do these days. Now, again, we've been criticizing the Israeli courts on this issue for years, and over the years, our criticism gotten harsher and harsher, because we saw how the legal tool that we have some hopes for many years back, we saw how it's failing time and again, this is still not good enough for the settlers, and because at the end of the day, you cannot have a coherent system that disadvantages one group over the other or advances one group over the other and creates this discriminatory system where you have one Group as citizens, as the and the other as under occupation or inferior or whatever, and and some of these abnormalities are like private land rights. You cannot officially take Palestinian private land. In practice, a lot of privatizing land has been taken, but there's this. You can't do it officially. You have to find excuses in rodent for the settlers, it's not good enough. They want a coherent system where it all makes sense, where they can achieve their policies unapologetically, and they can do whatever they want. They don't need to build the settlement division under the military, but they'll say loud and loud and clear, we're building the set of the division for the settlements, and this territory is annexed, and we can do whatever you want. And yes, and if you're a Palestinian, you're not a citizen, and you'll be treated under military law or whatever, and we can be do this and this. So for this system that was so bad anyways, the settlers are trying to weaken, and this is sort of what we saw during, I want to say, last year, before October 7. But you know, it's still a big question mark, if it's not happening still to this day, and just a and just on different sort of ways, but, but, but if we won't into that, go into that, you can say, largely speaking, the the judicial changes that this government tried to do was very much so an initiative of the settlements in order that they could live or Create their fantasy of one system that enables and justifies their sort of vision for the State of Israel, which is one that is for Jews and a certain type of Jews, I would argue, not all Jews, and of course not Palestinians, will be still In their occupation.

 

Madeleine Cereghino  38:21

So I have a bunch of things that I want to talk about with you that have been raised. But let's, you know, talk about this idea of sellers wanting a very clear, you know, from the government, you know, ability to make these steps and to kind of prevent the formation of a two state solution. Because that brings me to something I did want to raise, which was, you know, the fact that a few weeks ago now, the Knesset passed a resolution rejecting the two state solution, the formation of Palestinian state, which is obviously, you know, just the embodiment of these, you know, long policies that they've been furthering on the ground. What has been the reaction in Israel to this, and do you envision other similar legislation going forward?

 

Lior Amihai  39:13

Well, on the one hand, first of all, it's it. On the one hand, it wasn't new, because this government's policy is that there will never be a Palestinian state. So in that sense, it wasn't new. I think what was, you know, what made us sort of listen to this and criticize this, and to say was one that it was also supported by the opposition, so it was supported by Parliament, who was not part of this government and and the second was that those who wholeheartedly want the different like who see the picture that Biden is seeing, and that the Americans are seeing that in order to end this war and to. The only way for Israel to go back to normalcy is through a two state solution. And if you want to end this war, if you want to return of the hostages, if you want to stop the escalation of this conflict with Iran and with Hezbollah, this is the only way out. Now, it's not a guarantee. It's not to say that. You know, if we'll have a two state solution, Israel will have this, you know, you know this. You know, all, all the problems solved. We're not there, of course, but it's an essential step in order to go to that direction. We have to have this if we want the slimmest chance to have a better future. And I would argue that, and I think Biden is arguing this. And you know, everybody who has, you know, who understands the big picture sees that, you know, yes, you know, Israel can still prosper and live in a democracy with security. You know, if we would have asked Israel in, you know, in 1949 or 1952 are you willing to accept a two state solution, and you'll have peace with all Arab states. And then Iran was not Iran today, of course, but a coalition with them to provide you with security and benefits with the United States. Who would would say no, and in today's Israel's political climate, Israel is saying no, and they're saying no, and they're doing it through Parliament, and no one, and maybe this is the third point why we got so frustrated about this. No one, largely, is opposing this. There's no opposition in Israel's government. In Israel parliament, in these are in the political system in Israel, the opposition is weak. It's an ideological and it's not challenging the government on these issues. It's challenging them on the hostages. You have to do more to return the hostages. It's challenging them on corruption. It's challenging them on the judicial challenge that the government had to do. But what is Benny Gantz vision for the State of Israel? Does anyone know what is Yair lapis vision for the State of Israel. How is he going to end this war? Does anyone know, how is so this, I think, is what's got us was in the business of the two state solution. Who sees, you know, who's fighting for Israel to go on the right path? Was so frustrated with this parliament decision to prove, you know, that saying that there will not be a Palestinian state.

 

Madeleine Cereghino  42:23

I want to inject a little hope into this conversation. I did have a question from someone in the chat, and I'm going to merge it with one of mine. You know, they asked, What are the most effective actions that peace now is currently doing? And that was kind of in response to our conversation around the courts not really being the right avenue. But before you answer that, I want to also take a minute to talk about President Biden's Executive Order, which was issued in February targeting Israeli settlers accused of perpetrating attacks against Palestinians and Israeli peace activists, and also against those who support or promote this violence. This order, you know, was crafted to have broader reaching implications, and it certainly has in subsequent sanctions that have been issued over the months. You know, they've targeted folks who not only commit these activities but farm outposts that host it, they've targeted, you know, organizations themselves, organizations that, have, you know, prevented communitarian aid from getting into Gaza crowdfunding sources. It really has been very broad reaching, and I think, troubled the government quite a bit, which is great to hear. Frankly. Do you see that having a chilling effect?

 

Lior Amihai  43:47

Okay, you started with hope, and then you asked, like a direct question, that I have to have a sincere answer. And I think that, I think that, I think that one of the most positive things, policies that the government of of the US, the American administration, took, are these sanctions. I think it's, it's long waited. I think it's and why I support it so much, because to have sanctions an individual, you can say is, is, is anti human rights, right? You know, the these settlers who who have sanctions on them, they weren't foot to try. But this is the problem, because what we're seeing is that this is a lack of confidence in Israel's legal system, in Israel's enforcement of the law and and the consequences are just too high. And when you have so much evidence, and when you see so much the settler violence, and you see that the Government of Israel is basically supporting them, encouraging them, not preventing them, not providing protection to the Palestinians, then I think it's the minimum step that could happen, and it's a big statement. And but the the lack of the problem is, or to yet, is that it hasn't had any effect on the ground. And I think it will have an effect if these sanctions are shifted significantly to settler organizations like Amana and recov or two very prominent individuals like Minister Smotrich, I will say that would also be more symbolic, because I'll say it this way, financial sanctions and individuals were willing to go to Palestinian neighborhoods and throw cocktail molotov bottles to burn houses or throw stones that risk like can kill or damage significantly Palestinian communities. Financial sectors won't stop them. They won't prevent them, if you so, that's why it's not preventing them yet. And I think much as well, he's not. He doesn't care about his finances, about his salaries, about that's he. That's not going to prevent them. It will be very symbolic that an Israeli Minister would get sanctions. It's very symbolic that the United States is sanctioning Israeli citizens. This is something that was didn't happen today, that the sentence of sanctioning Israelis has a lot of meaning in that sense, in that sense, but I think it could potentially have a much wider on the ground effect and actual material effect, if groups like Amana, reggae beam and others won't be able to have financial activities and will have to close down due To that, and then we'll actually think we'll see some and I would encourage American citizens to encourage their representatives to follow path on that avenue. But I do want to talk about hope, and because it started with hope, and I was happy you did that...

 

Madeleine Cereghino  47:02

Fair. I think you know having this mechanism that really does cut off crowdfunding. Like all you mentioned, Hebron settlement being retroactively legalized. There are violent settlers in Hebron. We know this so and we also know that American friends of Hebron funds a significant chunk of the activities there. So it's not inconceivable that sanctions could be implemented that would really undercut a major source of their funding. So I think it's helpful. But yes, please give me hope!

 

Lior Amihai  47:35

Oh yes, yes, absolutely. This is, I think, the most significant policy step that was taken that in my lifetime, apart maybe from before the Madrid Conference. And this is, I think, a significant step that the Americans took and led the international community, or parts of the international community, to follow. So this is really important. And this is really important, and this is hopeful. My only encourage, like I would also hope that this will they would go further down to those, to the organizations who are the most significant in creating this environment and system and structure that takes Palestinian land that prevents a lifted solution that leads to settler violence, etc, but going back to your hope, anyways, that you started with, it's your question. I'm not hogging the conversation on this. I think that there is, you know, it's, it's to be, to be fair and sincere. To be in Israel today is to be without hope. That is like if you're speaking to Israel, especially tonight, you know we are. This is, you know, very unusual for like, for me, to be out of the office these days. You know, we're, we don't know if Iran will attack Bucha, his ball will attack to do you know, and how far? So we're living like, direct like, these days, especially under, under fire, not to mention, of course, the north of Israel and the south of Israel, which are like, which are north, especially now, are constant attacks. And nobody in Israel knows how this will end. Nobody knows, and like some have, like we have, our vision for this will end, and most of Israelis don't follow this vision at this moment. So nobody really knows, how will this end and when and how will you return the hostages? And so to be in Israel today is to be a person without hope. The only people that have hope are those who are demonstrating to end this war because of the Israeli hostages, and their only hope is that the hostages will be returned alive and as soon as possible, and that's a very sad position for us to be as as a nation and as citizens. So this is a very despair situation that we're living in. And why? What is the hope? The hope is that there's no alternative. And. And this what we're seeing is the vision of the Israeli right wing, the settler vision, of the Messianic vision in Israel, is leading up. This is what their vision is. This is that living on the sword what it means. This is what their vision is. What does annexation look like? It's permanent occupation. What does living on the sword means? It means it means that there will always be people who are trying to resist it, and will give them excuse to fight back and fight back. And this is what they want. This is their vision of this place. They don't have a different vision. They don't envision peace with Arab states or or with Palestinians to, you know, to say, this is, this is we're living now, the secular fantasy and vision for the State of Israel. And I think we know, we see that this has immediate implications on the region, on the coast region, on Europe, on the United States, globally, etc. Of course, it has for and as Israelis support this war, for, I would argue, certainly some justified reasons. Clearly this there will be there is a fatigue, and at the end of the day, when this will be clear, this government has no vision and that this is just leading us to a dead end, people will oppose it. And now they're already opposing it in order to return the hostages, and they wanted to support and then the question would be, what next? And what do we have to do? And if we'll manage to sort of build on that and to create a fiercer opposition that will say, Look this way or the other way, we have to go to the other. We tried violence, we tried war, we tried annexation and occupation, we have to go to the other route. That will be, I think. And you know, it's, I was born in 1984 so it's before my my time. But you know, Egypt, right? It's different. But Israel's biggest enemy was in 73 and we made peace with Egypt, and there's a peace which hold on. And who would have imagined Israel today with a peace agreement with Egypt and Jordan? Just imagine the seventh of October if there wasn't peace with Egypt and Jordan, how would Israel look like? How would this war be like? How would the situation be? So I think, you know, it's it's hard to see it, it's hard to feel it, but there is hope. Is a political choice, and we don't have an alternative. And there's so much to do, you know. And you asked what we're doing now, at peace now, I think we're doing two of the most, hardest things that can be done. One is to document and provide analysis on what the government is all what the government is doing and the settlers are doing in regards to what we just briefed, you know, talked about in regards to annexation and settlements, and they're just so much to do. And we're working in a lot of fields, the word Parliament trying to analyze the finances the government is doing. We're on the ground where the legal actions, trying to see how we can challenge. We've talked about the legal challenges. We're looking into that as well. You know, how do we utilize the legal situation right now to expose and express the government so there's so much we're doing, and if you look at, you know, settler watch reports. We've never had two such established researchers in settlement watch, and they've never worked as hard as they're doing, as they're working since this government was established, and especially since October 7. And the last thing that we're doing is, I think that we have the most unappreciated and the most difficult work in Israel right now, and that is to fight for the Israelis who identify as Zionists, who identify as liberals, who care about the state of Israel, and also get and understand that Palestinians are just as equal and just as deserving. And this what we what this government is doing, and is is harmful as as it could be. And, you know, and this is a very unpopular choice to be right now, because we haven't given up on the state of Israel. We see here is our country where we want to live in, and to better be a better place. And yet we're trying to work with the public, who is in the military, who's frightened, who who doesn't believe in a two state solution, as clear as we do, it certainly doesn't believe in the settlements and this public, I would argue no one is speaking to no one because Yair Lapid is not doing this, and neither is Benny Gantz and and the more left groups that we're in complete solidarity with them always and we go and we support them physically and we know in their demons. Is an image. They're not approaching this group either. So I think we really took upon ourselves a very difficult challenge to go to this to represent these Israelis who are left, who are Zionists, who are liberal, and who just, you know, don't have a political camp at this moment. So this is what we're trying to do every day, basically. And I'll say another thing, you know, we just finished a course right now of high schoolers, you know, of nearly 20 individuals who, during the war, signed up to a Peace Now course to learn about this, I, you know, we had noise in the beginning. I don't know if you heard the noise in the beginning, because we had about 30 activists now, listening to a professor from Hebrew University on international law analyzing, you know, the ICJ decision and all the legal actions right now that are happening in regards to Israel. So there is so much we can do to work and encourage and yes, it's hard to see how this all will change. But you know, when I really think that we have, as long as we see so much value in our work, we just have to push forward and something will happen.

 

Madeleine Cereghino  56:18

Thank you, Lior, we're with you in this fight, and I can't think of a more, you know, beautiful way to close this conversation, as much as I know there's 1000 other questions in the chat that I know we could get to, but I think this is a really lovely note to end on. So, so thank you. We're with you, and I want to share the thanks from folks in the Q and A as well, who want to express their gratitude for the work you're doing.

 

Lior Amihai  56:41

And thank you. And, of course, thank you APN for all of this.

 

Madeleine Cereghino  56:44

Our pleasure. And thank you to everyone who joined us. This will be available as a recording. You can find it on our website.